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Abstract 
The household registration system (hukou) was established in the 1950s to record 
families’ and individuals’ residential information. All populations in China are divided 
into urban and rural hukou. With the transition of the Chinese economy from a planned 
economy to a market one, the hukou system has been reformed and its strict limitation 
relaxed. However, segregation between urban workers and rural-urban migrants in the 
Chinese labour market caused by the hukou system is an unresolved issue. Motivated by 
the current hukou situation in the Chinese labour market, this thesis empirically 
investigates wage discrimination, income aspirations and subjective well-being of urban 
workers and rural-urban migrants.  
Utilizing the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from 1993 to 2011, wage 
differentials between urban workers and rural-urban migrants are explored in Chapter 2. 
Unlike previous Chinese research, which has regarded occupational distribution as an 
exogenous variable, occupation segregation is considered as an endogenous variable in 
the analysis. The Brown et al. (1980) decomposition method is utilized to decompose 
wage differentials, and the estimated results are divided into four parts: 
within-occupation explained and unexplained portions; and inter-occupational explained 
and unexplained portions. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to estimate the extent to which 
wage differentials can be attributed to within-occupation or inter-occupation portions 
and the extent to which wage differentials can be explained by different observed 
characteristics. The empirical findings show that the unexplained part is higher than that 
found using the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition approach. The existence of 
wage differentials between urban workers and rural-urban migrants is mainly ascribed 
to inter-occupational wage differentials. In addition, among the total unexplained 
component, a large proportion is also due to an inter-occupation wage gap. In other 
words, rural-urban migrants do not have equal access to occupational choice.  
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between hukou discrimination and income 
aspirations. Using data from the China General Social Survey (CGSS) 2010, this 
chapter compares the income aspirations of urban workers and rural-urban migrants and 
estimates the causal effect of hukou discrimination on income aspirations. Propensity 
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score matching is utilized to match urban workers and rural-urban migrants, based on a 
range of similar human characteristics. The results from the propensity score matching 
analysis show that, although actual income aspirations of rural-urban migrants are lower 
than the counterfactual income aspirations, the difference between actual and 
counterfactual income aspirations is not significant. The reason for the insignificant 
effect of hukou status on income aspirations may be attributed to the fact that 
rural-urban migrants adapt to their disadvantaged status. In addition, it may be ascribed 
to unobserved occupational segregation.  
Motivated by the previous two chapters, Chapter 4 compares subjective well-being 
(SWB) between rural-urban migrants and urban workers, and also examines how the 
income aspirations shape their SWB. Using the same dataset as Chapter 3, rural-urban 
migrants report similar SWB to urban hukou workers. An ordered probit model is 
applied to explore the impact of income aspirations on subjective well-being. The 
results show that the income aspirations have no significant impact on SWB. The 
similar SWB between rural-urban migrants and urban residents cannot be explained by 
income aspirations, no matter which measurement of income aspirations is utilized in 
the analysis. In order to explain the similar happiness between rural migrants and urban 
residents, further analysis about the impact of socioeconomic status on SWB is 
conducted as well. The results show that, in Chinese context, it is social comparison 
rather than income aspiration that can help to explain why rural-urban migrants have 
similar levels of SWB.  
This thesis concludes that, although hukou limitations were relaxed gradually, 
individuals with different hukou status continue to experience different treatment in 
terms of income and occupation. However, this different treatment of rural-urban 
migrants does not have a significant effect on restricting migrants’ aspirations. In 
addition, although rural-urban migrants are discriminated against, they report similar 
subjective well-being to their urban counterparts and similar perceptions of happiness. 
Thus, labour market policy should mainly promote an integrated labour market, which 
can provide equal access to occupational choice and wages.  
Key words: wage differentials; occupation segregation; income aspiration; subjective 
well-being; urban workers; rural-urban migrants; Chinese labour market. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 Origin and Development of the Hukou System 
This thesis investigates the dual structure of the Chinese labour market, which is 
caused by a household registration system known as the hukou system. How the 
household registration status influences the group members in the Chinese urban labour 
market will be explored.  
Hukou (household registration) was established by The Public Security Organ 
Household Management Institutions, and has long been a legal instrument utilized to 
record and retain basic household information, including date of birth, relationships 
between householders, sex, marital status, education levels, and legal home address of 
all household members. The Chinese household registration system not only provides 
evidence to prove individuals’ official status and identity but is also significant in their 
daily lives (Cheng & Selden, 1994). For example, individuals cannot go to school 
outside of their hukou areas unless they pay extra fees (Zhao, 2004). In addition, adults 
cannot marry, utilize medical care, or obtain employment without household registration. 
The present stage of China’s household registration system divides hukou into two 
groups, urban and rural, based on blood relationships and geographical location. The 
dualistic household system, which builds a barrier between urban and rural residence, is 
unfair in its treatment of citizenship and involves a certain degree of discrimination.  
The reason why the household registration system has long remained is attributed 
to China’s development strategy, which involves agriculture supporting heavy industry. 
Chan (2010) indicated that China, taking the Stalinist growth strategy as an example, 
chose rapid industrialization, centred on developing heavy industrial cities; meanwhile, 
replenishment of an agricultural surplus from the peasantry was achieved after the 
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Communist Revolution of 1949. The Chinese government, therefore, tried to prevent 
outflows of rural workers into cities in order to guarantee a sufficient agriculture surplus 
to feed urban employers engaged in industrial development. In 1958, the government 
decreed formal laws to restrict population mobility and all migration had to be approved 
by the local government (Chan, 2010). From 1958 on, each Chinese citizen was 
classified as either “urban” or “rural” hukou and lost the freedom to migrate. The 
household classification led to two different societies in China. Urban class members 
could obtain jobs in industrial factories and had access to social welfare benefits, like 
unemployment entitlement and a retirement salary. The other class was rural peasants, 
whose members produced the agricultural surplus for industrialization and made a 
living for themselves. As a consequence, the hukou system not only limited labour 
mobility but also excluded access to state-provided welfare and welfare entitlements for 
the rural population. 
However, at the end of the 1970s, China gradually carried out reforms of the hukou 
system and relaxed the limitations on labour migration. Cai (2011) demonstrated the 
motivation behind this government behaviour in relation to the household registration 
reforms and indicated that the Chinese economy had been bound up with two transitions 
that divided household registration reform into two phases: the transition from a dual 
economic structure to an integrated economic structure and the transition from a 
planned economy to a market economy. Under the planned economy, the government 
was responsible for implementing resource allocation and consumer products, and 
almost all economic behaviour relied on government instructions. On the other hand, in 
the market economy, production and sales of products entirely depended on the price 
mechanisms of the free market, not rigorous regulation from government.  
In the first phase of reform, roughly between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, 
regulations were relaxed gradually. At first, rural labour could migrate from the 
agriculture sectors to non-agriculture sectors in rural areas, and then, because of the 
limited job opportunities in rural and village enterprises, central and local governments 
acquiesced, allowing rural hukou workers to migrate from rural to urban areas and to 
seek non-agricultural jobs. In the second phase, during the mid-1990s, the policy was 
further reformed so that rural hukou individuals not only had the right to seek jobs in 
urban enterprises but also were allowed to do their own business in urban cities. During 
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this period, an increasing number of individuals started businesses, including both urban 
and rural hukou individuals. As long as there is enough financial capital, large ambitions, 
and reasonable/legal entrepreneurial ideas, everyone, including both urban and rural 
people, is free to apply for a business license from the specific business department to 
start their own business. Moreover, there is no different treatment for urban or rural 
people during the process of self-employment
1
 because the government encourages 
individuals to be self-employed in order to provide more job opportunities in urban 
cities, which can alleviate the employment pressure in Chinese labour market. In the 
third phase of reform, approximately from the mid-1990s to 2003, China changed to a 
labour-intensive and export-oriented growth strategy, leading to more job opportunities 
for rural migrants, mostly in the coastal provinces and non-public sectors. Due to the 
increasing demand for labour, a number of reform policies were carried out to eliminate 
the barriers impeding labour mobility. Furthermore, in order to incentivize a greater 
number of rural workers to enter the urban labour market to meet the huge demand in 
urban areas, the Ministry of Public Security relaxed the conditions of entry of rural 
people into urban cities. As a result, a large number of rural hukou people have migrated 
to urban cities to find a job.  
With the reform of the hukou system, the situation of migration is changing as well. 
At the beginning of the hukou reform, China was under a planned economy. During this 
period, although the hukou system was reformed and all the citizens were free to 
migrate to different areas, few rural hukou people migrated to urban cities due to limited 
job opportunities. Most departments and companies were public organizations where 
urban hukou individuals were more likely to be employed. In 1992, the Chinese 
economic strategy transformed from a planned economy to a market one, increasing the 
number of private companies in urban area. However, the natural growth rate of the 
local labour force in urban areas is too slow to satisfy the growing labour demand of 
                                                   
1 Yang (2017) stated that the most common motivation for Chinese individuals starting a business is to achieve 
greater economic benefits, realize larger ambitions, and provide more job opportunities in the Chinese urban labour 
market. The situation of choosing to start a business passively because of discrimination in the labour market is 
extremely rare in China (Zhou et al., 2017) because self-employment has a higher requirement for financial assets. It 
is difficult for discriminated rural migrants to meet the requirements of self-employment in terms of financial assets. 
In addition to the similar treatments between urban and rural people during the process of self-employment, rural 
people do not suffer from customer discrimination because it is very difficult for customers to distinguish these two 
groups from their appearance; therefore, self-employed people who work for themselves do not suffer from employee 
discrimination, but also do not suffer from customer discrimination. Consequently, I do not take individuals who are 
self-employed into account as this thesis mainly focuses on the discrimination against rural-urban migrants in the 
urban labour market.  
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urban employers. Since rural migrants can fill the labour force gap, some rural male 
individuals began to look for jobs in urban cities. These migrants left their parents, 
children, and wives at home and transferred income back to support their families. 
Moreover, most of the rural workers were engaged in the construction industry and were 
around 20-30 years old.  
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on November 10, 2001. 
Thereafter, the manufacturing industry, service industry and foreign investment have 
grown gradually, especially in southeast coastal cities. Over time, these industries were 
gradually developing in central and western China, as well, thus the demand for labour 
increased quickly and an increasing number of rural hukou individuals migrated to 
urban cities. In addition, the level of education of migrants is also gradually improved 
along with the proportion of female migrant workers and married migrants increased, as 
well. Female migrants occupied approximately 34.5% in 2009 and this proportion 
increased to 40.3% in 2016
2
. An increasing number of couples worked in urban cities 
together and left their parents and children at home, thus more and more empty-nesters 
and left-behind children in rural China have emerged in recent decade. With the 
increasing number of female migrants, the occupation types have also expanded to the 
manufacturing industry and service industry, but the percentage of migrants in 
construction industry has decreased during recent decade. 
1.1.2 Determinants of Hukou Status  
Zhao (2004), Chan (2010), and Meiyan & Fang (2010) investigated the factors that 
can determine and change hukou status. Zhao (2004) explained that the hukou status of 
each newborn depends on their parents’ hukou status, especially on the status of the 
head of household (the father, in most cases), i.e., the baby has rural hukou status if 
his/her father (head of household) holds a rural hukou. However, when the head of 
household has greater educational attainment, the probability of migrating to a city 
increases, which in turn increases the probability of transforming their status into urban 
hukou. The probability of the children being given urban hukou will be higher, too 
(Zhao, 2004); therefore, the family background (i.e., the father’s educational attainment) 
                                                   
2 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  
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determines the children’s hukou status, to a large extent. 
Although the hukou status is determined by the family background and the location 
of birthplace, the status could be changed with subsequent human capital investment 
and experience. Firstly, current hukou status can be changed by marriage. For a couple, 
if one person has urban hukou and the other one has rural hukou, one would change 
his/her hukou status to that of the other. Specifically, if a female holding rural hukou 
married a male with urban hukou, she would be able to acquire urban hukou status. 
Secondly, as age and work experience are accumulated and length of residence in urban 
cities is longer, the probability of obtaining local urban hukou status increases, as 
several cities utilize an integrating system of obtaining local urban hukou. The 
integrating system in some cities means that rural hukou individuals can earn credits 
with their length of residence in urban cities, educational attainment, higher standard 
occupations, contributions to the urban city, amount of tax payment, payment for social 
security in the local urban city, and so forth. When the credits reach a specific level, 
those migrants have the opportunity of setting their hukou status in the urban city.  
Lastly, Meiyan & Fang (2010) found that occupation can partly determine 
obtaining urban hukou status, and this correlation is indirectly caused by educational 
attainment. Specifically, the professional doctors, rural teachers, and civil servants of 
township government belong to the staff of government-affiliated institutions and are 
given urban hukou status regardless of the workplace3. Similar to other urban hukou 
workers, these workers with urban hukou status but working in rural area are paid 
directly by the state and are directly influenced by their position and administrative 
level. In addition, all staff of government-affiliated institutions are provided with 
economically affordable housing in local urban cities, regardless of their work place. All 
government units and hospitals build economically affordable housing for their staff. If 
the length of service is not long enough to enjoy economically affordable housing, these 
civil servants are provided a staff dormitory while waiting to obtain economically 
                                                   
3 As most hospitals and schools in China belong to national system, hukou status of people in these public 
institutions will be registered in urban area regardless of their working place. Their wages are paid directly by the 
state. In addition, the vast majority of hospitals and schools as public organizations are located in urban area of China 
which is quite different with the situation in western countries. Moreover, these urban people who work in rural areas 
are most likely to live in urban cities. Therefore, all the previous Chinese research, in general, considered all the 
people who hold urban hukou status as urban people no matter where they worked. In this thesis, following most 
previous Chinese research on the hukou problem (e.g., urban people and rural migrants), I also regard all these urban 
hukou individuals as urban people regardless of their working place.  
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affordable housing. In general, there are two typical accommodations for these urban 
hukou workers in rural areas. Firstly, most of them live in urban cities and take the 
specific bus provided by the working organizations. Secondly, some people who are not 
required to work every day such as doctors and teachers, choose to live in the staff 
dormitory during the 2-3 working days and live in the urban cities when they are 
off-duty. Therefore, although their work place is located in a rural area, their regular 
wages, welfare, benefits, living conditions, living area, and consumption conditions are 
no different with other urban workers in urban cities. 
With the reform of the hukou system, since the strict limitations were relaxed, an 
increasing number of rural hukou individuals with higher education levels can work in 
cities and change their hukou status by living in the urban city for a period of time. 
However, most are still discriminated against. Rural migrants are more likely to engage 
in low-quality jobs and have no access to social welfare. Although the hukou limitations 
were reformed, the differential treatment between urban and rural hukou individuals has 
not disappeared. The current situation of hukou discrimination between urban residents 
and rural migrants still exists in the Chinese urban labour market; therefore, Meiyan & 
Fang (2010) considered the hukou system reform to be no more than lip service. 
1.2 The Framework of Thesis 
According to previous description of hukou background, it is clear that the 
inequality between rural-urban migrants and urban hukou individuals still exists even if 
the hukou system has been reformed gradually. Therefore, the entire thesis focuses on 
the discrimination associated with hukou and its negative impacts on the workers 
employed in the urban labour market. 
First of all, I am concerned about the wage differential between urban hukou 
individuals and rural-urban migrants in Chapter 2. The human capital theory points out 
that the stock of knowledge, skill, capabilities, talents, social and personality attributes 
contribute to one’s productivity (Becker, 1962). From the view of labour economics, the 
economic value created by individuals is likely to be reflected in their own wages. 
Based on human capital theory as a theoretical basis, education, training and experience 
are likely to be the main factors that determine personal income and lead to wage 
7 
 
differences. However, it seems that some unobserved factors may also have influence on 
the determinant of wages since individuals who have the same human capital 
characteristics may be paid differently. Moreover, Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
decomposed the wage differentials and confirmed that the wage gap does not only 
depend on the differences in the observed human capital investment, it also depends on 
some unobservable factors, which may be linked to discrimination. Following the 
viewpoint of human capital theory and previous studies, Chapter 2 analyses the relation 
between discrimination and wage difference between urban people and rural-urban 
migrants in urban China.   
In the following two chapters I focus on the negative impacts of discrimination on 
personal aspirations and subjective well-being. Regarding the potential relationship 
between aspirations and discrimination, the social cognitive career theory (SCCT4) 
suggests that racial-ethnic background may directly influence one’s career development 
and aspirations via confidence in one’s capability to perform, potential outcome 
expectations and determination (Lent, Brown & Hackett, 1994). Discriminated people 
may underestimate their ability, which leads to a lower level of aspiration. Although 
racial discrimination does not exist in China, hukou separates social classes which bring 
urban people more opportunities and more social welfare than rural people. Taking into 
account SCCT, I investigate whether rural-urban migrants’ self-judgement of their 
capabilities is affected by hukou status, thereby reducing aspiration levels. Thus, 
following the relationship between racial discrimination and aspirations which was 
proposed by SCCT, Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between hukou discrimination 
and rural-urban migrants’ aspirations. 
In addition, discrimination may also influence people’s subjective well-being. In 
general, the determinants on subjective well-being involve economic factors (e.g., 
income) as well as some non-economic factors (e.g., age, health status, gender, 
education level). From an economic point of view, the most important factor affecting 
subjective well-being is personal income (Veenhoven, 1991; Diner et al., 1993). 
Moreover, some economists have proposed that an individual’s income aspirations may 
also have an impact on their wellbeing (Stutzer, 2004; Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010a), 
which can be seen in Figure 1-1. In China, rural-urban migrants are treated unequally 
                                                   
4 The detailed explanation of SCCT is shown in Chapter 3.  
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since they are discriminated against in urban labour market. Thus, their actual income as 
well as their aspiration income may be negatively affected by hukou discrimination, as 
discussed in the previous two chapters. In addition, following previous studies, actual 
income and aspiration income are likely to have different impacts on SWB, where 
actual income is likely to positively influence wellbeing while aspiration income has 
negative effects. I consider whether rural-urban migrants who are discriminated against 
in urban China are unhappier than their urban counterparts. Based on the relationship 
between discrimination and income and aspiration income discussed before, Chapter 4 
investigates the difference in SWB between rural-urban migrants and urban people from 
these two economic factors, i.e., actual income and aspiration income.  
Figure 1-1 The Framework of the Whole Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Contributions and Structure of the Thesis 
As discussed in the previous section, an increasing number of individuals with 
rural hukou status have migrated to urban cities to look jobs. Considering the effect of 
hukou status on dual group members in the Chinese urban labour market, the first part 
of this thesis (Chapter 2) focuses on rural-urban migrants’ current working conditions, 
including income and occupation, in comparison to urban hukou individuals. At the 
beginning, Chapter 2 compares the occupation distribution, working hours and wages 
by occupation of urban people and rural migrants. In addition, different personal 
endowment factors are compared between urban workers and rural-urban migrants. The 
Hukou system 
Inequality in society 
Discrimination 
Aspirations Subjective well-being 
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purpose of Chapter 2 is to investigate whether the different treatments of urban hukou 
workers and rural-urban migrants can be attributed to hukou discrimination. Most 
previous Chinese research has employed the traditional Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973) 
and Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition to decompose the wage differential 
between urban hukou and rural-urban migrants and ascribe the unexplained proportion 
to hukou discrimination. However, this traditional decomposition method ignores 
occupational segregation in the Chinese urban labour market and underestimates the 
discrimination which rural-urban migrants face in the Chinese urban labour market. In 
this chapter, not only is the wage gap between urban and rural-urban migrants 
considered, but also occupational segregation. The China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) 1993-2011, a longitudinal dataset which contains detailed occupation 
information, is utilized. The significant contribution of Chapter 2 is to regard occupation 
choice as an endogenous variable. The Brown et al. (1980) decomposition is used to 
decompose the wage differential into two parts: within-occupation and inter-occupation. 
It is found that the proportion of explained part decreases to 69% and the unexplained 
portion increases to 31%, when taking occupational segregation into account.  
Motivated by existing discrimination against rural migrants and an increasingly 
significant role of rural-urban migrants in the Chinese urban labour market, Chapter 3 
investigates whether long term discrimination has other negative impacts on rural-urban 
migrants. Psychological studies in western countries have found that racial 
discrimination restricts the disadvantaged group’s career ambition or aspiration. The 
limited ambitions can exacerbate the gap between the preferred group and the devalued 
group, which as the potential to intensify social instability. Therefore, considering the 
possible negative impacts on the disadvantaged group, Chapter 3 aims to investigate 
empirically whether discrimination against rural migrants also negatively influences 
rural-urban migrants’ aspirations. The 2010 China General Social Survey (CGSS) which 
contains data on income aspirations of rural-urban migrants and urban workers is 
utilized. Chapter 3 contributes to the existing literature by comparing income 
aspirations of urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants, and examining the 
impact of hukou discrimination on rural-urban migrants’ aspirations. To my knowledge, 
this chapter is the first study to explore whether hukou discrimination restricts 
rural-urban migrants’ income aspirations. Propensity score matching is utilized to match 
urban hukou workers and rural-urban migrants, based on a range of characteristics, 
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which in turn enables us to observe whether urban workers and rural-urban migrants 
with these characteristics report different income aspirations.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the subjective well-being of urban residents and rural-urban 
migrants, and explores what factors influence subjective well-being. Unlike previous 
Chinese studies which mainly focuses on the impact of income, personal endowment 
and social comparisons, this chapter investigates the impact on subjective well-being 
from the perspective of income aspirations. An ordered probit model is applied to the 
same dataset as in Chapter 3 (CGSS 2010). The chapter contributes to the literature by 
discussing how income aspirations play a role to determining the subjective well-being 
of urban hukou workers and rural-urban migrants. It is found that aspiration income has 
no impact on subjective well-being, no matter which measurement of income 
aspirations are utilized in the analysis.   
Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes the findings of all parts of this study, puts forward the 
corresponding limitations and possible future research, based on the results of this study. 
In addition, I give a comprehensive view of the overall policy implication.  
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Chapter Two 
Wage Differentials between Urban Workers and Rural-Urban 
Migrants in the Chinese Urban Labour Market 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Chinese economic development strategy has 
changed from a planned economic system to a labour-intensive and export-oriented 
growth strategy, which has increased the number of private companies in coastal 
provinces. The transition in the country’s economic development strategy and the 
corresponding rapid economic development has led to an increased demand for labour. 
At first, an increasing number of job opportunities were provided to surplus rural labour. 
Initially, these rural migrants’ wages were much lower than the wages of urban residents 
and could only satisfy their basic needs. With the surplus rural labour in traditional 
agriculture absorbed into the industrial organizations, a financial zero point was 
eventually reached. In the second phase, the demand for labour exceeded the supply at 
the current wage and China experienced a labour shortage, making it difficult for firms 
to hire rural-urban migrants at a lower cost. After 2003, the labour shortage became 
widespread and wage rates of rural migrants increased, referred to as the Lewis turning 
point (Zhang et al., 2011). The government increased the minimum wage and enforced 
legal employment contracts for all employees, regardless of their household registration 
type. Although the rural migrants have more access to jobs in the urban sectors and 
more access to social welfare benefits than before, the differential treatment of 
rural-urban migrants has not disappeared everywhere in China. Urban people are still 
more likely to be employed in high-skilled occupations with high wages. Few 
rural-urban migrants have the same access to these kinds of jobs, and most are engaged 
in temporary and low-skilled 3-D jobs (dangerous, dirty and demeaning) with lower 
incomes. 
The unfair distribution of income and occupation between urban residents and 
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rural-urban migrants may impede economic development and generate social instability 
(Meng & Zhang, 2001). Previous research (e.g., Démurger et al., 2009; Lee, 2012; 
Messinis, 2013; Liu et al., 2004; Meng & Zhang, 2001) analysed the different wages 
between urban residents and rural-urban migrants in China. However, most previous 
studies treat occupational differences as exogenous, including dummy variables for 
occupations, which ignore the potential discrimination affecting the difference in 
occupational attainment (Brown et al., 1980). There are factors that determine 
occupational attainment but have no direct impact on wages, which such as family 
structure, and people with similar human capital may have different occupations, which 
earn different wages. Occupation segregation between urban hukou individuals and 
rural-urban migrants is neglected in these studies. Few of these studies analyse the 
extent to which wage differentials between urban workers and rural-urban migrants is a 
consequence of intra-occupational or inter-occupational wage differentials. 
Although Meng & Zhang (2001) regard the choice of occupation as an endogenous 
variable and investigate the extent to which the income differential between rural-urban 
migrants and urban residents can be attributed to inter- and intra-occupational wage 
differentials, their research only focuses on individuals working in the Shanghai area 
based on the Shanghai Floating Population Survey 1995. As discussed in the first 
chapter, China changed their economic development strategy during the mid-1990s and 
2003 and joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. There have been gradual 
increases in the manufacturing and service industries and in foreign investment, 
especially in southeast coastal cities. In 1992, although the Chinese economy had 
started to transform from a planned to a market economy, there were no diversified jobs 
available for rural-urban migrants in this early stage of economic restructuring. In 
addition, the Chinese government aimed at building Shanghai into an economic, 
financial, and trade center. Therefore, compared with the rest of China, the job 
opportunities in Shanghai are limited to commodity Trading and Processing, and the 
textile and construction industry. Most workers were engaged in those few industries 
and occupation segregation was not widespread in Shanghai at that time. From this data, 
Meng & Zhang (2001) found that the inter-occupational wage gap is much lower than 
the intra-occupational wage gap.  
This study utilizes the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which covers 9 
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provinces including coastal provinces (where Shanghai is located) and inland provinces 
such as Henan and Heilongjiang, where the focus is mainly on heavy and manufacturing 
industries. With the economic transition and the expansion of survey coverage, more 
diverse occupations appear so the labour force can be dispersed to many kinds of 
occupations all over the China. It is unknown whether the contribution of the 
within-occupational wage gap and the inter-occupational wage gap as part of the total 
wage differential between urban people and rural migrants has variation over time when 
the coverage of the investigation is not limited to Shanghai. In this chapter, I adopt the 
Brown et al. (1980) decomposition and utilize the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS), to consider the extent to which the wage gap between urban hukou and 
rural-urban migrants can be attributed to intra-occupational and inter-occupational wage 
differentials. The next section describes the theory of discrimination, an empirical test 
for discrimination, and the relevant literature on discrimination in Western countries and 
China. Section 2.3 outlines the methodology and a discussion of the data is given in 
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the results of this chapter, followed by a conclusion.     
2. 2 Literature Review 
2.2.1. The Theory of Discrimination  
This section gives a brief introduction to the theory of discrimination, including a 
definition of discrimination and the identification of different types of discrimination. 
Discrimination implies that individuals who provide identical services and have equal 
productivity are treated differently. In other words, individuals with similar observed 
human characteristics experience unequal outcomes. Two main types of discrimination 
have been described in the economic literature. Firstly, Becker (1957) defined 
taste-based discrimination as differential treatment arising from individual prejudices or 
animosity to members from disliked target groups. This form of discrimination, which 
relies on individual attitudes, implies that a certain number of individuals would spend 
more opportunity cost, rather than have any interaction with members from their 
disliked groups. In Becker’s words, if one person is a discriminator, he will prefer to 
hire members of a favourite group to substitute the members of other disliked groups, 
even at a higher cost. 
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In the Economics of Discrimination, Becker (1957) delineated three drivers: 
employer, employee, and consumer taste-based discrimination. Just as their names 
imply, employer discrimination means that discriminatory employers would rather give 
up a fraction of revenue in order to hire their favourite applicants. Meanwhile employee 
discrimination (co-worker discrimination) exists where several members of the majority 
group have animus towards another other minority group and are not willing to 
collaborate with its members. Employee discrimination may have an indirect effect on 
employers, leading them to compensate for the discriminatory employees or reduce the 
wages of minorities. In addition, Becker (1957) also discussed the consequence of 
consumer discrimination, when customers prefer to be served by certain specific groups. 
For example, discriminatory consumers may prefer to be served by white males as 
doctors and drivers, and white females as nurses, flight attendants or tour guides. 
Occupational segregation is more likely to be suffered in the social service occupations 
and involves the separation of people into different occupations on the basis of their 
characteristics (Lang, 2011). Segregation and discrimination might go together but they 
are not identical, unless one group’s circumstances, such as wages, welfare and the 
working environment, are obviously worse than that of the other group.  
In the early 1970s, Arrow (1973) criticized the Becker’s taste-based discrimination 
model, on the grounds that those discriminatory employers who would rather spend 
more to employ their favourite workers would be expelled from the market under 
perfect competition, in the long run. Nevertheless, Arrow (1973) and many other 
authors have also demonstrated that the relationship between wages and racial prejudice 
based on Becker’s conclusion might survive in an imperfectly competitive market in the 
long run, because in reality, it is difficult for firms to fill vacancies instantly, and 
workers also need enough time to find new jobs. Firms cannot know which applicants 
are seeking jobs and workers are not aware of which companies have vacancies (Lang, 
2011). Therefore, although Arrow criticized Becker’s model to some extent, it does not 
mean that Becker’s conclusion should be replaced by that of Arrow (1973).  
In light of the criticisms of Becker’s taste-based discrimination model, Arrow 
(1973) put forward a discrimination model based on limited information which is 
referred to as statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination assumes that firms 
attempt to maximize profits and are not prejudiced against minorities, and that 
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individuals are treated according to the group’s average situation, rather than the 
individuals’ personal characteristics. In the statistical discrimination model, employers 
cannot observe all the characteristics of the applicants: for example, it is difficult for 
employers to assess the productivity of applicants by interviewing and reading their 
resumes. However, employers can observe the applicant’s group membership in terms 
of e.g. gender and race, and can be aware of the applicants’ educational levels, based on 
their resumes. Because of limited information, Arrow (1973) explained that employers’ 
optimal prediction of productivity was the combination of the average of the individual 
characteristics and employees’ average productivity in the same group. Therefore, in the 
absence of information, employers will treat individuals as if they have the average 
features of one group. For example, in general, black people do have more 
disadvantaged backgrounds, such as lower educational levels or less trust from 
consumers, so employers may affirm that all applicants from the black membership 
group will perform worse than those from the white group. Employers will judge one 
black applicant based on the average productivity of this group, even if this job hunter is 
better than most white applicants. As a consequence, black people are more likely to 
earn lower wages and experience a lower probability of being employed in jobs 
requiring higher professional skills.   
2.2.2. Discrimination in Western Countries 
At the beginning of research on discrimination, it was apparent that an increasing 
number of research studies have aimed to investigate racial discrimination between 
whites and black people in America. Racial discrimination and household registration 
discrimination may be similar in the sense that two different group members with 
identical characteristics are treated differently in some respects, such as wages, 
occupations and employment opportunities. However, western racism is more a 
question of perception, whereas China’s household registration discrimination is a kind 
of institutional discrimination. There are no decrees in Western countries to confine 
blacks to working in specific districts or professions, while China’s government strictly 
restricted labour mobility before the 1980s. In spite of the relaxation of the restriction 
on individuals seeking jobs everywhere, many employers may still regard rural-urban 
migrants as of lower-status because of their long-term segregation from urban workers 
and because they may consider rural workers to have lower educational levels, inferior 
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working skills and lower productivity. Therefore, most employers in China, like those in 
Western countries, are likely to prefer one group when recruiting. Therefore, it is useful 
to review research about racial discrimination for reference when analysing household 
registration discrimination in China.   
2.2.2.1. Determinants of Different Treatment in Western Countries 
    Ritter & Taylor (2011) investigated racial discrimination from two aspects, wage 
gaps and different rates of unemployment, as they indicated that disparities in both 
wages and unemployment were the critical features in the U.S. labour market. Focusing 
on wages alone was insufficient to reflect the achievement differential of the labour 
market, and employment rates played a significant role in affecting racial disparity as 
well. They found that the wage differential is more likely to be ascribed to personal 
characteristics, such as social demographic factors, educational attainment, and 
cognitive skills but not to racial discrimination. However, the results of unemployment 
rates demonstrated that a sizeable part of the unexplained unemployment differential 
rates could be ascribed to the statistical discrimination model. Therefore, they 
concluded that discrimination plays an important role in determining an individuals’ 
employment or unemployment situation. Thus, I intend to review previous studies from 
two aspects: personal characteristics and occupation. In terms of human characteristics, 
I mainly focus on the impact of educational attainment on wage differentials.  
A. Influence of Education 
The basic approach to testing whether differential treatments are attributable to 
discrimination is to examine how much of the disparity cannot be explained by human 
characteristics and then to ascribe the unexplained component to discrimination. It is 
significant for the success of the test to choose suitable characteristics as the human 
capital variables in the model. Among a large number of previous studies, demographic 
factors such as age, gender, education, health and marital status are the ones most 
commonly examined for their influence on differential treatments. In addition, 
individuals with different educational levels tend to be employed in different 
professions, and their wages vary between professions. Therefore, education level is 
highly correlated to occupations and wages. In this chapter, I intend to include highest 
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education levels as the independent variable to test the extent to which wages 
differentials should be attributed to different education levels or discrimination.  
Lang & Manove (2011) studied the different returns to education in the US and 
utilized the statistical discrimination model to explain the phenomenon that blacks were 
required to have more years of education or higher education levels than whites with 
similar skills to have wage parity with whites. As explained, the statistical 
discrimination assumption implies that the model is based on the employers’ limited 
information about the applicants. Employers infer applicants’ productivity from 
observed characteristics, such as education levels or time spent in education in their 
resumes. The literature about statistical discrimination suggests that companies and 
employers observe the productivity of white people more accurately than for black 
people, based on relative educational achievement (Lang & Manove, 2011). Therefore, 
workers have an incentive to use educational levels as a signal of productivity; and 
furthermore, education is seen to be more important in relation to black people, as a 
signal of productivity, than for white people, leading to black people having to obtain 
more education relative to white people with the same ability. However, they found that 
black people with higher educational levels earned similar wages to their white 
counterparts. In other words, with the same ability, the returns to education for black 
workers were less than for white workers.  
    O’Neill (1990) researched the impact of human capital on earnings differences 
between black and white people, based on data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth. The author found that, since 1940, as education levels and the quality of black 
people’s performance in school improved, the racial difference of human capital tended 
to narrow, so that black people now earn much more than previously. Thus, the wage 
differential between black and white people has narrowed, gradually. The author 
explained the increase in the relative wages of black workers from two significant 
factors as resulting from a rise in the cognitive skills of blacks and a decline in labour 
market discrimination. Firstly, the estimated results indicated that the narrowing of 
educational distinction between black and white people made a great contribution to 
convergence in the earnings gap, which meant that educational achievement and 
working skills account for most of the earning gaps between black and white people. 
However, O’Neill also stated that human capital factors were not the only cause of 
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narrowing wage differentials. The reduction in discrimination may also have been 
influenced by the relative rise in black earnings, as better job opportunities and training 
became available to them, providing cumulative career benefits. The author therefore 
concludes that the rise of the Black-White wage ratio is related to interaction between 
human capital and the reduction in discrimination.  
    Card & Krueger (1991) studied the relationship between school quality and the 
returns to education for black and white workers and found similar evidence to O’Neill 
(1990) that the narrowing of schooling quality between black and white people had 
contributed to the convergence of black-white relative wages. Nevertheless, their 
estimates indicated that school quality can account for only 15% to 25% of the 
narrowing of the black-white wage ratio. The rest of the convergence could be attributed 
to the higher requirements of black people’s educational levels by employers. In 
addition, government policy and judicial pressure incentivizes the demand for skilled 
black employees, which can be explained by the reduction of discrimination, similar to 
O’Neill’s second viewpoint.  
In addition, Maxwell (1994) also researched the effects of the quality and quantity 
of education on the black-white wage differential using the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth. He tested the extent to which the black/white wage difference might 
be explained by the quality and quantity of educational attainment. The analysis 
demonstrated that the critical cause of the wage differential was the quality of the 
education levels of the two groups, rather than the quantity of schooling (Maxwell, 
1994). A number of firms preferred to gauge unobserved variables, like working skills 
and workers’ productivity as markers of their workers’ educational quality. Therefore, 
the conclusion suggested that attempts to close the black-white wage gap should 
concentrate on the closing of the educational quality differential by offering higher 
quality schooling to blacks. However, as previous research such as Card & Krueger 
(1991) has shown, the narrowing of the racial gap in education quality and basic skills 
learned from school only contributes to the convergence of wages by two-thirds rather 
than the whole differential. 
B. Impacts of Occupation 
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Apart from the impact of human characteristics on wage differential, few studies 
(Brown et al., 1980; Gabriel & Schmitz, 1989; De Beyer & Knight, 1989; Fearon & 
Wald, 2011) consider that the wage differential between whites and blacks may be 
attributed to their inequality opportunity of occupation. Blacks may suffer from racial 
discrimination when applying for jobs, therefore their wages are restricted by their 
lower quality jobs. In this section, those studies which regard occupation segregation as 
an endogenous factor influencing wage differentials will be reviewed. 
Both Gabriel & Schmitz (1989) and De Beyer & Knight (1989) investigated how 
occupational segregation influences wage differentials using Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) 
decomposition
5
. Gabriel & Schmitz (1989) found that blacks were less likely to be hired 
in higher-paid occupations. In light of their estimated results, if blacks had experienced 
identical occupational opportunities, the probability of blacks being employed as 
managers, and in professional jobs with higher incomes, would have increased, and 
blacks would have been less likely to work in sales and service jobs. Therefore, the 
researchers argued that parts of the black-white wage differential could be attributed to 
this occupational disparity. However, the results from Gabriel & Schmitz (1989) showed 
that while earnings-related characteristics such as type of occupation, had an impact on 
wage differentials, they could just account for about 33 percent of the black-white wage 
differential and the rest should be attributed to unexplained factors, such as differential 
treatment of blacks in the labour market, i.e. discrimination.  
De Beyer & Knight (1989) emphasized the importance of both human capital and 
job-related characteristics on the determination of wages, and both factors were likely to 
be interconnected. For example, the type of occupation in which workers are engaged in 
is related to their educational levels, sex, race and working experience. In addition, De 
Beyer & Knight (1989) also considered the different productivity among different 
occupations, concluding that the returns to productivity in non-manual occupations were 
higher than in manual occupations, and the returns were lowest for unskilled jobs. Thus, 
like Gabriel & Schmitz (1989), they deemed that occupation had no independent impact 
on wages, and only played a proxy role for unmeasured personal characteristics, such as 
unobserved ability or productivity (De Beyer & Knight, 1989). The occupation had a 
                                                   
5 This is a traditional decomposition method for the wage gap. The Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition method is 
described in detail in the methodology section of this chapter.  
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positive effect on wages, but the role of characteristics which determine occupational 
access suggests the existence of discrimination. Therefore, the wage differential was 
partly attributed to occupation segregation as much as the presence of discrimination. In 
addition, Fearon & Wald (2011) utilized Brown et al.’s decomposition method, which 
takes occupational segregation into account, to research the wage differential between 
blacks and whites in Canada. The estimated results suggested that wage discrimination 
and occupational segregation account for a large proportion of the wage gap, while 
human characteristics account for a small part (Fearon & Wald, 2011).  
2.2.3 Discrimination in China 
According to the previous research on racial discrimination in Western countries, 
an increasing number of researchers have begun to use the former principles and 
methods to analyse household registration discrimination as well. Lee (2012) researched 
wage differentials between rural migrants and urban hukou employees using the 2005 
China Urban Labour Survey (CULS). Unlike most previous research on wage 
differentials, Lee (2012) took other welfare aspects, such as the annual bonus and 
insurance cover, into account when carrying out the decomposition of the wages using 
the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition. The decomposition approach divided the 
wage differential between rural migrants and urban hukou workers into an explained 
and unexplained component. The explained component of the wage differentials was 
ascribed to human characteristics such as age, gender, job tenure, marital status, health, 
years of education and highest education levels. The unexplained part of the wage gap 
was attributed to discrimination. The results demonstrated that a majority of rural 
migrant workers did not receive full insurance entitlements; and, moreover, migrant 
workers earned less than their counterpart urban hukou employees, holding their similar 
characteristics constant. A considerable income gap between rural migrants and urban 
hukou workers was unexplained, and the reason for the unexplained component may be 
that employers are statistically discriminatory towards the minorities, as they were not 
able to observe the applicant’s capacity.  
Messinis (2013) proposes a different conclusion to Lee (2012) on the issue of the 
wage gap between urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants, where China 
Household Income Project (CHIP 2002) data is used to research the productivity of rural 
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migrant and urban hukou individuals in the Chinese labour market. Messinis (2013) 
utilizes matching and the Instrumental Variable method to assess different conditional 
and unconditional quantile treatment impacts in terms of different levels of education 
and different migrant status. By dividing the education into different levels and defining 
the duration of being non-local migrants, Messinis (2013) compares the returns of 
education between local urban workers and long-term migrants within the same 
education levels. The dataset (CHIP) covers local urban households and rural migrant 
households samples. Messinis (2013) regards these rural migrant households in CHIP as 
long-term migrants living with their family, which is more directly comparable to urban 
households. The estimated results show that urban hukou people are advantaged and 
better treated, in comparison to rural-urban migrants. The different treatment can be 
completely explained by different personal factors and the lower human capital 
investment of rural migrants (Messinis, 2013).  
In terms of the occupational segregation, Démurger et al. (2009) analysed the 
different treatments of rural migrants and urban hukou workers, from segregation to 
different sectors and different incomes within in the same sector. Using the China 
Household Income Project (CHIP), they utilized Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition 
to divide the difference into four parts: (1) difference in sector allocation; (2) different 
working time (working time effect); (3) different wages within sectors; (4) different 
population structure
6
. In addition, the authors separated the sectors into self-employment, 
private and public sectors, in order to evaluate the impact of difference in earnings and 
opportunities for urban people and rural hukou applicants hired into the different sectors. 
Their findings showed that rural hukou individuals were more likely to be 
self-employed or to be hired in the private sector; in contrast, urban hukou applicants 
were more likely to work in the public sector, receiving higher wages and better benefits. 
What is more, annual wages of urban workers were 1.3 times higher than those of rural 
migrant ones. However, their analysis suggests that the differential treatments toward 
urban and rural workers did not contribute to segregation in terms of access to jobs but 
the different population characteristics, which indicated that rural migrants were much 
less experienced and educated than urban hukou applicants.  
                                                   
6 This aspect refers to the effect of the distribution of human characteristics in the populations.  
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Regarding the income inequality and occupation segregation, Meng & Zhang 
(2001) were the first to utilize the Brown et al. (1980)
7
 decomposition and to regard the 
occupation choice as an endogenous variable. They regarded the migrants as a 
disadvantaged group with lower wages than the majority, less benefits and insurance. 
They decomposed the wage gaps into four parts: intra-occupation explained; 
intra-occupation unexplained; inter-occupation explained and inter-occupation 
unexplained portions. In addition, Meng & Zhang (2001) also utilized the 
Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition and compared the results with Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposition results. They found that a large proportion of wage differential was 
attributed to the intra-occupational unexplained part, which are more likely to be due to 
discrimination. In addition, the total unexplained portion in Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposition was higher than that in the traditional Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) 
decomposition method. Therefore, these results suggest that the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) 
approach underestimates the discrimination against disadvantaged group because 
occupation segregation is ignored. However, Meng & Zhang (2001) only aimed at 
exploring the income inequality and occupational segregation between urban people and 
rural migrants in Shanghai area. They did not consider whether this situation existed in 
the whole of China. Therefore, this chapter will fill the gap in previous Chinese 
literature and explore the wage gap between urban workers and rural-urban migrants in 
China as a whole and investigate the extent to which wage gaps between urban workers 
and rural-urban migrants can be ascribed to inter- or intra-occupational wage 
differentials.  
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Human Capital Theory and Earning Function 
Human capital theory corresponds to the stock of knowledge, skills, social and 
personality attributes that it represents the ability to perform labour thus contribute to 
productivity (Becker, 1962). In other word, human capital is a collection of personalities 
which includes knowledge, competencies, skills talents, experience, training that are 
possessed by individuals. It can be defined as a measurement of economic value of 
                                                   
7 An extension of the traditional Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition, will be explained in detail in this section.  
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one’s capabilities. From the labour economics point of view, human capital refers to a 
set of people’s characteristics which contributes a worker’ productivity. In the current 
labour market, the economic value of the production created by a person is often 
reflected by their wage. Human capital has increasingly been seen as a unidimensional 
object such as knowledge or skill that it directly contributes to the production or wage 
function (Becker, 1962; Becker, 1993). Therefore, wage difference amongst individuals 
are often reflected by the diverse elements of human capital such as knowledge, skills, 
ability, institutions, etc.  
In terms of the difference in human capital investment, it is useful to explore the 
diversity of human capital sources including innate and acquired ability. In the biology 
and social biology point of view, innate ability refers to the genetic IQ. For example, 
even though two individuals are in the same situation (e.g. education background, 
economic conditions, social environment) and they have the same access to the 
investment opportunities, they still can create different human capital and act differently 
in their work. According to Blundell (1999), wages difference is caused by the 
difference in human capital investment mainly focus on schooling and on the job 
training. The purposes of schooling and on the job training both aim to improve 
individual’s knowledge, skills and abilities that to create further productivity or 
economic value.  
Schooling has been the most commonly utilized component of human capital 
investment model. Schooling is often regarded as an institution that it dedicates to 
specializing in the training for people (Becker, 1962). Although one cannot make money 
directly from attending school, the training and taught knowledge received at school has 
a close relationship to their future working wage or income. The amount of investment 
in schooling one receives can have great impact on their wage after graduation. The one 
who gets more training in school can often have better income and wage. Besides the 
time spent on school education, the quality of schooling is deemed as another important 
component that can determine the human capital accumulation. For example, previous 
research found when two different students holding urban and rural hukou status 
separately, even the two students have similar innate intelligence and receives the same 
years of education, they still develop different human capital due to the different 
schooling quality in urban and rural cities (Afridi et al., 2015). This can be explained by 
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different quality of schooling education. However, even when two people receive the 
same quality of education, they still develop different human capital that may be caused 
by their innate capability and different effort they put into their study.  
Training, especially on the job training, is other important component of human 
capital investment that is mostly received after leaving school during their work. Unlike 
the campus training (schooling) that specializes in teaching, on-the-job training 
specially focuses on the job relevant training that aims to enhance one’s productivity 
and create more economic value in the future work (Becker, 1962; Becker, 1993; 
Konings & Vanormelingen, 2015). However, it is difficult for workers to make 
investment on the occupational training for themselves. Most on-the-job training is 
provided by firms who require their employees to have specific skills and would like to 
spend a large proportion of benefit on the training investment. The expenditure and the 
length of training rely on the specific skills required in each firm. Therefore, on-the-job 
training is not a purely individual investment in human capital rather than a joint 
investment by both companies and workers.  
There are two types of on-the-job training which are general training and specific 
training (Becker, 1962). General training refers to the process of skills training that can 
be applicable to many other firms. For example, the skills learned by an interned doctor 
in one hospital can also be applied to other hospitals. Thus, the general training a firm 
provided not only increases their marginal productivity, it also has the same productivity 
function in other firms. Unlike the general training, there are some kinds of training that 
only increases the productivity of workers in the firms providing the training. The 
specific training that brings more productivity to the firm which provide training is 
called specific training. Therefore, the participation of on-the-job training, investment 
on training, different types and length of training of each worker received will have a 
great contribution to the difference in human capital. 
Regarding to the utility of training for human capital, Mincer (1958) and Mincer 
(1974) argued that the working experience accumulated through learning from previous 
colleagues and summing up their projects at work is also an essential part of training. 
Although working experience differs from the formal training either general training or 
specific training measured by the amount of investment and length of time spent, it is 
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also crucial to influence one’s human capital accumulation. For example, besides the 
professional training a doctor received for the job, the number of surgeries he/she 
participated also underpin the skills they have generated. Therefore, previous research 
proved that one’s working performance is determined by both on-the-job training and 
experience accumulated from their work (Mincer, 1974). Individuals become more 
productive as they get more experienced and their wages will also increase with the 
accumulation of experience.   
However, some labour economists have criticized the human capital theory that 
tries to explain all the difference in wages by the difference in human capital. Wages can 
be higher due to some factors such as gender and occupational status instead of some 
traditional human capital elements. Regarding to the occupational status, Mincer (1958) 
argued the positive association between the level of occupation status and earnings. 
Mincer (1958) proposed that occupational status is a meaningful indicator to quantify 
the “formal training”. Occupation difference determines difference in the total amount 
of training. The professional or specialized skills that is required by a specific job can 
directly affect the amount of investment and time spending on the formal training. 
Occupational status can be divided into different levels, from the lower-skilled 
occupations that required basic training (e.g., waiter) to those highly professional 
occupations which require a large amount of specific training (e.g., doctor). Thus, it is 
more likely that occupations with higher wages require more specific formal training, 
i.e., either general or specific training. In addition, the concept of human capital also 
includes unobserved heterogeneity such as individual’s social connection, personal 
characteristics and discrimination against the minority groups, which can also lead to 
different wages amongst workers. Therefore, when exploring the wage difference in 
labour market, it is very important to make a right balance between assigning wage 
differences to unobserved heterogeneity and difference in human capital investment. 
Based on the general description of human capital theory above, a relevant human 
capital model that is relevant to earnings function and investment in human capital can 
be established.  
0 1 2 3
heterogeneity
ln tan exp
unobservedtraditional human capital investment
wage cons t schooling training erience             (2-1) 
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where μ refers to a set of unmeasurable indicators other than human capital, such as 
discrimination against minority group. 
2.3.2 Decomposition  
Based on human capital model, Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) proposed a 
decomposition method to disentangle the observed from the unobserved factors 
affecting wage differential. The starting point of the decomposition method is to specify 
two linear Mincer wage functions based on human capital model for different groups A 
and B: 
                   0)(,YA  AAAA EX                  (2-2) 
                   0)(,B  BBBB EXY                 (2-3) 
YA(YB) is the outcome variable (earnings), XA(XB), which is a set of human capital 
indicators, such as education, work experience and training; εA (εB) is a stochastic error 
term. The key issue with the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition is how much of the 
mean outcome variable difference,  
                       )()(R BA YEYE                           (2-4) 
is accounted for by group differences in the predictors (Xt). E(Y) denotes the expected 
value of the outcome variable.  
In this chapter, I intend to estimate the wage differential between urban hukou 
individuals (A) and rural-urban migrants (B); thus, for the given two groups “urban” 
and “rural” hukou, I specify two wage equations for urban hukou workers and 
rural-urban migrants, respectively.  
              ,,,, uituuituit XY    urban hukou workers               (2-5) 
,,,, ritrritrit XY    rural-urban migrants               (2-6) 
where Yit refers to the log of monthly wages of the i-th employee in year t, and the 
subscripts u and r indicate that the sample is restricted to urban hukou people and 
rural-urban migrants, respectively. X is a vector of explanatory variables, including 
basic socio-demographic factors such as age, marital status, gender, education level, 
occupation type, working unit, and a constant. β is the vector of coefficients to be 
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estimated, containing slope parameters and the intercept. The average difference in 
outcome (Y) can be expressed as the difference in the linear model between urban 
workers’ wage equation (2-5) and rural-urban migrants’ wage model (2-6), giving 
                     
rruu
ru
XEXE
YEYER
 )()(
)()(


                      (2-7) 
since E (εu) =0 and E (εr) =0 by assumption. The equation of raw wage differential can 
be transformed as follows: 
* * *{ ( ) ( )} { ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}u r u u r rR E X E X E X E X                         (2-8) 
We now have a twofold decomposition, where β* is the non-discriminatory coefficient 
vector. The first component  represents the portion of the wage 
gap that is explained by group differences in the characteristics, and the second 
component, is the unexplained portion, which is more 
likely to be ascribed to discrimination. When dealing with this equation, the reference 
group should be specified. In general, most researchers assume that the discrimination is 
only directed against one group. Following the classical Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) 
decomposition, since discrimination is assumed to be directed only against rural 
migrants, the coefficient of urban people can be regarded as the non-discriminatory 
vector; or the urban people are chosen as a reference vector that is β*=βu. The wage 
differential can be expressed as 
                
exp exp
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )u r u r u r u r
lained un lained
R Y Y X X X                              (2-9) 
However, in terms of calculating the reference vector or non-discriminatory vector, 
Neumark (1988) suggested using the coefficients from a pooled estimation over both 
groups, which is utilized more commonly in the literature. As pointed out by Oaxaca & 
Ransom (1994), the wage structure (2-8) can be transformed in the following equation: 
( ) ( ( ) )
+{( ) } ( )
u r u r
u r u r
R X X W I W
I W X W X
 
 
   
    
                   (2-10) 
where W indicates a matrix of observed weights containing the urban and rural migrant 
samples, and I is the identity matrix. Choosing W=I in Eq. (2-10) is equivalent to setting 
β*=βu in the classical Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition. The first part on the 
right-hand side ( ) ( ( ) )u r u rX X W I W     is the explained portion, which can be 
*{ ( ) ( )}u rE X E X 
* *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u u r rE X E X      
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explained by human capital or individuals’ characteristics, and the second part 
{( ) } ( )u r u rI W X W X        is the unexplained portion that may be due to 
discrimination. Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) also utilized Ω to represent the fitted value of 
the weighted matrix: 1ˆ ( )u u r r u uW X X X X X X
      .  
However, even though we can know whether the wage differential has been 
affected by the unobserved indicator (e.g., discrimination) in human capital model 
through Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition, this decomposition approach is likely 
to underestimate the actual discrimination against rural-urban migrants. In this model, if 
wage differential were attributed to different occupation types, it would be difficult to 
decide whether the wage gap results from observed human capital indicators leading to 
difference in occupational status or discrimination constraints on occupational entry, 
since applicants might be confronted with discrimination while applying for jobs. In 
general, it is well-known that senior professional and technical workers (doctors, 
professors, lawyers and engineers) earn higher wages than service workers, such as 
waiters, doorkeepers and counter salespeople. But rural-urban migrants might be faced 
with discrimination while seeking jobs and they may have limited access to these senior 
professional or technical occupations. As Brown et al. (1980) indicated, persons with 
similar characteristics may attain different occupations and earn different wages. In the 
context of China, rural-urban migrants are more likely to be engaged in less skilled jobs 
with lower wages and worse working conditions than urban workers, even if they 
possess similar characteristics. Hukou discrimination against rural-urban migrants not 
only influences the wage gap but also generate constraints on rural migrant’s 
occupational choice or entry, to some extent. Therefore, if the dummy variables of 
occupational status are included in the human capital model as justified and exogenous 
indicators, the types of occupational status may be affected by the potential 
discrimination in unobserved disturbance. This approach ignores the impact of potential 
discrimination among the differences in occupational distribution on wage differential. 
The discrimination faced by rural-urban migrants in the urban labour market will be 
underestimated. Therefore, I follow Brown et al. (1980) in regarding occupational status 
as an endogenous variable and take the potential discrimination in occupational 
attainment into account. A separate model of occupational attainment is proposed in the 
estimation of the income gap to estimate the wage differential between urban hukou 
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workers and rural-urban migrants.  
Brown et al. (1980) proposed an approach to combine occupation choice and the 
wage model, and derive a more accurate decomposition to estimate the gender wage 
differential. This decomposition is an extension of the conventional Oaxaca 
decomposition, which considers occupational discrimination. Brown et al. (1980) 
incorporate the difference in the probability of being engaged in one occupation 
between urban workers and rural-urban migrants. Based on Brown et al. (1980), the 
wage gaps in this chapter between urban workers and rural-urban migrants can be 
estimated as the sum of intercept, within-occupational and inter-occupational portions. 
Within-occupation wage gaps refer to unequal pay for equal work. It means that urban 
workers and rural-urban migrants earn different wages, although they have the same 
occupation and are engaged in the same work. The inter-occupation wage gap captures 
the difference in occupations between urban workers and rural-urban migrants, which 
considers that urban people and rural-urban migrants experience different opportunities, 
holding their characteristics constant. In other words, urban workers and rural-urban 
migrants with similar characteristics, such as the age, education level, gender and 
marital status, might be employed in different occupations. Rural-urban migrants might 
be engaged in a worse job than their urban counterpart. Hence, wages for the workers 
are likely to be different. Assuming there are j occupations, Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposed the wage differential into three portions,  
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(2-11) 
where puj (prj) is the proportion of urban workers and rural-urban migrants employed in 
the j-th occupation, and tX is a K×Nt vector of mean personal characteristics, t=u, r 
which refer to urban individuals and rural-urban migrants. atj and βtj represent the 
intercept and the coefficients of the personal characteristics, respectively. I is the 
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unexplained portion of the intercepts. The within-occupation proportion is similar to the 
Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition, which focuses on unequal pay for equal work. 
This proportion can be decomposed as the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition 
into an explained part (WE), which can be attributed to human characteristics, and an 
unexplained part, due to the difference in coefficients of the wage equations between 
urban workers and rural-urban migrants. In general, this portion (WU) can be attributed 
to discrimination.   
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )rj uj uj rj rj rj uj uj rj rj rj uj rj
j j j
WE WUwithin occupation
p X X p X X p X    

               (2-12) 
In addition, the inter-occupation differential can also be further decomposed into 
an explained part due to different observed characteristic (IE). The qualifications for one 
occupation might have a close relationship with different education levels, experience, 
gender or marital status. In addition, the second portion of the inter-occupation 
differential is an unexplained part, due to differences in the structure of occupational 
attainment between urban workers and rural-urban migrants (IU) not based on observed 
characteristics, which mean that urban workers and rural-urban migrants with similar 
characteristics experience different treatment while looking for jobs.  
int
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
                    (2-13) 
The new term ( rjpˆ ) in this model is the counterfactual proportion of rural-urban 
migrants in occupation j, if rural-urban migrants faced the same occupational 
opportunities as urban workers. The estimation of this new term ( rjpˆ ) requires a model 
to predict rural occupational choices, assuming that rural-urban migrants encounter the 
same opportunities as urban workers. Brown et al. (1980) used the multinomial logit 
model to estimate the probability of an individual’s employment in a particular 
occupation ( rjpˆ ).  
      


J
j
xx
ijiij
jiii eexfoccuypp
1
/)()(

      (2-14) 
31 
 
i=1, 2,…, N 
j=1, 2,…, J. 
where the dependent variable y is a categorical variable with J outcomes: occu1, 
occu2,…, occuJ. The categories are numbered 1 through J, and )( jiij occuypp   
is the probability of individual I working in occupation j and xi refers to variables 
influencing the choice of occupation. N is the number of observations and βj represents 
the vector of coefficients corresponding to the j-th occupation. Using the multinomial 
logit model, I can estimate the unobserved rjpˆ  by predicting the occupational choice 
of urban hukou workers using the rural migrants’ human capital indicators. This is a 
measure of the rural occupation choice in the absence of discrimination. The parameters 
(β1, β2, …, βJ) in the multinomial logit model can be estimated by maximum likelihood, 
and the log-likelihood function is given by 
                     
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1 1
)ln(                 (2-15) 
where yij=1, if alternative occupation j is chosen by individual i, and 0 if not, for the J 
possible outcomes. Therefore, for each individual only one of the yij’s is 1. The purpose 
of the estimation of these parameters is to analyse the difference in the structure of 
occupational attainment decomposed from the inter-occupational wage differentials.  
2.4 Data 
The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) used in this chapter is conducted 
by an international team of researchers and collects information from 12 aspects: 
population density, traditional markets, modern markets, transportation infrastructure, 
sanitation, communications, housing, education, diversity, health, and social services. 
The purpose of the CHNS is to investigate the health effects of nutrition and family 
planning policies, and to examine the role of China’s social and economic changes on 
the health and nutrition status of the population. The survey began in 1989 with eight 
provinces (Henan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hubei, Hunan, Liaoning, Shandong and Jiangsu) 
and added a ninth, Heilongjiang, in 1997 and three autonomous cities, Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Chongqing, in 2011, and ran from 1991 to 2011. The Longitudinal 
Survey covers nine waves 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. 
By the last wave in 2011, the CHNS survey covered 32,877 individuals from 8619 
households; detailed information about this data set is given in the Appendix. 
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After the combination of different separate datasets and deleting the necessary 
missing values, the estimation sample includes 12,221 observations and 7,186 
individuals.
8
 The dependent variable in my analysis is the log of hourly wages, defined 
as the log of monthly income divided by monthly hours worked. The mean value of log 
of hourly real wages is about 0.89. The distribution of the log of hourly wages is 
showed by the Figure 2-1.  
As mentioned in the methodology section, Brown et al. (1980) estimated the 
earning function and occupational choice model separately. In terms of the earnings 
function, most studies utilize the human capital model as the theoretical basis (Becker, 
1962). Based on human capital theory, wage increases with the accumulated skills 
including education, training and working experience. Further categories of explanatory 
variables will be taken into account as well, demographic factors (e.g., gender and 
marital status) and characteristics of job (e.g., working overtime and work unit). Based 
on Chinese-specific characteristics that transform the planned economy to the market 
economy, there are two types organizations in China, the public sectors and private 
sectors each having different mechanism to determine the employees’ earnings. 
Therefore, the type of working unit is also considered in the wage equation. The 
detailed description of each determinant on earnings is shown in following paragraphs.  
Regarding the occupational model, Boskin (1974), Schmid & Strauss (1975) and 
Brown et al. (1980) consider that individuals’ occupational attainment depends on 
employers’ willingness to hire one person and the job-hunters’ ambition of a specific 
occupation. Employers’ willingness to hire one person replies on the employees’ 
education attainment, work experience, and training received. Job hunters’ desire for a 
job depends on income, the consumption aspects of working, and whether the career is a 
stable job, often induced by the family size. Following the argument from Boskin 
(1974), Schmid & Strauss (1975), and Brown et al. (1980), educational attainment, 
work experience, number of children, and other demographic factors (gender and 
marital status) are included in the occupational model.  
 
                                                   
8 The detailed description of getting this sample from the original sample is shown in Section 2.7.2.2 Data structure, 
in the appendix. In addition to the literal description, I also give Table 2-15 to show the sample clearance to guarantee 
it looks much clearer. 
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Figure 2- 1 Distribution of Lnwage 
 
In terms of each independent variable, “hukou” contains the answer to the question 
“To which type of household registration do you belong?” and is used to divide all the 
individuals into one of the two hukou categories. The question regarding living area can 
be used to separate the rural hukou people into rural residents and rural-urban migrants. 
In addition, since I am analysing urban labour market discrimination between urban 
hukou workers and rural-urban migrants, it is necessary to choose individuals who are 
presently working, therefore, I only focus on working people in my sample. Only 
females between 16 and 55 and males between 16 and 60 are included in the sample 
since Chinese labour law sets the minimum legal working age at 16 and the retirement 
age for male and female workers at 60 and 55, respectively. 
When measuring work experience, there is no available information in the CHNS. 
Also, since Heilongjiang province was added in 1997 and three autonomous cities, 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing were added in 2011, it is difficult to obtain 
information of history of actual work experience for individuals in these newly added 
areas. The most common method to measure work experience is taking the age of the 
individual minus years spent in education; however, it is less accurate if I estimate the 
years of schooling based on respondents’ highest level of education they obtained. The 
primary school system is five years in some provinces while it is six years in other areas. 
Moreover, the length of normal undergraduate degree is four years, whereas it is five 
years for medical, architectural, and civil engineering domains. I, therefore, intend to 
follow Drolet & Mumford (2012) and utilize age as a proxy for work experience. When 
using age instead to interpret the estimated results, it is important to understand that the 
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relationship between age and earnings may be underestimated if individuals were not 
employed for a long time period (Chatterji, Mumford, & Smith, 2011; Mumford & 
Smith, 2007). Finally, there is no available information in the CHNS about the length of 
time that employees spent in occupational training either.   
Education and occupation are categorical variables, and I will divide these two into 
multiple dummy variables. For education level, the Chinese government decreed the 
“Nine-year Compulsory Education Law” in 1986, which ruled that primary school and 
lower middle school were compulsory for all children. According to education law, all 
school-age children and teenagers must receive nine years of compulsory education, and 
the government covers all the tuition fees of this period. It is the obligation of the 
compulsory schools, parents, and the community to let school-age children receive the 
appropriate education. Those who do not fulfil this obligation may be punished by law. 
The purpose of this law is to enhance the integral educational levels of all persons in 
order to avoid illiteracy. After nine years of compulsory education, some students may 
choose to study further in higher middle school or technical school, while other students 
may give up studying further and devote their time to working, therefore, the categorical 
variable “highest education level” is divided into 4 dummy variables: no educational 
attainment, compulsory education, senior higher school, and university. 
The variable stemming from the question “What type of work unit is this?” is a 
categorical variable including government, state service institute, state-owned enterprise, 
small collective enterprise (township-owned), large collective enterprise (such as owned 
by county, city, province), family contract farming, private enterprise, and three-capital 
enterprise (owned by foreigners, overseas Chinese and joint ventures). In the Chinese 
economic system, all the organizations and institutions can be divided into public 
ownership and private ownership. In general, public ownership means that all the 
production materials and capital goods are owned by all workers together. These 
workers devote themselves to working jointly and are in possession of the products 
jointly as well. In CHNS, government departments, state service institutes, state-owned 
enterprises, small collective enterprises, and large collective enterprises belong to the 
public ownership category. Private ownership, as opposed to the public ownership 
economy, refers to the situation where the means of production are possessed by 
individuals or some collectives exclusively, which means that individuals have 
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exclusive possession right and do not need to share the production material with others. 
In CHNS, private ownership includes family contract farming, private enterprise and 
three-capital enterprises. Therefore, I will transform this categorical variable into a 
dummy variable, where 1 refers to public ownership while 0 stands for private 
ownership. In addition, working time for different occupations is also taken into account. 
The dummy variable of overtime describes whether an individual always works 
overtime, where 1 refers to working overtime. 
The categorical variable occupation type, which is the dependent variable in the 
occupational choice model in the Brown decomposition, stems from the question “What 
is your primary occupation?”, and it includes senior professional workers (i.e., doctor, 
lawyer, professor and architect), junior professional workers (including midwife, nurse, 
editor, teacher, and photographer), administrator/executive/managers (i.e., government 
official, working proprietor, department director, section chief, and village leader), 
office staff (secretary, office helper), skilled worker (i.e., foreman, craftsman, and group 
leader), non-skilled worker (ordinary labourer, logger), service worker (i.e., housekeeper, 
counter staff, cook, sale person, and waiter), army officer, ordinary soldier, athlete or 
actor, and other. I have left out three categories, army officer, ordinary soldier, and 
athlete or actor. For the army officer and ordinary soldier, this is because their wages are 
decided directly to the national government, and are also related to their military rank. 
All army officers and soldiers who are at the same military level will receive the same 
wages from the national government, no matter to which company they belong. In 
addition, the athlete and actor are very particular occupations, as the athlete could earn 
significant amounts of money winning one competition and the actor could earn a very 
large remuneration for one movie, therefore, they cannot be compared with workers 
who earn regular wages. Hence, I kept only 8 categories from the original 
occupation-type framework, senior professional, junior professional, 
administrator/executive/manager, office staff, skilled worker, non-skilled worker, 
service worker, and other. I combined skilled and non-skilled workers as blue-collar 
workers, and drivers, service workers and other categories are merged as service 
workers. Therefore, there are 6 occupation types left in the models. Table 2-1 shows a 
description of all the factors in this chapter. 
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Table 2- 1 Description of Variables 
Variables  Description  
Dependent variable  
Hourly wages  Individuals’ regular hourly real wages  
Treatment dummy  
Rural  1- All respondents with rural hukou status but work in urban city 
0- All respondents with urban hukou status regardless of their 
working place  
Independent variables  
Male   1- Male 
0- Female  
Age  Age of respondent in years 
Married   1- Married 
0- Unmarried  
Work unit  1- Public sector 
0- Private sector 
Working overtime The legal working hours are 8 hours per day and 5 days per week.  
1- Respondents working hours per week exceeds 40 hours 
0- Otherwise  
Respondents’ highest education level 
Non-education 1- No education 
0- Otherwise 
Compulsory level  1- Highest education level is compulsory school  
0- Otherwise 
Senior high school 1- Highest education level is senior level (professional high school, 
senior high school and technical school) 
0- Otherwise 
University  1- Highest education level is university  
0- Otherwise 
Type of occupation  China as a dual structural country, rural area is mainly engaged in the 
production of agricultural activities. The diversity of non-agricultural 
occupations is mainly concentrated in urban cities. Individuals who 
are engaged in these occupations are urban hukou people and 
rural-urban migrants. The occupational categories given in the dataset 
is shown below: 
Senior professional   1- Respondents who are engaged in senior professional jobs 
(doctors, lawyer, professor, architect and engineer) 
0- Otherwise  
Junior professional  1- Respondents who are engaged in junior professional jobs 
(midwife, nurse, editor, teacher, photographer and journalist) 
0- Otherwise  
Administration/executive/manager 1- Respondents who are engaged in administration job 
(administrator/ executive/ manager, government official, 
department director, section chief and leader) 
0- Otherwise  
Office staff  1- Respondents who are office staff (secretary, office helper, typist) 
0- Otherwise 
Blue collar worker 1- Respondents who are engaged in blue collar jobs (foreman, 
craftsman, group leader, ordinary labourer, logger) 
0-  Otherwise 
Service worker 1- Respondents who are engaged in service jobs (housekeeper, 
counter staff, cook, sale person and waiter/waitress) 
0- Otherwise 
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
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Table 2-2 lists the summary statistics of the independent and dependent variables 
for all respondents. According to Table 2-2, the average value of the log of hourly wages 
for all the respondents is about 0.89. In addition, the results from Table 2-2 show the 
mean value of human characteristics and the probability of being in one occupational 
category for both urban workers and rural-urban migrants. Tables 2-3 and 2-4 present 
information on the differences in occupation distributions, hours worked, wages, and 
different individual characteristics between urban workers and rural-urban migrants. 
Table 2- 2 Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Lnwage 12221 0.889 0.917 -2.079 5.187 
Hourly wages  12221 3.821 6.122 0.125 178.947 
Independent variables 
Age  12221 38.858 10.132 16 60 
Age2 12221 1612.602 792.097 256 3600 
Rural hukou 12221 0.208 0.406 0 1 
Married  12221 0.842 0.364 0 1 
Male  12221 0.574 0.494 0 1 
Public sector 12221 0.789 0.408 0 1 
Overtime  12221 0.468 0.499 0 1 
Highest education level 
Non-education  12221 0.028 0.165 0 1 
Compulsory school 12221 0.398 0.489 0 1 
Senior high school 12221 0.397 0.489 0 1 
University  12221 0.176 0.381 0 1 
Occupation type  
1. Senior professional  12221 0.107 0.309 0 1 
2. Junior professional 12221 0.105 0.306 0 1 
3.Admin./executive/manager 12221 0.114 0.318 0 1 
4. Office staff  12221 0.131 0.338 0 1 
5. Blue collar worker 12221 0.357 0.479 0 1 
6.Service worker 12221 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized. 
Firstly, as can be seen from Table 2-3, the difference between occupational choice 
between urban workers and rural-urban migrants is obvious from the 6 occupation 
categories. Senior/junior professional, administration, and office staff are considered 
“white-collar”, and only 23.16% of rural-urban migrants have white-collar jobs, while 
51.63% of urban workers are in this category. However, about 76.84% of rural-urban 
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migrants are engaged in blue collar and service jobs, whilst 48.37% of urban workers 
are employed in these categories. Hence, according to the descriptive statistics, it is 
necessary to take occupation segregation into account and regard occupation attainment 
as an endogenous variable, since rural-urban migrants and urban workers are faced with 
different occupational distributions.   
Table 2- 3 Occupational Distribution, Hours Worked, Earnings of Rural and 
Urban Workers 
 
Occupation  
Occupational distribution Hours worked by occupation 
Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Freq. % Freq. % Mean SD Mean SD 
Senior professional 56 2.20 1252 12.94 48.57 10.13 40.74 6.98 
Junior professional 159 6.25 1122 11.59 42.91 9.88 41.10 6.97 
Administration/ 
executive/manager 
214 8.42 1176 12.15 44.19 13.89 42.01 6.95 
Office staff 160 6.29 1447 14.95 44.18 9.36 41.38 7.12 
Blue collar worker 1397 54.94 2963 30.62 51.77 12.56 45.22 9.74 
Service worker 557 21.90 1718 17.75 49.43 14.54 47.17 12.58 
Total  2543 100 9678 100 49.52 13.13 43.54 9.40 
 
Occupation  
Monthly wages by occupation Hourly wages by occupation (ln) 
Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Senior professional 571.23 452.51 944.89 1239.07 0.79 0.86 1.37 0.94 
Junior professional 431.85 319.45 721.95 785.68 0.65 0.86 1.12 0.93 
Administration/ 
executive/manager 
485.22 815.58 825.77 1300.51 0.58 0.93 1.16 0.93 
Office staff 526.38 370.42 732.19 1072.84 0.89 0.75 1.08 0.92 
Blue collar worker 490.84 480.65 472.36 699.22 0.61 0.77 0.61 0.85 
Service worker 589.55 835.24 581.12 702.60 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.87 
Total 512.30 597.22 663.62 954.73 0.68 0.81 0.94 0.94 
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized. 
Secondly, rural-urban migrants are not only more likely to be employed in less 
prestigious jobs, they also work longer hours and earn lower wages than urban hukou 
workers. On average, rural-urban migrants work approximately 8 hours per week more 
than the urban hukou individuals, and the difference is particularly evident in the senior 
professional. Thirdly, rural-urban migrants earn lower wages than urban workers. The 
average monthly wages of rural-urban migrants (512.30) is 22.8% lower than that of 
urban hukou workers (663.62). The difference in working hours between rural migrants 
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and urban workers is taken into account and the dependent variable is defined as the 
difference in log of hourly real wages (the log (monthly real wages/ working hours)). 
Since rural-urban migrants work longer shifts than their urban counterparts, the hourly 
wage gap is wider than the monthly wage gap. The average log of hourly wages of 
rural-urban migrants (0.68) is 27.6% lower than the wages of urban hukou workers 
(0.94), which is similar findings by Meng & Zhang (2001). 
According to Becker (1957), different wages and different occupational attainment 
should be attributed to productivity-related characteristics, such as educational levels, 
age, work experience, and non-productive related characteristics, such as gender, race, 
and the hukou status. If individuals with the same productivity related characteristics 
and other human capital indicators are treated differently in terms of occupation and 
wages because of race, gender and hukou status, it will be defined as discrimination. 
Therefore, before analysing the extent to which the characteristics influence the 
different wages and occupational choices, it is necessary to know the difference in 
individual characteristics for the wage model and occupation choice model, 
respectively. 
Table 2-4 shows the comparison in personal characteristics between urban workers 
and rural-urban migrants, and presents information of human capital endowment and 
personal characteristics between the two groups. Rural-urban migrants are 3 years 
younger than their urban counterparts, on average. The descriptive statistics in Table 2-4 
show the overtime variable is consistent with the statistics from Table 2-3. In Table 2-3, 
on average, rural-urban migrants work 8 hours per week are more than urban workers. 
Table 2-4 shows that 70% of rural-urban migrants work overtime, while only 41% of 
urban residents do. Lee (2012) using Chinese data also finds that the weekly working 
hours for rural-urban migrants is 13 hours more than for urban workers, on average, 
which is similar to this chapter. 
As expected, the highest education level of rural-urban migrants is lower than for 
urban workers. Most rural-urban migrants only have compulsory education level (64%), 
while only 26% and 4% of rural migrants have graduated from senior higher education 
and university, respectively. Therefore, these rural-urban migrants may not be qualified 
for jobs with a high skill requirement. In comparison, 22% and 43% of the urban 
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workers graduated from university and senior high school. Hence, it is clear that the 
education levels of rural-urban migrants are lower than urban workers, in this context. 
In addition, the urban residents are more likely to be hired in the public sector (83% of 
urban workers), including governmental departments, state service institutes, 
state-owned enterprises, and small and large collective enterprises.  
Table 2- 4 Comparison of Personal Characteristic between Rural and Urban 
Workers 
 Rural-urban migrants Urban residents 
 Mean value SD Mean value SD 
Independent variables  
Age  36.18 10.75 39.56 9.84 
Number of kid  0.59 0.76 0.48 0.60 
Married  0.80 0.40 0.85 0.35 
Male  0.72 0.43 0.57 0.49 
Overtime  0.70 0.46 0.41 0.49 
Public sector (work unit) 0.62 0.46 0.83 0.37 
Highest education level 
Non-education   0.06 0.48 0.02 0.37 
Compulsory school 0.64 0.48 0.33 0.47 
Senior high school 0.26 0.44 0.43 0.49 
University  0.04 0.19 0.22 0.41 
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
In comparison, only 62% of the rural-urban migrants are employed in the public sector. 
Considering gender, about 72% of the rural-urban migrants and 57% of the urban 
workers are men. The higher proportion of men in rural-urban migrants can be 
explained by the nature of migration which has been discussed in Chapter 1. In urban 
China, the great majority of urban women choose to work due to the higher cost of 
living in urban cities. However, for rural hukou migrants, there were limited job 
opportunities that were concentrated in the construction industries in the early stage of 
migration. Thus, most of the rural hukou individuals who migrated to urban cities were 
men. Most rural women chose to stay in rural area and were reluctant to work in urban 
cities. With the accession to the WTO, types of jobs in urban cities are gradually 
diversifying and more job opportunities are available than that before. The number of 
rural hukou female who migrated to urban cities have increased gradually. About 85% 
of urban workers are married, while 80% of rural-urban migrants are married, which 
may be due to the fact that the average age of the urban hukou workers is higher (39.56) 
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than for rural-urban migrants (36.18).  
The summary statistics in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 are informative, but cannot tell 
us how the difference in the characteristics between urban and rural groups influences 
wages and occupation choice. In addition, it can also be difficult to ascertain the extent 
to which the difference in wages and occupational attainment between urban workers 
and rural-urban migrants can be explained by the difference in individual characteristics. 
In the next section, I will use the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition to disentangle this 
issue.  
2.5 Results 
In this section, the results come from applying the econometric techniques 
described in the methodology section to the data. Since some researchers have analysed 
wage differentials in relation to gender, race or hukou status by the Oaxaca 
decomposition approach previously, I will compare both approaches by Brown et al. 
(1980) and Oaxaca & Ransom (1994), and discuss the advantage of the Brown et al. 
(1980) decomposition.  
Table 2-5 presents results of wage regressions by hukou status. The explanatory 
variables in the wage regressions are age, gender, marital status, type of work unit, a 
dummy variable for working overtime, a time dummy, and dummies for highest 
education level. As can be seen, all the explanatory variables have a significant effect on 
hourly wages for both urban people and rural migrants except the work unit. According 
to Table 2-5, there was an increase in wages for both rural migrants and urban hukou 
workers from 1997 to 2011. The overtime dummy variable indicates whether working 
overtime has a negative effect on hourly wages. The variable age has a positive effect on 
hourly wages: the hourly wages for rural-urban migrants increase by 1.4% for each 1 
year increases in age, which is consistent with other research. That is because most 
researchers have regarded age as a proxy for work experience. The older individuals 
might have an abundance of work experience and might be more skilful; thus, they may 
be more likely to be hired in superior positions with higher wages. 
The type of work unit has no significant impact on either urban workers or 
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rural-urban migrants. Married individuals are more likely to obtain higher wages than 
those unmarried. Married urban people earn 4.9% higher wages than unmarried urban 
people. In terms of education level, individuals who graduated from senior high school 
and university are more likely to be in superior occupations and positions that require 
higher levels of skills and knowledge; therefore, they might earn higher wages than 
those who do not receive education. In addition, the rate of return of a university 
education is much higher than that of senior high school. For example, compared to 
non-education for rural-urban migrants, individuals graduating from university earn 
21.9% higher wages, and individuals graduating from senior high school earn 14.5% 
higher wages, on average. Workers with a bachelor’s degree are more likely to be 
engaged in senior professional jobs, such as lawyer, architect, and doctor, while ones 
who graduated from senior high school might be occupied as office helpers, craftsmen 
or group leaders. Thus, workers with a bachelor’s degree enjoy a higher rate of return 
than individuals who graduate from senior school. In addition, it can be seen that the 
rate of return to university level is lower for rural workers than for urban residents, 
similar to the findings by Messinis (2013) and Démurger et al. (2009). These authors 
indicated that the difference in terms of the rate of return of education levels for 
rural-urban migrants and urban hukou workers is most likely to be due to 
discrimination.  
As discussed previously, I took occupational segregation into account and 
estimated with the multinomial logit model for occupational choice to process the 
Brown et al. (1980) decomposition. Tables 2-6 and 2-7 present the results of the 
multinomial logit model, which shows the effect of individual characteristics on 
occupational choice. Firstly, according to Table 2-6, for rural-urban migrants, in 
comparison to those who do not have education attainment (the base category), 
applicants graduating from senior high school and university tend to work in 
white-collar jobs, which includes senior and junior professional jobs, administrative and 
manager, and office jobs. The effect of senior high school and university are significant 
on all the categories for white-collar jobs. There is not a significant difference in the 
probability of being engaged in white-collar jobs (except for office staff) for 
respondents who only receive compulsory education. The insignificant effect of 
compulsory education level should be attributed to senior and junior professional jobs, 
and administrative and manager, which have higher requirements for employees’ 
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education level. Individuals only having compulsory education level are not competent 
for most high-level jobs such as doctor and professor. Furthermore, the probability of 
being in a blue-collar job is lower than for people graduating from compulsory and 
senior high school and university, compared with individuals without any education 
attainment. 
Table 2- 5 OLS Estimation of Hourly Wages Equations 
 Rural migrants  Urban workers 
Variables  Coefficient Cluster S. E.  Coefficient Cluster S.E. 
Constant  -0.325** 0.165 -0.651*** 0.107 
Independent variable 
Age  0.014** 0.005 0.021*** 0.005 
Age2 -0.0003** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.00006 
Overtime  -0.350*** 0.026 -0.423*** 0.014 
Male  0.278*** 0.024 0.163*** 0.013 
Public (work unit) -0.016 0.031 0.021 0.020 
Married  0.065* 0.032 0.049** 0.021 
Highest educational levels 
Compulsory school -0.028 0.047 -0.029 0.047 
Senior high school 0.145** 0.052 0.102** 0.046 
University  0.219** 0.072 0.365*** 0.048 
Year 1997 0.465*** 0.039 0.338*** 0.020 
Year 2000 0.631*** 0.043 0.681*** 0.023 
Year 2004 0.859*** 0.048 1.010*** 0.023 
Year 2006 1.008*** 0.046 1.158*** 0.024 
Year 2009 1.343*** 0.045 1.483*** 0.025 
Year 2011 1.567*** 0.042 1.721*** 0.022 
Number of observations  2543 9678 
Adjusted R2 0.5701 0.6818 
Note: (1) In highest education level, compulsory (including primary and junior middle school) is the base category.  
(2) ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively. 
(3) China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
(4) Standard errors adjusted for individual-level clustering in parentheses. 
For example, rural-urban migrants who are university graduates are 5.5 percent and 9.8 
percent more likely to work in senior professional jobs and junior professional jobs, 
respectively. Furthermore, they are 54.4 percent and 20.7 percent less likely to work in 
blue collar and service jobs, in comparison to those without educational attainment. The 
reason for these results is likely to be that the senior professional jobs, such as 
professors, doctors, architect and lawyers require more advanced and professional 
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knowledge or skills, which are based on higher education levels, whereas blue collar 
and service jobs, such as waiters, counter staff, and hairdressers, do not require the 
applicants to have an advanced educational background. In this case, companies can 
save on labour costs by hiring individuals without higher education levels. 
For urban hukou workers, the results are similar to rural-urban migrants; 
individuals graduating from senior high school and university are more likely to be 
hired in white-collar jobs, including senior and junior professional jobs, administrative 
and manager, and office staff, in comparison to those without education attainment. As 
with rural-urban migrants, all the educational levels in Table 2-7 have negative and 
significant effects on being employed in blue collar and service jobs. Individuals 
graduating from university are 61.3 and 21.7 percentage points less likely to be engaged 
in blue collar and service jobs, respectively, compared to those with non-education 
attainment. For the blue collar and service categories that do not have higher 
educational requirements, the higher the education level is, the lower the probability of 
individuals being in these two occupational categories. For most white collar 
occupational categories, having a higher education level leads to a higher probability of 
being engaged in these occupations, except people with compulsory education 
attainment. For example, those who graduated from university are 29.3 percent more 
likely to be engaged in senior professional jobs. And those graduating from senior high 
school are 17.0 percent more likely to be in this category, in comparison to people with 
non-education attainment. 
Comparing Tables 2-6 and 2-7, we also see that for the highest occupation category 
(senior professional) and the lowest occupation category (service jobs), urban hukou 
workers have a higher chance of being engaged in the senior professional category and a 
lower chance of being employed in a service job, in comparison to rural-urban migrants. 
For example, if individuals graduated from university, the probability of urban hukou 
workers in senior professional occupations would increase by 29.3 percentage points, 
while the probability of rural-urban migrants being in this category would only increase 
by 5.5 percentage points. In addition, for the most inferior occupations (service jobs) 
among those graduating from university, the probability of urban workers decreases by 
21.7 percentage points, whereas the probability of rural-urban migrants drops by 20.7 
percent. This situation is identical for the senior high school, for example, among those  
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Table 2- 6 Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Model, Rural-Urban Migrants 
Occupation Senior professional Junior professional  Administrative 
/executive/manager 
Office staff Blue collar 
worker 
Service  
worker  
Compulsory school  0.021 0.028 0.017 0.025* -0.163*** -0.072** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) 
Senior high school   0.038** 0.064*** 0.040*** 0.053*** -0.313*** -0.116*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016) 
University   0.055*** 0.098*** 0.103*** 0.082*** -0.544*** -0.207*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.046) (0.039) 
Age  -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Age2 0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0005** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.00001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
Married  -0.001 0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.018 -0.022 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.015) (0.016) 
Number of children 0.0001 0.005** 0.010*** -0.001 -0.011 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) 
Male  0.007** -0.014** 0.028*** -0.003 0.047*** -0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) 
Note: (1) ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively. 
(2) Highest education level includes non-education attainment (base category), compulsory school, senior high school and university.  
(3) Standard errors adjusted for individual-level clustering in parentheses.  
(4) China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized. 
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Table 2- 7 Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Model, Urban Hukou Workers 
Occupations  Senior professional  Junior 
professional  
Administration 
/executive/manager 
Office staff Blue collar worker Service worker 
Compulsory school  0.006 0.108 0.024 0.046** -0.110** -0.074** 
 (0.060) (0.070) (0.037) (0.021) (0.032) (0.026) 
Senior school 0.170** 0.210** 0.035** 0.092** -0.328*** -0.180*** 
 (0.059) (0.069) (0.010) (0.045) (0.032) (0.026) 
University  0.293*** 0.267*** 0.133*** 0.135** -0.613*** -0.217*** 
 (0.059) (0.069) (0.036) (0.048) (0.035) (0.028) 
Age 0.008** -0.012*** 0.011** 0.001 0.0003 -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Age2 -0.0002*** 
(0.00004) 
0.0002*** 
(0.00003) 
-0.0001** 
(0.00004) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0001** 
(0.00004) 
Married  0.010 0.006 0.031** 0.009 -0.017 -0.039** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) 
Number of children 0.021** 0.007 0.004 -0.028*** -0.014* -0.018** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Male  0.018** -0.088*** 0.069*** -0.044*** 0.091*** -0.045*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Note: (1) ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively.  
(2) Highest education level includes non-education attainment (base category), compulsory school, senior high school and university.  
(3) Standard errors adjusted for individual-level clustering in parentheses. 
(4) China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized. 
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who graduate from senior high school, urban hukou workers are 17.0 percent more 
likely to be employed in the senior professional occupation, while the proportion of 
rural-urban migrants in this category is 3.8 percentage points. For the impact of other 
socio-demographic factors, with an additional year of age increasing, the probability of 
urban workers being engaged in senior professional and 
administrative/executive/manager increases but at a decreasing rate. The probability of 
rural-urban migrants being engaged in administrative/executive/manager also increases 
at a decreasing rate. Number of children has a significant and positive effect on the 
junior professional and administrative/executive/manager for rural-urban migrants, 
while it has a significant effect on senior professional, office staff, blue collar and 
service workers for urban workers. The individuals’ family situation, such as marital 
status, seems to affect few occupational attainments for urban workers. Urban 
respondents who are married are more likely to be engaged in administrative and 
manager positions and less likely to be a service worker. The reason for these results 
might be that among the administrative and manager positions most have more work 
experience and accumulation of social wealth with their married status. In addition, 
workers in these occupations are older and married longer, in comparison to blue collar 
and service workers, therefore that may be why being married has a positive effect on 
the probability of being employed in administration or as a manager. 
Turning to the effect of gender, a dummy variable for being male has similar effect 
on the two groups. Male workers are more likely to be employed in senior professional 
jobs (doctor, professions or lawyer), administration, executive and manager positions, 
and blue-collar occupations. However, they are less likely to be engaged in junior 
professional jobs (midwife, nurse, and teacher), office staff such as secretaries, and 
service workers. This issue should be attributed to the occupational segregation between 
genders, because certain occupations tend to be carried out by one group, such as jobs 
like nurse, midwife and secretary, which women are more likely to do, and occupations 
like craftsman or logger, which tend to be done by men. 
The difference in occupational choice between urban people and rural-urban 
migrants indicates that urban people and rural-urban migrants might be treated 
differently in the urban labour market. In order to evaluate the extent of different 
48 
 
treatment for rural-urban migrants with regard to occupational choice, I also estimate 
the actual and predicted occupational choice of urban workers and rural-urban migrants 
in Table 2-8. The predicted occupational choice for rural migrants refers to the 
occupation distribution of rural workers who have the same occupation opportunities as 
urban hukou workers based on the urban hukou workers’ occupational attainment model 
and using the rural estimated characteristics. The difference between actual and 
predicted occupational distributions for rural-urban migrants can be attributed to the 
different treatment of the migrants. The predicted occupational choice of urban hukou 
workers is based on the rural-urban migrants’ occupational attainment model using 
urban estimated characteristics. The predicted occupation distributions for both urban 
workers and rural-urban migrants indicate what occupation attainment of urban workers 
and rural-urban migrants would have been if they had been treated as their counterparts 
in the labour market. 
Table 2-8 shows the difference between actual and predicted occupational choices 
for both rural-urban migrants and urban hukou workers. According to Table 2-8, about 
1.50% more rural-urban migrants would be hired in senior professional occupations if 
they were treated as urban hukou workers. Only 5.18% of rural-urban migrants were 
employed as the office staff, while 11.56% of rural-urban migrants should have been in 
the office staff category if they had been treated as urban hukou workers. In addition, 
only 49.58% would have been in blue-collar jobs if they were treated equally to urban 
workers. This situation is reversed for urban hukou workers. The actual percentage of 
urban hukou workers in senior professional jobs is 8.77%, while only 3.06% of urban 
hukou workers would have worked in this type of occupation if they were treated 
equally to rural workers. On the contrary, about 11.75% and 2.84% more urban hukou 
workers would have been in blue-collar and service jobs, respectively. 
It seems that rural-urban migrants are treated differently from urban hukou people 
in terms of their job opportunities. If occupation segregation did not exist, more 
rural-urban migrants would have been engaged in white-collar occupations, while more 
urban hukou workers would have been in blue-collar occupations. Meng & Zhang (2001) 
also estimated the different occupation attainments between rural migrants and urban 
residents, and reached the same conclusion. They also indicated that occupation 
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segregation not only lowered rural-urban migrants’ social status, but also led to a wage 
gap between urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants. Liu et al. (2004) also 
found similar results in their study of occupation segregation and wage differentials 
between Hong Kong natives and mainland immigrants. In their studies, they found that 
the actual percentage of people in high quality jobs (i.e. managers, professionals, and 
clerks) is lower than the predicted percentage, whilst the actual percentage of service 
workers is higher than predicted. If the mainland immigrants were treated equally to the 
Hong Kong natives, the percentage of mainland immigrants in the professions, such as 
clerks, managers, administrative, and plant operators, would increase. Démurger et al. 
(2009) analysed whether rural-urban migrants were second-class workers in the Chinese 
labour market and found that about 50% of urban hukou workers were professionals, 
technicians, or office workers, while more than 50% of rural-urban migrants did not 
have regular jobs and were self-employed workers. 
Table 2- 8 Actual and Predicted Occupational Distribution for Urban People and 
Rural-Urban Migrants 
Types of Occupation  Actual % Predicted % Difference % 
Rural-urban migrants 
Senior professional 0.79 2.29 1.50 
Junior professional 1.99 4.74 2.75 
Administration/executive/manager 4.55 5.56 1.01 
Office staff 5.18 11.56 6.38 
Blue collar worker 61.56 49.58 -11.98 
Service worker 25.96 26.27 0.31 
Urban hukou workers 
Senior professional 8.77 3.06 -5.71 
Junior professional 11.19 8.55 -2.64 
Administration/executive/manager 12.07 11.81 -0.26 
Office staff 18.09 12.09 -6.00 
Blue collar worker 29.04 40.79 11.75 
Service worker 20.84 23.68 2.84 
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized. 
In summary, in light of the analysis above, it can be seen that urban people and 
rural-urban migrants have different characteristics; in addition, they face different 
treatments in occupational attainment (Table 2-8) and wages (Table 2-3). However, it is 
difficult to confirm the extent to which the different treatments of these two groups can 
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be attributed to individual characteristics or unexplained factors, such as discrimination. 
Most Chinese researchers have regarded occupation distribution as an exogenous 
variable to analyse differences in treatment by the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) 
decomposition methodology. However, by using this methodology, they may ignore the 
potential discrimination in the different occupational attainments. 
Unlike these previous Chinese studies, I take the occupational attainment as an 
endogenous variable. The wage differential from Brown et al. (1980) can be 
decomposed into within-occupation and inter-occupation gaps. I will also compare the 
decomposition results between Brown et al. (1980) and Oaxaca & Ransom (1994). 
Before analysing the wage differential by Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) approach, I 
consider the self-selection of migration for rural people and try to correct the selectivity 
bias. However, there is limited reference in terms of the theoretical and technical 
approach to show how to address the selection problem in Brown et al.’s (1980) 
decomposition; consequently, it is difficult to guarantee the feasibility of addressing 
selectivity. However, Neuman & Oaxaca (2004) present how to address the selection 
issue in Oaxaca’s decomposition (Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and Oaxaca-Ransom 
decomposition), and Jann (2008) gives a description of the technical calculations of 
selectivity in Oaxaca’s decomposition. Due to the difficulties for addressing selectivity 
in Brown et al.’s (1980) decomposition, I intend to solve the self-selection for migration 
in Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition and compare the decomposition results 
with and without selectivity. These comparison results can provide evidence for whether 
the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition results are sensitive to selectivity 
correction so that I can understand if the results of the Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposition will be influenced by ignoring selectivity. If there is no significant 
difference in the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition results with and without 
selectivity, the estimation by the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition approach in this 
chapter would likely not be affected by ignoring selectivity and the estimations are more 
reliable. On the contrary, if there is a large difference when comparing the Oaxaca & 
Ransom (1994) decomposition with and without selectivity, the estimation results of the 
Brown et al. (1980) decomposition without selectivity in this chapter are likely biased. 
This caveat should be kept in mind when interpret the Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposition results. 
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Although the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition is a benchmark for the 
Brown et al. (1980) decomposition, it is not the main content in this chapter. All of the 
information about the description of the theory, formulas for selectivity, selection model, 
exclusion restrictions, and probit estimations are shown in the Appendix. In the main 
results, I only demonstrate and compare the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition 
results with and without selectivity. The estimation of the Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposition and the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition with and without 
selectivity are compared in Table 2-9. Columns (A) and (B) show the results from the 
common decomposition approach, Oaxaca & Ransom (1994), without and with 
selectivity, respectively, which computes the decomposition by using the coefficients 
from a pooled model over both urban people and rural-urban migrants as the reference 
coefficients (Oaxaca & Ransom, 1994; Jann, 2008).  
In column (A), according to the sample, the mean value of ln(wage) for urban 
people is 0.940 and is 0.676 rural migrants, which yields a raw wage differential of 
0.264. The share of the explained portion is approximately 83.3%, whilst the 
unexplained part is around 16.7%. The estimation of the decomposition indicates that a 
majority part of the mean wage differential between urban people and rural migrants is 
ascribed to observed human capital or individual characteristic differentials. A small 
portion of the income gap is attributed to the unobserved factors, which are most likely 
to be discrimination against rural migrants. Among the explained portion, the most 
important contributing determinants are job characteristics (42.4%), education level 
(24.6%), and types of occupation (11.4%). Thus, the explained portion to total wage 
differential indicates that hourly wage differentials between urban people and rural 
migrants is mainly attributed to the difference in the different occupation distribution 
and their different education levels. The unexplained portion can be decomposed further 
into advantages of urban people (overpayment and favouritism) and disadvantages of 
rural migrants (underpayment and discrimination). 
When the self-selection of migration for rural people is taken into account, the 
adjusted wage differential (shown in Eq. 2-21) between urban people and rural-urban 
migrants shown in column (B) increases to 0.370, with 0.218 explained (58.9%) and 
0.152 unexplained (41.1%). In comparison with the decomposition without selectivity, 
the detailed decomposition results with selectivity for migration expresses that there is a   
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Table 2- 9 Wage Decomposition by Oaxaca-Ransom with and without Selectivity 
 Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) without 
selection (A) 
Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) with 
selection (B) 
 Coef. Perc. (%) Coef. Perc. (%) 
Wage differential 0.264 100% 0.370 100% 
Total explained 0.220 83.3% 0.218 58.9% 
Total unexplained 0.044 16.7% 0.152 41.1% 
Advantage of urban 0.002 0.8% -0.001 -0.3% 
Disadvantage of rural 0.042 15.9% 0.153 41.4% 
Total explained  Coef. Perc. (83.3%) Coef. Perc. (58.9%) 
Social demographic  -0.003 -1.1% -0.003 -0.8% 
Age (working experience)  0.015 5.6% 0.013 3.5% 
Education level 0.065 24.6% 0.064 17.3% 
Job characteristics 0.112 42.4% 0.111 30.0% 
Occupations  0.030 11.4% 0.031 8.4% 
Time dummies 0.001 0.4% 0.002 0.5% 
Total unexplained  Coef. Perc. (16.7%) Coef. Perc. (41.1%) 
Social demographic  -0.081 -30.7% -0.095 -25.7% 
Age (working experience) 0.317 120.1% 0.372 100.5% 
Education level -0.041 -15.5% -0.072 -19.5% 
Job characteristic -0.032 -12.1% -0.032 -8.5% 
Occupations -0.068 -25.8% -0.069 -18.6% 
Time dummies 0.091 34.5% 0.095 25.6% 
Constant  -0.142 -53.8% -0.047 -12.7% 
Note: (1) Social demographic factors contain gender and marital status. Education level include non-education, 
compulsory school, senior high middle school and university which non-educational attainment is regarded as 
reference group. Job characteristics include the dummy variables of working overtime and work unit.  
(2) In the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition, the occupation types are included as exogenous dummy variables. 
The occupation categories include six dummy variables that are senior professional, junior professional, 
administration/executive/manager, office staff, blue collar workers and service workers, respectively. In terms of the 
categorical variable e.g. occupation, the decomposition results reply on the choice of reference group. The Stata 
command “categorical” is used in this chapter to identify dummy variables for categorical variables and transform 
coefficient vectors. Consequently, deviations from the grand mean are presented and the coefficient for the base 
category is added (Yun, 2005; Jann, 2008). Such transformation of estimation can guarantee the decomposition 
results do not rely on different choice of omitted base category.    
(3) The unexplained portion of Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition can be further decomposed into advantaged 
of urban people and disadvantaged of rural migrants.  
(4) Decomposition approaches are usually utilized in cross-sectional dataset. There is very litter research conducting 
the panel analysis currently in decomposition method (including Oaxaca-Blinder, Oaxaca-Ransom, Brown 
decomposition) regardless of the structure of panel data. That is because it is difficult to obtain corresponding 
coefficient for those variables that do not change over time through the panel analysis to perform the further 
decomposition. In addition, while the CHNS is a panel dataset most individuals are only observed in one wave (see 
Table 2-12), which makes it difficult to control for fixed effects in this chapter. In China, new cities or new provinces 
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were added constantly into different waves of several panel dataset, due to Chinese specific situation. In addition, 
some rural areas or districts in one of the provinces did not continue to be investigated due to several special cases in 
local province. In order to consider wage gap across the whole country, one Chinese researcher Ge (2007) pooled 
different years together. In this chapter, I follow Ge (2007) to pool different years and decompose the wage 
differential between urban people and rural-urban migrants. The standard errors are clustered by ID in this chapter to 
control the individual effect.  
(5) China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
slightly different impact of the explained portion, whereas the unexplained portion 
varies to a large extent. The variation of the raw wage differential with selectivity is 
more likely to be ascribed to the unexplained portion. Similar to the Oaxaca & Ransom 
(1994) decomposition without selectivity, job characteristic (30.0%), education 
attainment (17.3%), and types of occupation (8.4%) also denote the major contributions 
to the explained portion. Therefore, these comparison estimations show that the extent 
of discrimination of decomposition results are likely to be downward biased when 
ignoring migration selection for rural people. 
The reason why the coefficient effects (unexplained portion) in the Oaxaca & 
Ransom (1994) decomposition with selectivity increases a lot may be ascribed to that 
rural-urban migrants differing markedly from non-migrant rural hukou residents in 
terms of some unobservable factors. Given the similar observed human characteristics 
and unobservable productivity determinants, rural-urban migrants are more likely to 
have greater ambition, more motivation, and better capability of dealing with pressure 
and recovering, compared to non-migrant rural people (Lee, 2012). Rural-urban 
migrants, therefore, are likely to be a group who have these unobserved factors. In this 
case, those rural people who choose to migrate to urban cities may not be a random 
sample among all the rural hukou populations. In comparing the Oaxaca & Ransom 
(1994) decomposition with selectivity and without selectivity, I realize that the Brown et 
al. (1980) decomposition results in my analysis without correcting for selectivity shown 
in Table 2-10 may be downward biased and may underestimate the actual discrimination 
against rural -urban migrants. The failure to deal with sample selection in the Brown et 
al. (1980) decomposition is the limitation of this chapter. 
As shown in Table 2-10, the estimated results from the Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposition change significantly, in comparison with results from the Oaxaca & 
Ransom (1994) decomposition without selectivity. The explained portion of the wage 
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gaps from the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition is smaller than the results achieved 
from the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition, once occupational segregation is 
taken into account. Using the Brown et al. (1980) method, the total explained portion 
decreases to 69%, and the unexplained portion of the whole wage differential is 31%. 
This result is consistent with Brown’s theory and other research. For example, Fearon & 
Wald (2011) analysed the earnings gap between black and white workers in Canada. 
They indicated that 41.2% was due to differences in the endowments of characteristics, 
while 58.8% was not attributed to the characteristics when using the Oaxaca & Ransom 
(1994) approach. However, only 21.1% of the wage differential was attributed to 
endowment differences, while 78.9% was obtained from an unexplained portion once 
the Brown et al. decomposition was used. Meng & Zhang (2001) obtained similar 
conclusions. 
Table 2- 10 Decomposition Results of Wages Differentials between Urban Hukou 
Workers and Rural-Urban Migrants  
 
 
 
 
Brown et al. 
decomposition 
Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition 
without selection 
Log hourly wages % of total Log hourly wages % of total 
Total earnings differential 0.264 100 0.264 100 
Within-occupation 0.101 38%   
Explained  0.037 14%   
Unexplained  0.064 24%   
Inter-occupation  0.163 62%   
Explained  0.146 55%   
Unexplained  0.017 7%   
Total explained  0.183 69% 0.220 83% 
Total unexplained  0.081 31% 0.044 17% 
Note: (1) China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.     
     (2) The reason why I compare the Brown et al. (1980) with Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) without selectivity 
correction is attributed to that the results of Brown et al. (1980) is this table is not dealt with selectivity.  
The reason for this result is that, in the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition, 
rural-urban migrants are compared to urban hukou workers, regardless of their 
occupational attainment. However, in the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition, the 
occupation distribution between urban individuals and rural-urban migrants is taken into 
account. Rural-urban migrants are compared with urban ones within each occupation. 
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As shown in Table 2-3 above, rural-urban migrants are more likely to be engaged in 
lower-status categories. Taking this into account, occupational distribution leads to the 
unexplained part of the whole wage differential rising. To sum up, the comparison 
between the two decompositions shows that the increase in the unexplained portion 
should be attributed to inter-occupational wage differentials between rural-urban 
migrants and urban hukou individuals. 
Brown et al.'s (1980) method decomposes the wage differential into four categories, 
which are within occupational explained and unexplained, and inter-occupational 
explained and unexplained portions, all listed in Table 2-10. The average value of log 
hourly wage differentials between urban workers and rural-urban migrants is 0.264, 
0.101 or 38% of the whole wage gap is attributed to within occupational wage 
differentials, and the rest (0.163 or 62%) should be attributed to inter-occupational wage 
gaps from differences in occupations. On one hand, of the 0.101 or 38% within 
occupational wage differentials, about 14% of the overall wage differential could be 
explained by different personal characteristics, such as age, a dummy of overtime, 
gender, marital status, and work units. Here, it means that the wage differential between 
urban people and rural-urban migrants is due to different human capital, work 
experience. The difference in individual characteristics between urban and rural-urban 
migrants is shown in Table 2-4. It can be seen that urban hukou workers are three years 
older than rural migrants, on average. In the Chinese labour market, especially in the 
public sector, wages are positively affected by length of service and ranking level; for 
example, the wages for civil servants would grow with their seniority. At the same 
ranking level, then, older individuals would be likely to earn more wages than younger 
persons. Urban hukou workers in this chapter might earn higher wages than their 
rural-urban migrants, as the average age for urban hukou workers is higher than that for 
rural ones. The variable “age” contributes to the explanation of the wage gaps. In 
addition, within each occupation, working overtime, marital status, gender, type of work 
unit, and education level also makes contributions to the wage gaps. The effect of these 
variables on wages was previously shown in Table 2-5. On the other hand, there is an 
unexplained portion, 0.064, or 24% of the entire within-occupation wage differential. 
These results show that 24% of the intra-occupational income differential is ascribed to 
the different treatment between urban people and rural-urban migrants, which are more 
likely to be attributed to discrimination in favour of urban workers and against 
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rural-urban migrants. 
    Kidd & Shannon (1996) indicated that some of the within-occupational wage 
differences might be inter-occupational gaps. According to Table 2-10, about 0.163 or 
62% of the entire hourly wage is attributed to inter-occupational differences. Among the 
inter-occupational wage differentials, 7% is due to occupation segregation and 55% is 
attributed to human characteristics, such as marital status, number of children, gender, 
age, and education level. Tables 2-6 and 2-7 show the influence of these variables on 
occupational attainment. It can be seen that gender and education levels are major 
contributing factors to the explained portion of wage gaps. Further, 7% of occupational 
segregation indicates that rural-urban migrants are faced with different treatments while 
applying for jobs even if they have the same human characteristics as urban hukou 
workers. This portion may be attributed to discrimination in favour of urban hukou 
workers and against rural ones. Overall, 69% of the total income gap is attributed to 
personal endowments and 31% of the earnings differential can be ascribed to the 
unexplained part, which might be due to discrimination.  
Comparing the within-occupational portion with the inter-occupational portion, the 
latter makes a major contribution to the total wage differential. It indicates that the 
occupation segregation shows a significant effect on wage gaps by oppressing 
rural-urban migrants in lower occupational categories. However, in Meng & Zhang 
(2001) and Fearon & Wald (2011), who also used the Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposition, the occupational segregation has a significant effect on wage 
differentials, although its measured impact on the wage gaps is quite small (Meng & 
Zhang, 2001). In their research, the within occupational portion is the major 
contributing factor to the entire wage differential, and according to Liu et al. (2004), the 
importance of intra-occupational wage differentials is almost the same as the 
inter-occupational differential. The effect of the within-occupational earnings gap is 
slightly higher than the inter-occupational gap. In their research, the intra-occupational 
portion is the major contributing factor to the entire wage differential. The reason for 
this result might be attributed to the different personal characteristics chosen in their 
research. If the variables in the wage equation were the major contributing factors to the 
total wage gaps, the influence of the intra-occupational differential would be higher than 
occupation segregation. For example, Meng & Zhang (2001) chose job experience, 
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current job tenure, years of educational schooling, a dummy variable for training, and 
other socio-demographic factors, including gender, marital status, and number of 
children in the wage model. They chose age, years of schooling, a dummy for training, 
and the same personal characteristics in the occupation distribution model. In their 
research, job experience and job tenure had a positive and significant effect on wages. 
The effects of job experience and job tenure might have made a significant contribution 
to the within-occupational wage gaps, which in turn probably influenced the entire wage 
differential. In this chapter, it is quite likely that occupational segregation makes a major 
contribution to the hourly wages because of the significant effects of higher educational 
levels on occupational attainment. Moreover, unlike Meng & Zhang (2001), this chapter 
analyses the wage differential between urban people and rural migrants all over the nine 
provinces, including the coastal city (Shanghai) and provinces and inland provinces 
such as Henan and Heilongjiang, which mainly focuses on heavy industry and 
manufacturing. As discussed in section 2.1, with economic transitions and the coverage 
of the survey expansion, an increasing number of industries and more job opportunities 
have appeared all over the China. Different treatments for applying for a job become 
more widespread than that only in Shanghai. Thus, this may be a reason why the 
inter-occupational wage differential is higher than the intra-occupation wage gap in this 
chapter. In addition, Messinis (2013) also explained that the educational level could lead 
to different opportunities in different occupations, which in turn influence the returns 
from education. The effects of the educational level on the wage gap mainly come from 
different occupational attainments, which may be why the effects of inter-occupational 
segregation outweigh that of intra-occupational wage gaps in this study. 
Overall, my findings on the wage differential between urban people and 
rural-urban migrants are consistent with previous studies based on CHNS (i.e., Messinis, 
2013 and Démurger et al., 2009), which is that a sizeable wage differential between 
urban and rural-urban migrants is the explained portion. However, Lee (2012) and 
Meng & Zhang (2001) have opposite findings, where they indicate that most of the 
difference cannot be explained by characteristic differences between the two groups, 
which implies that the rural-urban migrants are discriminated against. The difference in 
conclusions may be because of the different datasets and methodologies used in the 
different studies. For example, Lee (2012) used the China Urban Labour Survey, which 
covers five cities: Wuhan, Shenyang, Xi’an, Fuzhou, and Shanghai. His results suggest 
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that rural-urban migrants face significant discrimination, but this discrimination varies a 
lot between the different cities. In addition, although Meng & Zhang (2001) utilize the 
same Brown et al. (1980) decomposition method, they only analyse the different 
treatment of urban people and rural-urban migrants in the Shanghai province. In 
addition, the CHNS dataset in my research involves almost the whole of China, 
including 9 provinces (Guangxi, Guizhou, Henan，Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong and Heilongjiang). In addition, because of the limitations of my dataset from 
the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), the variables related to occupation and 
wages are limited. For example, there are no available variables related to job tenure, 
work experience, and so on. Therefore, choosing different human characteristics in the 
decomposition might lead to different results. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter utilizes data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to 
estimate the wage differential of urban workers and rural-urban migrants in the Chinese 
urban labour market. Although the existence of different treatment in the Chinese urban 
labour market is well-known, how the market is segregated between urban workers and 
rural-urban migrants has not been explored in detail. Specifically, only 23.16% of rural 
migrants have white collar jobs, while 51.63% of urban workers are in this category. 
However, most previous research regards the different occupation distribution as an 
exogenous variable. Unlike these previous studies, occupation segregation has been 
considered as an endogenous variable influencing the wage differential in this chapter. 
Utilizing the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition, the actual and predicted occupational 
distribution of urban residents and rural-urban migrants show that approximate 12% of 
rural-urban migrants who would have been working in white collar jobs if they are 
treated the same as urban workers are employed in blue collar jobs or service jobs. This 
occupation mismatch means that rural-urban migrants earn lower wages than what they 
would have earned, if discrimination did not exist. 
Without considering the occupation segregation of urban residents and rural-urban 
migrants, the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition without selectivity correction 
shows that about 83% of the wage differential is attributed to differences in human 
characteristics between urban residents and rural-urban migrants. 17% of raw wage gap 
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is the unexplained portion which is more likely to be ascribed to hukou discrimination. 
When taking occupational distribution into account, the estimated results show that the 
proportion of the explained part decreases to 69% and the unexplained portion increases 
to 31%. These results suggest that the results from the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) 
decomposition underestimate the discrimination against rural-urban migrants.  
My results show that a large proportion of the wage differential can be attributed to 
the inter-occupational wage gap (62%). The whole wage differential is mainly ascribed 
to occupation segregation. Specifically, I find that the main reason that rural migrants 
have lower wages is due to the fact that they are restricted from obtaining high quality 
jobs, not unequal pay within occupations. Among the inter-occupational wage 
differential, 55% of the wage gap is due to human characteristics, such as rural-urban 
migrants’ lower education levels. Due to the positive association between education 
attainment and occupation distribution, the lower educational level of rural-urban 
migrants prohibits them from getting better jobs. In addition, about 7% of 
inter-occupation by wage gap is ascribed to an unobserved characteristic which is most 
likely to be due to discrimination (it may be the synthetic of prejudice and statistical 
discrimination). Although the causal factors of taste-based discrimination and statistical 
discrimination is slightly different, i.e., the former one is due to employer’s animosity 
against rural people and statistical discrimination is attributed to employer’s limited 
information on rural people which leads to the assessment of individual characteristics 
by this group’s average situation, both of these two types of discrimination depend on 
employer’s unobservd personal attitude. Due to that there is no difference in the 
appearance of urban hukou workers and rural-urban migrants and no available questions 
related to respondents’ specific attitude to the minority group in CHNS, it is difficult to 
distinguish prejudice from statistical discrimination in China. In addition, Charles & 
Guryan (2008) and Doleac & Stein (2013) also claimed that animosity can be a product 
of statistical discrimination, and vice versa; the presence of one type did not preclude 
the presense of the other. Therefore, the discrimination found in this chapter may 
depend on the employers’ prejudice against rural migrants. It may also be ascribed to 
that all rural-urban migrants are regarded according to their average situation, rather 
than their personal characteristics. Since, in general, rural-urban migrants’ educational 
levels are lower than urban workers, those highly educated rural migrants may be 
treated unfairly, being prevented from obtaining better jobs corresponding to their 
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educational attainment.  
In terms of the total explained and total unexplained part of the wage differential of 
urban workers and rural-urban migrants, 69% of the whole wage differential can be 
explained by individuals’ characteristics and 31% cannot be explained by observable 
factors. However, it should be paid more attention to that the self-selection issue has not 
been dealt with in Brown et al. (1980) decomposition. By observing the Oaxaca & 
Ransom (1994) decomposition with selectivity and without selectivity, I found that the 
estimation will be downward biased while ignoring the selectivity correction. Therefore, 
the estimated results obtained from Brown et al. (1980) underestimate the actual 
discrimination against rural-urban migrants. This unsolved selectivity issue in Brown et 
al. (1980) decomposition is the limitation of this chapter. Regarding the policy 
implication, the results suggest that the policy should not only consider how to 
eliminate the difference in wages, but also should deal with the hukou discrimination 
when applying for jobs.  
2.7 Appendix 
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) is a longitudinal dataset with 9 waves, 
including 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. It contains 
multiple variables obtained over multiple time periods for the same individuals, 
recording information of individuals and households in a number of years.  
2.7.1 Sample Changes 
Table 2-11 states the integral information of the observations in each survey and 
how the process of observations’ changes during these waves. In addition, family size 
and number of children in one family can be seen from Table 2-11. By comparing 
family size in each year, it can be seen how family size and number of children in one 
household changed during the waves. In row 3 of Table 2-11, “-” indicates the number 
of individuals leaving in that specified year, while “+” refers to the number of 
individuals added to the sample. According to the questionnaires, the reason for the 
added individuals can be attributed to new-born children, marriage and newly formed 
households, replacement households and all households in replacement communities; 
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meanwhile, subtracted individuals may be attributed to moving away or death. In Table 
2-11, it is obvious that the average number of children in one household is slightly 
higher and the family size marginally larger than before 2004. This may be attributed to 
the fact that the One-Child policy was carried out in 1982 transforming the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Population and Family Planning in 2001.Therefore, with 
the strict limitation of the law, an increasing number of persons give birth to one child, 
so that the average number of children after 2001 will decline gradually. In addition, in 
the early stages of the policy the restriction on rural residents was not rigorous. In rural 
areas, if the first child was a girl, a second child would be allowed. In addition, in light 
of the question “relationship with householders”, 30.73% of respondents said they were 
the head of the household, and 27.20% that they were the spouse of the householder.  
Table 2- 11 Information for Each Wave 
Year Observations Changes in observations 
compared to the 
previous wave 
Mean of family size 
in each wave 
Mean of number 
of children under 
18 in each wave 
1989 14343 0 4.18 0.93 
1991 13672 1989: -1842 
1991: +1171 
4.14 0.93 
1993 13320 1991: -1757 
1993: +1405 
4.21 0.99 
1997 13774 1993: -3920 
1997: +4374 
3.96 0.82 
2000 14890 1997: -2430 
2000: +3546 
3.80 0.70 
2004 11555 2000: -5489 
2004: +2154 
3.06 0.39 
2006 11160 2004: -2825 
2006: +2430 
2.96 0.31 
2009 11296 2006: -3171 
2009: +3307 
3.02 0.27 
2011 14538 2009: -2731 
2011: +5973 
2.92 0.28 
1989-2011(total): 118548 observations; 32877 individuals 
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
Among the rest of the respondents, more than 30% are kids of householders and 
their spouses, householders’ parents occupying 2.44%, householders’ 
grandsons/granddaughters taking over 3.72% and 3.99% being householders’ 
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son-in-law/daughter-in-law. It is evident that there may be more than one generation in 
one family, which can explain family size. 
Table 2-12 shows the frequency of individuals interviewed, meaning how often 
individuals were interviewed among the 9 waves. 28.47% (9360) of all the persons 
(32877) were interviewed once, which may be attributed to the new members in old 
households and all members in new households. In 2011, 5973 new members joined and 
1842 persons left after 1989, which took up 23.8% of all the individuals, and these were 
interviewed just once. In addition, 7.49% of all individuals took part in all the nine 
surveys from 1989 to 2011. The average frequency of individuals interviewed is 3.606. 
Table 2- 12 Frequency of Individuals Interviewed 
Frequency of being 
interviewed 
Observations Individuals Percentage of frequency being 
interviewed 
1 9360 9360 28.47% 
2 9824 4912 14.94% 
3 13353 4451 13.54% 
4 14496 3624 11.02% 
5 15930 3186 9.69% 
6 13278 2213 6.73% 
7 8428 1204 3.66% 
8 11712 1464 4.45% 
9 22167 2463 7.49% 
Mean=3.606 
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
2.7.2 Questionnaire Information and Data Structure 
2.7.2.1 Questionnaire Information 
CHNS as a longitudinal data with nine waves, covering household, nutrition, 
physical examination, a never-married women survey and a community survey in 1989, 
1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000, involving questions on detailed demographic information 
(age, marital status, family’s relationship, education, employment and income) of head 
of households and other members, time allocation at home (e.g. elderly care, baby care, 
and other key home activities), economic activities (e.g. job, wage, expense occupation), 
health status, insurance, activities of daily living, nutrition (detailed diet) and so on. All 
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the surveys in each wave are not completely identical; however, the basic information of 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of household and individuals stayed the 
same. Table 2-13 shows an overview of the data CHNS domain for each year.   
Table 2- 13 CHNS Domains 
Questions domains CHNS 
Number of waves 9 (1989-2011) 
Personal characteristics (age, gender) All surveys 
Marriage history All surveys 
Hukou status 1993-2011 
Household composition (number of members) 1989-2006 
Number of children 1989 
Education All surveys 
Income/employment by sector of work All surveys 
Detailed health service use/insurance All surveys 
Time allocation/physical activity-inactivity All surveys 
Basic health examination (e.g. weight/height/ blood pressure) All surveys  
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
Table 2- 14 Hukou Information 
Waves  Obs. Hukou distribution  Changing 
numbers  
Percentage changeper 
wave 
1993 13320 Urban:34.46% 
Rural:65.54% 
  
1997 13774 Urban: 37.44% 
Rural: 62.56% 
1290 9.37% 
2000 14890 Urban: 37.46% 
Rural: 62.54% 
1801 12.10% 
2004 11555 Urban: 41.33% 
Rural: 58.67% 
1130 9.78% 
2006 11160 Urban: 40.85% 
Rural: 59.15% 
945 8.47% 
2009 11296 Urban: 40.63% 
Rural: 59.37% 
820 7.26% 
2011 14538 Urban: 49.64% 
Rural: 50.36% 
751 5.17% 
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
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In this chapter, it is necessary to use hukou status to distinguish urban hukou 
workers and rural-urban migrants. However, before 1993, there were no questions 
related to this issue, so that I can just use 7 waves from 1993 to 2011 to analyse this 
issue. On the basis of the panel data recording dynamic change, Table 2-14 provides 
hukou distribution and hukou changes for each wave. 
2.7.2.2 Data Structure 
The data set CHNS has 20 independent documentations, based on the related 
information, which are agriculture, birth history, child care, children energy expense, 
education file, ever-married women, health care, household assets, ID file, income file, 
infant feeding files, marriage history, medical insurance, physical exam files, nutrition 
files, pregnancy files, relationship files, roster files, and time-use files. 
The documentation on ID includes fundamental information about respondents’ 
houses in nine waves, such as household number, member number of each individual in 
household, whether each family member lived in the household, interview date, 
province, etc. According to the ID file, it is evident that the household number (hhid) for 
any one family is constant during the nine waves, hence each individual and household 
can be tracked accurately by the ID number. In other documents, each individual is 
required to provide information such as demographic characteristics, education, and 
occupation under the corresponding household number, member number, and wave. 
Hence, household number and member number in each household and wave is the 
connection hub when merging different datasets. 
The education file provides information on individuals’ educational history and 
status (e.g., highest educational level and whether currently in school). The occupation 
documentation includes information on employment, such as whether presently working, 
whether retired, primary occupation, employment position, type of work unit, hours of 
work, regular wages, and secondary jobs. Questions were also asked about bonuses and 
subsidies (e.g., whether individuals received a bonus, the total bonus amount receiving 
for the whole year, whether subsidies were given, details of types of subsidies, and the 
total subsidy received for the whole year), as well as household and individual 
businesses, including type of business, average revenues, and average expenses. 
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The remaining documentation provides information about health status, child care, 
daily-living activities, assets, diet, and the agriculture activities in which rural residents 
are engaged. For example, child care involves the issue of who cares for the children in 
one household, whether the baby is cared for at home, whether child care takes place at 
a care centre or nursery school, how much household income goes to child care, and 
whether the family has a child subsidy. The agricultural documentation includes 
questions about whether individuals engaged in farming, fishing, livestock, or gardening. 
Total revenues and costs of these activities are also asked in this section. In the medical 
insurance documentation section, questions on the type of medical insurance, payments 
for health care, whether insurance is provided by employers, and so forth, were asked. 
The variables I choose in this chapter can be divided into three sets, demographic 
information and educational and employment information. Thus, the datasets I used 
came from the four CHNS documents: ID, roster, education, and occupation files 
(including the occupation and wages datasets). In addition, the self-selection for 
migration is corrected for in the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition so that the 
relevant information about health or disease history in physical examination files is 
taken into account as well. When I merge these six datasets (ID, roster, education, 
occupation, wages, and physical-examination), there are 41,186 valid observations 
(18,481 individuals) in this successfully merged sample. The study in this chapter 
mainly concentrates on the survey from 1993 to 2011, as the survey questionnaires have 
slight differences in the first two waves; for example, there are no available questions 
related to the hukou status and the given occupation categories are different with other 
waves. Therefore, 6,236 observations from 1989 or 1991 are deleted from the original 
sample. The socio-demographic factors, age, marital status, hukou status, and gender 
can be picked out from the two files (ID file and roster file). In addition, a majority of 
other independent variables that I bring forward in this chapter were selected from the 
occupation files (including the occupation and wages datasets), such as occupation type, 
employment position, work unit, working time, and regular wages. 
Firstly, since I investigate Chinese urban labour market discrimination, only the 
people within the legal working age range are selected. The minimum legal working age 
is 16 years old and retirement age for males and females is 60 and 55, respectively. 
Moreover, individuals within the legal working age who are currently studying at school 
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during the investigation stage are also not taken into account. The remaining sample that 
is within the legal working age and not studying at school includes 25,427 observations. 
Secondly, I remove those with missing values for demographic factors, education 
attainment, and health-related variables that cannot be replaced with relevant 
information from the previous or following wave. Thirdly, I delete the missing values of 
the remaining occupational related factors (e.g. work unit, working hours, occupation 
type) for those people who are employed in specific occupations and report their regular 
wages in the urban labour market. Moreover, the extremely high and extremely low 
value in terms of real income (top/bottom 1%) are also dropped from the sample in 
order to guarantee even income distribution. Lastly, as discussed in chapter 1, 
self-employed people do not suffer from employee discrimination. Due to the  
Table 2- 15 Sample Clearance 
The procedure for cleaning sample Changes in the 
observations to the 
original sample 
The remaining 
observations  
The successfully merged sample － 41186 
Step1: Delete wave 1989 and wave 1991 -6236 34950 
Step2: Delete those who are not in legal working 
age 
-8359 26591 
Step 3: Delete those within legal working age but 
still study at school during investigation period 
-1164 25427 
Step 4: Delete those irreplaceable missing values 
for demographic factors, educational attainment 
and health-related variables 
-618 24809 
Step 5: Delete the missing values for occupational 
related factors (working hours, work unit, 
occupation type) for those who are employed and 
report their regular wages in the urban labour 
market, and the extremely value in terms of real 
income  
-1707 23102 
Step 6: Delete all the self-employed individuals  -2175 20927 
Note: China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
difficulties in distinguishing rural migrants and urban people by appearance, 
self-employed individuals are less likely to suffer from customer discrimination in 
China; therefore, self-employed individuals are not considered when analysing urban 
labour market discrimination. Among the remaining observations, 2,175 individuals 
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reported a self-employment status and 90% of those are urban hukou individuals. After 
removing these self-employed observations, there are 20,927 observations remaining in 
the sample, where 9,678 observations have urban hukou status, 2,543 are rural-urban 
migrants, and 8,706 are rural non-migrants. The study in this chapter examines the 
hukou discrimination in the Chinese urban labour market, thus I mainly concentrate on 
urban people and rural migrants. There are 12,221 valid observations in this sample, 
which includes 9,678 urban observations and 2,543 rural-urban migrants. Table 2-15 
also shows the process on how I obtain the sample for this chapter. 
2.7.3 Selectivity in Oaxaca & Ransom decomposition 
In terms of correcting the migration selection of the wage gap by the Oaxaca’s 
decomposition method (including the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) and Oaxaca & Ransom 
(1994) decomposition), the most straightforward approach is to deduct the selection 
effects from the overall wage differential and then apply the Oaxaca decomposition 
equation to this adjusted differential (Neuman & Oaxaca, 2004; Jann, 2008). This 
method, proposed by Heckman (1979), involves conducting a standard probit model 
that estimates the probability of a rural person migrating to the urban city to a set of 
determinants, and then applying the probit estimation to calculate the Mills ratio. The 
migration equation (Eq. 2-16) identifies the determinants that may influence a rural 
hukou individual’s decision to migrate to an urban city. The wage function for 
rural-urban migrants is given by Equation (2-6), which has been introduced in the 
methodology section: 
                   
*
, , ,i r i r r i rMigration H                          (2-16) 
                   , , ,it r it r r it rY X                                (2-6) 
where *
,i rMigration  is a latent variable representing rural people’s migration, ,i rH   is a 
vector of variables affecting the migration. ij and ,i r are identical and independently 
distributed (i.i.d.) error terms that follow a bivariate normal distribution (0, 0, 
j , j ,
j ). The probability of rural people’s migration can be expressed as,  
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where  is the standard normal cumulative density function (the variance of is 
normalized to 1). The dependent variable of the rural hukou individual’s migration takes 
a value of 1 if rural people migrate to an urban city and 0 otherwise. Regular wages of 
rural migrants are observed for those where Migration*i, r >0, thus the expected earning 
equation shown in Eq. (2-6) of a rural migrant can be determined by, 
*
, , , , , ,
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 
                 (2-18) 
where , , and is the standard normal density 
function. The estimating equation for rural migrants could be expressed as, 
*
, , , ,| 0i r i r i r r r i r rY Migration X error                                (2-19) 
Equation (2-19) is estimated for rural migrants by the Heckman procedure. When 
regular income is decomposed in the presence of the selection issue, the wage 
differential based on the Oaxaca’s decomposition is shown as, 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )=( )u r u u r r r r u u r r r rY Y X X X X                              (2-20) 
The most straightforward method mentioned by Neuman & Oaxaca (2004) and 
Jann (2008) to address the selection problem is to deduct the selection effects from the 
original income differential as shown in Eq. (2-21) below. The part on the left-hand side 
of this equation is the adjusted wage differential, and the part on the right-hand side can 
be decomposed by the same Oaxaca’s decomposition formulas. 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )u r r r u u r r
selectivity
Y Y X X                                         (2-21) 
In terms of choosing the suitable factors for selectivity correction in the Oaxaca 
decomposition, it must contain at least one variable that is in the probit selection model 
but not in the original earning function (Lee, 2012). As discussed previously, 
( ) 
.i r
,r r  , , ,( ) / ( )i r i r r i r rH H     ( ) 
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rural-urban migrants are likely to be a group of people with larger ambition and better 
capability of dealing with pressure and recovering. In addition, according to the 
National Bureau of Statistics Survey, most of the rural-urban migrants are young adults. 
Regarding the factors influencing rural people’s migration, Li (2003) conducts an 
analysis of push and pull factors for migration. The author finds that Chinese economic 
development, policy reform, family structure (i.e., number of children in the household), 
age, health status, frequency of contacting with neighbours, and unobserved motivation 
or ambition can influence rural people’s aspirations for migration. The available 
information obtained from the CHNS includes the number of children and disease 
history. In the probit selection model for the Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition, I 
intend to take these two determinants into account because they satisfy the exclusion 
restrictions by not determining wages directly.   
There is no available information in the CHNS of general self-reported health 
status (e.g., good health, standard health, or poor heath). However, the CHNS includes 
detailed health information and specific disease history; for example, “Has a doctor ever 
told you that you suffer from high blood pressure, diabetes, myocardial infarction?”, 
“What treatment method did you use before?”, “How much money did you spend on the 
medical service?”, and so on. The dummy variable of chronic disease (blood high 
pressure, diabetes, and myocardial infarction) is taken into account in the selection 
model of this study. The dummy variable satisfies the exclusion restriction by not 
directly influencing earnings, as most people with chronic disease are elderly 
individuals who have already retired, and fewer young adults with chronic disease are 
influenced to participate in working. Even if young adults are diagnosed with chronic 
diseases, most of them are still working, as they have to earn money to support the 
family. Therefore, whether a person has a chronic disease has no direct impact on his 
regular wages in most cases. However, due to the fact that the available jobs for rural 
migrants are often limited, and most rural migrants are more likely to take part in the 
lower skilled, longer working time and physical exertion jobs, rural people without 
good health might be reluctant to migrate to and work in the urban city. Thus, I am 
concerned whether their decision for migrating to the urban city may be influenced by 
their status of health, which does not affect their earnings directly. 
In addition, the number of children may positively influence migration as adults 
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bear the heavy economic burden of raising children and undertaking the educational 
expense (Li, 2003), which may push adults to migrate to the urban city to look for a job. 
In China, there is a very common situation where parents from both sides are more 
likely to help take care of child when the couple has a newborn baby. In addition, some 
of them also employ full-time nannies to take care of an infant aged below 12 months. 
Therefore, fewer young adults in China choose to stay at home and take care of the 
child. Most adults will return to work after their maternity leave and the child is more 
likely to be cared for by the grandparents during working hours. Consequently, earnings 
are less likely to be influenced by the number of children in China. 
Table 2- 16 Probit Model for Rural Hukou Individuals’ Migration 
Dummy for Migration  Coef.  Robust SE. 
Number of children  0.103*** 0.021 
Health status  
Dummy for chronic disease  0.142* 0.071 
Socio-demographic factors 
Age  -0.047*** 0.012 
Age2 0.0003* 0.0001 
Male  0.210*** 0.036 
Married  -0.067 0.059 
Education attainment (ref: no education) 
Compulsory school 0.252*** 0.058 
Senior high middle school 0.847*** 0.068 
University  1.714*** 0.143 
Year 1997 -0.295 0.197 
Year 2000 -0.570** 0.073 
Year 2004 -1.511*** 0.065 
Year 2006 -1.459*** 0.065 
Year 2009 -1.245*** 0.062 
Year 2011 -1.038*** 0.064 
Number of observations: 2543 rural migrants; 8706 rural hukou non-migrants 
Note: (1) ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels, respectively.  
(2) China Health and Nutrition Survey is utilized.  
Table 2-16 presents the results of the selectivity model for rural people’s migration. 
The number of children in a household is found to have a positive correlation with the 
probability of migration for rural people, which is consistent with the suggestion from 
Li (2003). Specifically, the heavy economic burden to support a child pushes rural 
adults to work in an urban city to obtain greater economic benefits, which in turn leads 
to children left-behind and empty nesters in rural China being more widespread. It can 
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be seen from Table 2-16 that a rural person having been diagnosed with a chronic 
disease is positively related to the probability of migration at the 10% significance level, 
which is not line with Li (2003). The reason may be ascribed to the fact that these rural 
people who have a chronic disease consider that they can obtain better medical 
treatments in an urban city. Specifically, people who are diagnosed with a slight chronic 
disease (e.g., high blood pressure and diabetes) and take regular medication and 
treatment (e.g., hypotensive drugs, hypoglycemic agent, and control diet) are able to 
work normally. Moreover, few young adults in China with chronic diseases give up 
working, as they have to bear the financial burden of the whole family and medical 
expenses. Therefore, these rural people may consider that working in an urban city 
could bring more economic benefits so that they will be able to afford better medical 
treatment than before. In addition, the medical conditions in an urban city are also much 
better than that in the rural area; thus, they are likely to migrate for higher income in 
order to control their chronic disease more efficiently. 
Regarding other control variables, results in Table 2-16 show that education 
attainment, gender, age, and time dummies have a significant relationship with the 
probability of migration. I find that education level positively influences rural 
individuals’ aspiration for migration. It may be due to the fact that people with more 
educational attainment are more likely to have greater ambition. In terms of gender, 
males seem to be more likely to migrate to an urban city, which is in line with the 
statistics from National Bureau of the People’s Republic of China. It describes that men 
account for the majority of all rural migrants, but the percentage of female migrants has 
continued to increase in recent years. In addition, rural-urban migrants are mainly 
energetic young people under the age of 30
9
. With age increasing, the willingness of 
rural people to migrate to an urban city declines gradually. Consequently, the results in 
Table 2-16 show the negative association between age and the probability of migration. 
There is a negative correlation between time dummies and the probability of 
migration, which may be due to that the population structure in the rural area is 
gradually changing. Specifically, the number of children in households is decreasing 
due to the one child policy, and the aging problem in China is getting more serious. 
Consequently, the phenomena of empty nesters and children left-behind in the rural area 
                                                   
9 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  
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have become more prevalent during the recent decade. The available labour supply of 
young rural adults is declining so that the Chinese statistics surveys show that the 
growth rate of rural people migrating to an urban city is decreasing gradually. Based on 
the current rural population structure, the probability of migration for those remaining 
rural residents decreases inevitably, and the time dummies indicate the falling trend in 
the migrations.  
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Chapter Three 
The Impact of Hukou Discrimination on Income Aspirations of 
Rural-Urban Migrants 
3.1Background and Introduction  
As explained in the previous two chapters, all Chinese people are divided into 
urban hukou and rural hukou individuals, based on the household registration system 
established by The Public Security Organ Household Management Institutions. Chapter 
2 has already investigated the effects of hukou discrimination in terms of income 
inequality and occupation segregation between urban hukou workers and rural-urban 
migrants in Chinese urban labour market. Most previous research has also analysed the 
impact of discrimination in these areas. However, during recent years, an increasing 
number of studies (e.g. Bigler et al., 2003; Alagaraja et al., 2016), have pointed out the 
psychological impact of social discrimination on the devalued group. Following these 
studies and Chapter 2, I intend to analyse whether hukou discrimination has other 
impacts on rural-urban migrants, and on society as a whole.  
    Alagaraja et al. (2016) have analysed the negative impact of racial discrimination 
from a psychological perspective, in particular the influence on the devalued group’s 
aspirations. They state that the negative effect on individual aspirations is significant to 
social development because discrimination in the long term creates a sense of passivity 
and apathy. This passive acceptance of discrimination can create a cycle of silence 
around issues of power and privilege (Sims, 2010), which in turn lowers the devalued 
group’s ambitions and aspirations regarding career and income. Many in the devalued 
group lose passion and motivation to work, which exacerbates the gap between the 
preference group and the devalued group. In addition, several individuals in the 
devalued group underestimate their own capabilities regarding career and income, 
although they have more educational attainment than many people in the preferred 
group. Therefore, Alagaraja et al. (2016) point out that there is an outflow of talent from 
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society due to discrimination, as many people do not make full use of their talents due 
to the context in which they live and work.  
Rural-urban migrants in China are still discriminated against in the urban labour 
market, in spite of the increasing number of job opportunities for rural hukou workers. 
Many are engaged in low-skilled jobs (“dangerous, dirty and demeaning”) with low 
incomes, such as manufacturing, construction, and service jobs
10
. Urban hukou workers 
still receive priority for the professional jobs, with higher incomes and better working 
conditions (Cai, 2011). Following Alagaraja et al. (2016), it is important to consider the 
aspirations of the people in the disadvantaged group, as their lower aspirations and 
ambitions will negatively influence their social productivity. In addition, the large 
number of rural-urban migrants in the urban labour market (about 20 million in 2010
11
) 
intensifies the necessity to care about rural-urban migrants’ aspirations. If the aspiration 
or ambition of rural-urban migrants is influenced by hukou discrimination, their lower 
enthusiasm for work will negatively influence social development (Alagaraja et al. 
2016).  
Previous studies (Easterlin, 2001; Stutzer, 2004) have investigated the determinants 
of the absolute aspirations among American people and residents of Switzerland. 
Individuals with higher incomes and a higher social status tend to have larger ambitions 
and higher aspirations in terms of their income, career and social status. Thus, following 
these previous studies, urban hukou individuals with higher incomes and superior 
occupational conditions should have higher aspirations compared to rural hukou 
individuals in China. However, whether hukou discrimination between urban hukou 
individuals and rural-urban migrants contributes to the difference in aspirations is 
unknown. In this chapter, I intend to compare the income aspirations of urban hukou 
people and rural-urban migrants, and investigate the effect of hukou discrimination on 
their aspirations. In the next section, I will introduce the causal mechanism in this 
chapter, i.e. the causal relationship between aspirations and discrimination.  
3.2 Causal Mechanism between Aspirations and Discrimination 
                                                   
10 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 
11 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 
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The idea of this chapter was inspired by previous studies that investigate the 
impact of racial discrimination on career aspirations following social cognitive career 
theory. Social cognitive career theory (SCCT), which is derived from Bandura’s (1986) 
general social cognitive theory, aims at understanding three interrelated aspects of 
career development: (1) how the career-relevant interests develop, (2) how occupational 
and educational selection are made, (3) how educational and occupational achievement 
can be obtained (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994). It involves a series of factors in earlier 
career theories (e.g., abilities, values and environmental factors), and has also been 
found to have close relationship with individual’s career development. When analysing 
the influence mechanisms of SCCT on the career development process, the main focus 
is on three social cognitive elements: self-efficacy belief, outcome expectations and 
goals.  
Self-efficacy belief refers to individuals’ personal self-evaluation of their abilities 
to perform activities and particular behaviour (Bandura, 1986). This judgement can be 
derived from personal previous performance achievement, previous experiences and 
emotional states. Self-efficacy belief not only affects one’s choice of activities, it also 
influences one’ effort expenditure, persistence, patterns of thinking, and attitude in the 
face of barriers (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994, 2000). In addition, self-efficacy has a 
dynamic trait and is specific to particular performance domains. An individual’s 
judgement of their self-efficacy will vary in different environment, academic and career 
domains (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994). For example, one person may have 
confidence in his/her capabilities in making social connections but feel less confident 
about their capabilities in maths. Thus, people are more likely to be interested and have 
better performance in the domains which they report higher self-efficacy belief, in 
general.  
Outcome expectation indicates one’s beliefs about the potential consequences or 
outcomes of particular activities or behaviours (e.g., if I do this, what will happen?) 
(Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994). One’s choice behaviour (e.g., the choice of activities 
he/she prefers to participate in, the effort expenditure and persistence in the activities) 
depends on both individual’s judgement of self-efficacy and the probable outcome of 
participating in the activity. To be specific, a person is more likely to participate in the 
activities which lead to a positive outcome or have greater value utility (e.g., reward, 
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attractive welfare benefits). However, Bandura (1986) pointed out that career behaviour 
is determined by both self-efficacy beliefs and outcome expectations, with self-efficacy 
playing a more important role in influencing the behaviour. Because there are many 
examples indicating that many people would like to avoid such activities which they are 
not confident to do even if they can obtain more valuable outcomes.   
Personal goals refer to one’s determination to participate in a particular activity or 
to achieve a certain level of performance. Personal goals can help people to guide and 
regulate the behaviour and persist in their target when suffering from setbacks. SCCT 
points out that these three variables (self-efficacy, outcome expectation and personal 
goals) are highly interrelated with each other. To be specific, people are more likely to 
set practical goals which are consistent with the assessment of own abilities 
(self-efficacy) and expected outcomes from particular activities. On the contrary, 
whether the goals can be achieved or not will inversely affect and alter one’s judgement 
of capabilities and outcome expectations. 
SCCT highlights that various background factors such as social demographic 
factors, social economic status and racial background may directly influence one’s 
career development (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994). Such contextual factors influence 
career development and performance by affecting the motivational role of self-efficacy, 
outcome expectations and goal. To be specific, for two individuals with similar 
capabilities, the one having higher self-efficacy belief is more likely to expect the 
positive outcomes for particular activities, which in turn establish higher performance 
goals. Therefore, controlling for individuals’ capability, these people with higher 
self-efficacy are more likely to organize their skills effectively, and insist on the goals 
even if they are confronted with obstacles. As a result, they can obtain more success 
than people with lower self-efficacy and outcome expectations (Bandura, 1986, 1989). 
On the contrary, a person may be restricted by his/her background factor such as gender 
or racial-ethnic background and underestimates their talents and capabilities. Thereby, 
they are more likely to set lower performance goals and less expectations of positive 
outcomes, compared to the people who have similar capabilities and are more confident. 
In the face of setbacks, these people with lower self-efficacy may give up more quickly 
and attain less success consequently. Such contextual factors may lower a person’s 
assessment of their capability for work and restrict their aspirations. Therefore, the 
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SCCT theory is increasingly applied to the study of career behaviour in a number of 
countries and cultural contexts. Specifically, there are a number of studies (e.g., Bigler 
et al., 2003; Brown & Segrist, 2016) exploring how racial-ethnic background influences 
people’s career aspirations, based on social cognitive career theory. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 urban hukou individuals usually obtain preferential 
treatment and rural-urban migrants are discriminated against in urban cities. Following 
the principle of SCCT that highlights the effect of racial background on one’s career 
development and aspiration by affecting self-efficacy beliefs, outcome expectation and 
goals (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994), this chapter investigates whether rural-urban 
migrants’ judgement of their capabilities (self-efficacy belief) is influenced by the 
impact of hukou discrimination as well. If so, rural-urban migrants’ expectation of 
outcomes and their career aspirations will also be negatively affected. Based on the 
close relationship between careers and income, income aspirations are utilized as an 
available indicator to quantify career aspirations in this chapter. As mentioned before, 
SCCT focuses on how self-efficacy, outcome expectations and goal mechanism 
interrelate with other personal characteristics (e.g., gender, education, social economic 
status, racial background) to shape career assessment, development and expectations. In 
the next section, I will review previous studies based on socio-demographic factors, 
social economic status and discrimination, respectively. 
3.3 Literature Review 
Based on the discussion in section 3.2, I will review previous studies investigating 
the determinants of income aspirations from these three aspects (socio-demographic 
factors, social economic status and discrimination). It aims to understand which factors 
contribute to income aspirations more generally and to assess whether the differential 
aspirations are due to differences in these determinants, especially the discrimination.  
3.3.1 Personal Socio-demographic Factors 
In terms of personal factors, an individuals’ present income is a common factor to 
be analysed (Fuchs & Landsberger, 1973; Centers & Cantril, 1946; Portes et al., 1978; 
Stutzer, 2004; McBride, 2010; Dalton et al., 2016). Income aspirations are generally 
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found to have a positive relationship to individuals’ current income (Fuchs & 
Landsberger, 1973 and Stutzer, 2004). Fuchs & Landsberger (1973) examined the 
income aspirations of the elected presidents of 123 blue-collar local unions in Chile. 
Their results showed that current income was the most important determinant of income 
aspirations and aspiration income increases with increases in present income. This result 
is supported by the findings of other studies, e.g. Centers & Cantril (1946) and McBride 
(2010). Previous Chinese research also points out the positive relationship between 
personal current income (actual income) and income aspirations. Knight & Gunatilaka 
(2012b) compared subjective well-being between rural-urban migrants and rural 
residents, and found that rural-urban migrants are not happier than rural residents, 
although the rural-urban migrants have a higher income. They ascribe this to the 
difference in income aspirations between rural residents and rural-urban migrants. When 
empirically examining the determinants of absolute income aspirations, it was found 
that people’s income aspirations depend positively on their actual income, which is 
consistent with previous research. Therefore, although rural-urban migrants earn higher 
wages than rural residents, the migrants experience higher income aspirations, which 
lower rural-urban migrants’ happiness.  
In addition to present income, some other socio-demographic factors also play an 
important role in determining aspirations. Centers & Cantril (1946) utilized a survey by 
the Office of Public Opinion Research in Princeton to investigate income satisfaction 
and income aspirations. All respondents were given a card indicating different weekly 
income classes. Based on the card, respondents answered two questions related to their 
average weekly wages and their income aspirations. Apart from present income, they 
also point out that occupation, age, gender and educational attainment have impacts on 
income aspirations. The impact of these factors on aspirations may vary, depending on 
background and the period in which the survey was carried out. Therefore, due to its age, 
I will not review this study in detail.  
    Stutzer (2004) investigated the effect of income aspirations on individuals’ 
happiness in Switzerland, and also studied how income aspirations are formed. He 
found that absolute aspirations increase with people’s income levels, which is consistent 
with the findings of previous research. He also investigated the effect of other 
socio-demographic factors, such as financial situation or social status, the size and 
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composition of the household, age, education and gender on absolute income aspirations. 
Financial situation and social class have a positive effect on individuals’ income 
aspirations. In terms of the size and composition of the household, the number of 
children in the household has a positive relation with adults’ income aspirations. Income 
aspirations are inversely U-shaped with age and increase with education level. No 
sizable differences in income aspirations levels exist between men and women.  
    Portes et al. (1978) analysed the determinants of occupational and income 
aspirations among Mexican and Cuban immigrants arriving in the United States in 1973. 
During 1970, net immigration accounted for nearly one-fifth of total US population 
growth. Numerically and socially, immigrants form an important component of 
American life (Portes et al., 1978), and one of the major characteristics that immigrants 
bring is aspirations. The authors investigate aspirations from two perspectives, namely 
rationality and motivational needs. From the rationality perspective, they suggest that 
aspirations can be regarded as the rational products of individuals’ previous experiences 
and their assessment of their own abilities. Based on individuals’ education levels, 
previous occupational status and past income attainment, they set goals in accordance 
with their reasonable aspirations. The higher the educational, occupational and income 
attainment is, the higher the aspirations will be. On the other hand, aspirations are 
formed based on attitudes and more basic personality needs. Individuals do not set 
aspirational goals only based on their previous achievements, but also based on their 
inherent preference of what they want to do in the future. Regarding their personal 
attitudes, Portes et al. (1978) argue that respondents’ family background, such as their 
father’s educational attainment, can positively influence respondents’ attitudes towards 
career aspirations, which in turn may positively affect income aspirations. Therefore, 
the more modern and achievement-oriented immigrants will have higher aspiration 
levels.  
Overall, the existing research reviewed in this section demonstrates how personal 
factors determine individual aspirations. These previous studies demonstrate the basic 
determinants of individual income aspirations, which include present income and social 
demographic factors (educational attainment, occupational status, family size, family 
background, financial situation and age). Regarding these factors, urban residents are 
more likely to be engaged in professional jobs with higher incomes and superior 
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working conditions. Rural hukou individuals are more likely to have lower educational 
attainment, as found in Chapter 1. Therefore, these factors that have been proposed by 
previous research are likely to play an important role in differential aspirations, as this 
can result from the significant difference in present income, occupational status, 
financial status and educational attainment between urban and rural hukou people.  
3.3.2 Social Comparisons 
In addition to the personal factors reviewed in the previous sub-section, it is 
necessary to consider whether income aspirations are influenced by impersonal factors 
such as different living environments. Urban and rural hukou people have unequal 
incomes and segregated occupations, thus having differences in working conditions and 
living environments as well. In terms of the effect of environment on aspirations, most 
previous research has focused on human factors. In other words, they primarily 
emphasize how the relationship with neighbours, friends and colleagues influence 
individual aspirations (Stutzer, 2004; Ray, 2006; McBride, 2010 and Dalton et al., 
2016).  
In addition to individual characteristics, Stutzer (2004) also studied the effect of 
social comparisons on people’s absolute aspirations. The average income in the 
community where respondents live was considered to be a potential determinant of 
respondents’ income aspirations. A higher income of fellow residents has a positive 
influence on individuals’ income aspirations. This may be because individuals in a 
community with higher income levels have higher price levels for individual services, 
which in turn leads to higher income aspirations. Furthermore, Stutzer (2004) also 
found that the effect of average community income on individual income aspirations is 
larger for people who interact with other members in the community frequently.  
Similar to Stutzer (2004), McBride (2010) also investigates the relationship 
between money, happiness and aspirations. In addition to exploring the effect of 
aspiration on happiness, he examines how absolute aspirations form and adapt over time. 
Firstly, the author finds that individual aspiration levels rely positively on past income, 
which is consistent with most previous research. Secondly, he examines how social 
comparisons influence individuals’ aspiration formation, finding that respondents prefer 
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to compare themselves to those who are most similar to themselves when making social 
comparisons, and their aspirations are positively influenced by the outcomes of others in 
their comparison group. To be specific, individuals prefer to perform better relative to 
others in their comparison group. Moreover, aspiration levels will adapt to the 
environment and comparison group variations, therefore an income increase in the 
comparison group stimulates increasing aspirations.  
Following Stutzer (2004), Knight & Gunatilaka (2010a) have also analysed how 
income aspirations affect subjective well-being and the determinants of absolute income 
aspirations in rural China. Similar to Stutzer (2004), they not only explore the effect of 
current income and social demographic factors (age, education, gender, marital status, 
and composition of household) on income aspirations, but also take social comparisons 
into account. Firstly, they show the effect of comparator income on respondents’ income 
aspirations. More than 65% of respondents reported that their main reference group was 
within the village. The comparator income of the reference group has a positive impact 
on the respondents’ income aspirations. A higher income of the main reference group 
raises income aspirations substantially (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010a). Secondly, 
respondents assess their own income and answer whether their income is much above, 
above, at, below or much below the average income of their village, which is regarded 
as the reference group. They found that, in comparison to individuals at the average 
income level, those respondents whose incomes were far below the village average had 
significantly higher aspirations. However, this result was only found for those with 
materialistic attitudes who firmly believed money was very important. For those 
without such attitudes, this finding does not hold.  
    Knight & Gunatilaka (2010b, 2012b) divided their rural sample into rural 
households and rural-urban migrants in China. When utilizing income aspirations of 
rural-urban migrants to explain the reason for rural-urban migrants with higher income 
in urban areas having lower happiness levels than rural residents, Knight & Gunatilaka 
(2010b, 2012b) also analyse the determinants of income aspirations. They ascribe the 
reason for rural-urban migrants’ failure to foresee how they are likely to have to adapt 
their aspirations in their new situation. Before migration, rural-urban migrants and rural 
households may hold similar aspirations regarding income and living standards, but 
aspirations are likely to rise after making the decision to migrate. Although rural-urban 
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migrants earn higher wages and can access superior individual services, their 
comparison group has changed as well. Migrants tend to compare their own situations 
with others living in their new surroundings, and the higher standard of those living in 
their new environment will lead them to develop higher income aspirations.  
   In this section, I have reviewed previous research that investigates the effects of 
different environments or comparison groups on aspirations. The next section focuses 
on the extent to which discrimination restricts the aspirations of the disadvantaged 
group.  
3.3.3 Discrimination Impacts 
In this sub-section, I intend to review studies which analyse the effect of 
discrimination on aspirations. Several previous studies have analysed the career 
aspirations of African American individuals who had encountered racism in the United 
States, and have examined whether racial discrimination or oppression can restrict this 
disadvantaged groups’ career aspirations. In general, the disadvantaged group is 
discriminated against in terms of both career and earnings, which is similar to how 
rural-urban migrants encounter occupation segregation and income inequality in China. 
In the United States, a complex history of occupational inequality has existed between 
European Americans and African Americans. African Americans are overrepresented in 
lower occupational status and lower paid jobs. Although the representation of African 
Americans in some professional fields has improved, African Americans are still 
discriminated against and remain under-represented in careers related to high-skilled 
occupations (Alagaraja et al., 2016).  
In order to understand the career development of African Americans, some 
researchers have focused on career aspirations. They have discussed whether being 
discriminated against or lack of representation in higher status occupations in the long 
term can exacerbate African American’s generally low aspirations (Evans & Herr, 1994; 
Jackson & Nutini, 2002; Bigler et al., 2003; Tovar & Murray et al., 2012; Brown & 
Segrist, 2016 and Alagaraja et al., 2016). Evans & Herr (1994), Jackson & Nutini 
(2002), Bigler et al. (2003) and Tovar & Murray et al. (2012) focused on a sample of 
African American children and college students to investigate whether racial 
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discrimination and oppression constrained their career aspirations. Evans & Herr (1994) 
explored the possible impacts of perceptions of discrimination on the traditional career 
aspirations of 111 African American college student volunteers and proposed that 
discrimination can predict career aspirations. Their results do not support the hypothesis, 
which they ascribe to the fact that African Americans have learned to adapt to the 
disadvantaged status resulting from long term racial discrimination.  
Although Jackson & Nutini (2002), Bigler et al. (2003) and Tovar & Murray et al. 
(2012) focus on a sample of children and students, their results are not consistent with 
Evans & Herr (1994), suggesting that racial discrimination can influence career choices 
and lower aspirations. Jackson & Nutini (2002) conducted an analysis with students in a 
low-income, culturally diverse and inner-city public school and examined the possible 
influence of discrimination on career learning. They posit that individuals who are 
sensitive to discrimination encounter potentially unobserved barriers in their career 
assessment. In terms of career understanding, the awareness of systemic career barriers 
may be different for culturally diverse individuals. Moreover, this awareness can partly 
determine their direct and indirect learning experiences. Behaviours and feelings that 
racially discriminated individuals learn from the inequality and discrimination they 
experience can restrict the utilization of existing resources and constrain their 
exploration of areas that might be beneficial to their career development (Jackson & 
Nutini, 2002). In the long term, the disadvantaged group cannot conduct accurate career 
assessments, which lowers their career aspirations. 
Both Bigler et al. (2003) and Tovar & Murray et al. (2012) have examined whether 
racism-related stress influences judgments on occupational planning. It was found that 
most African American people are more likely to select jobs in which African 
Americans are traditionally engaged. On one hand, the lower occupational aspirations 
have been ascribed to their assessment of potential limitations afforded by their 
socio-economic status. On the other hand, they have also been attributed to the fact that 
African Americans have an awareness that they are more likely to face prejudicial 
attitudes in traditional occupational settings, which is consistent with Jackson & Nutini 
(2002). The results of both Bigler et al. (2003) and Tovar & Murray et al. (2012) show 
that the coefficient for racism stress was negative on African American career goals, 
suggesting an inverse relationship. Racism plays an important role in restricting African 
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American respondents’ occupational goals. Their career aspirations decrease as their 
racism-related stress increases.  
In addition, both Bigler et al. (2003) and Tovar & Murray et al. (2012) investigated 
the factors that moderate African Americans’ occupational judgments and alleviate the 
career barriers they encounter. Tovar & Murray et al. (2012) report racial or ethnic 
identity as a psychological buffer that protects African Americans from racism 
regarding career aspirations, moderating the negative effects of racial discrimination on 
respondents’ self-assessments, which suggest that African Americans will report higher 
levels of career aspirations when they strongly identify with their racial identity. On the 
other hand, Bigler et al. (2003) suggested that children’s socioeconomic status can 
moderate their occupational judgments, especially during adolescence. 
African-American children with a higher socioeconomic status have more interest in the 
jobs that European Americans, or both African American and European Americans, 
undertake than they do in jobs viewed as involving only African Americans (Bigler et 
al., 2003). The relationship between socioeconomic status and career aspirations 
suggests that economic support is significant in African American children’s career 
decisions. To be specific, lower socioeconomic status children have the awareness that 
they lack sufficient financial resources to attain a high educational level, which in turn 
restricts their pursuit of high-skilled jobs. 
In the United States, previous research has focused mostly on the career aspirations 
and development of children and adolescents. Among the sample of African-American 
adults from 18 to 62 years of age, Brown & Segrist (2016) have investigated whether 
African-American career aspirations are influenced by internalized racism, based on 
Social Cognitive Career Theory (SCCT) (Lent et al., 1994). Brown & Segrist (2016) 
argue that racial discrimination or racial oppression creates many barriers to African 
American’s career development by lowering respondents’ self-evaluation for 
capabilities. Therefore, it is necessary to take the experience of racial discrimination 
into account when exploring the career aspirations of this disadvantaged group. An 
inverse relationship between internalized racial discrimination and career aspirations 
was found. The most serious consequence of racial oppression and discrimination may 
be the internalisation of the idea of inferiority. African Americans are more likely to feel 
that they are not as worthy as others; therefore, racial oppression can constrain 
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African-American individuals’ motivations and aspirations.  
Although Dalton et al. (2016) do not indicate whether discrimination exists 
between the poor and the rich, the difference in access to relevant information is 
apparent. They construct a theoretical model and analyse the relationship between 
poverty and “aspiration failure”, defined as the failure to aspire to one’s own potential. 
They divide all individuals into rich and poor persons and assume that both the rich and 
the poor share the same preferences and behaviours in setting career aspirations. They 
found that poverty can cause behavioural bias or internal constraints, such as a lack of 
foresight, a lack of willpower and a lack of aspirations. In addition, poverty can also 
impose external limitations on the poor, which intensify the negative impacts of the 
behavioural bias in setting career aspirations. The external limitations are not only 
financial resource barriers, but also include other constraints that make it more difficult 
for the poor to achieve a given outcome, such as less influential contacts or less access 
to relevant information (Dalton et al., 2016). Such limitations make the poor more 
vulnerable to aspiration failure; thus, these individuals are more likely to have a 
relatively lower level of aspirations. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that 
individual aspirations and efforts are jointly determined. The lower level of aspirations 
can lead to a low level of effort relative to the optimal level, which in turn strengthens 
the lower aspirations. In urban China, rural-urban migrants may also suffer from 
differential access to relevant opportunities and beneficial information, due to hukou 
discrimination. Therefore, following Dalton et al. (2016), it is reasonable to suspect that 
the different treatments deriving from discrimination can restrict rural-urban migrants’ 
aspirations. 
To sum up, most previous studies have examined how current income, 
socio-demographic factors and social comparisons influence individuals’ income 
aspirations. Following previous research, a study of the Chinese context by Knight & 
Gunatilaka (2012b) also investigates the determinants of income aspirations for 
individuals in rural China. They examined the influence of present income, 
socio-demographic factors (age, education, gender, marital status, household size) on 
the formation of income aspirations, and tested how the comparator income of the 
reference group influenced respondents’ income aspirations. In addition, Knight & 
Gunatilaka (2010a, 2012b) compared the income aspirations between rural-urban 
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migrants and rural residents and explained the difference in income aspirations between 
these two groups. They also reported that aspirations depend on income compared with 
the relevant reference group. Rural-urban migrants will adapt to their new environments 
and compare their own situations with the new members in their communities. 
Therefore, rural-urban migrants have higher income aspirations in comparison to rural 
residents. Overall, although previous studies of the Chinese context have identified the 
determinants of income aspirations, there are limitations and gaps to be filled, as 
explained below.  
Firstly, there is a limited amount of Chinese research investigating the 
determinants of income aspirations. In particular, previous research by Knight & 
Gunatilaka (2010a, 2012b) only analyses the determinants of income aspirations for 
rural hukou individuals: no research compares the income aspirations between urban 
hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants. As discussed in Chapter 2, income 
inequality and occupational segregation between urban people and rural-urban migrants 
are not only attributed to educational attainment, working experience and family 
background, but also to hukou discrimination. Following previous research reviewed in 
Section 3.2.3, African-American people, who are also overrepresented in lower 
occupational status with lower incomes, suffer from barriers to setting their career 
aspirations. Their aspirations are restricted by racial discrimination and/or racial 
oppression in the United States. However, no previous Chinese research has examined 
the impact of hukou discrimination on rural-urban migrants’ aspirations in China. Thus, 
following these studies which analyse the impacts of discrimination on aspirations, I 
intend to utilize the China General Social Survey (CGSS 2010) to obtain specific 
information on respondents’ income aspirations and compare income aspirations 
between urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants. The purpose of this chapter 
is to investigate whether hukou discrimination constrains rural-urban migrants’ income 
aspirations and whether any differences in income aspirations between urban hukou 
individuals and rural-urban migrants is attributable to hukou discrimination. 
3.4 Methodology 
As discussed in Chapter 2, rural-urban migrants suffer from discrimination in 
urban labour market. In order to investigate whether the hukou discrimination affects 
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rural-urban migrants’ income aspirations, all individuals are divided into two groups as 
Chapter 2: urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants. Propensity score matching 
(PSM) is used to estimate the effect of hukou discrimination on aspirations, by matching 
urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants with similar characteristics and 
comparing their reported income aspirations. This section discusses the evaluation 
framework, conditions and procedures of PSM implementation.  
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a technique to estimate causal treatment 
effects (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). It aims to estimate the effect of a treatment or 
policy program by accounting for the covariates that predict the reception of the 
treatment. PSM applies to situations where there are two groups, a group of treated 
individuals (the treatment group) and a group of untreated individuals (the control 
group). An estimate of the treatment effect is obtained from the difference between 
potential outcomes of individuals under treatment conditions (treatment outcome) and 
under control conditions (potential outcomes). Assuming a case of binary treatment, 
Di=1 refers to individual i receiving the treatment, and Di=0 otherwise. Potential 
outcomes for each individual I are denoted Yi (Di), where i=1, 2,…, N. Therefore, the 
effect of treatment (δi) can be defined as the difference between the potential outcomes 
Yi (1) and Yi (0).  
(1) (0)i i iY Y                            (3-1) 
However, the problem arises that it is impossible to observe both outcomes for the same 
individuals at the same time. The unobserved outcome is called the counterfactual 
outcome (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). For example, if I intend to analyse the impact of 
having a Master’s degree on a person’s income, it would be impossible for a Master’s 
student to observe their income without a Master’s degree. Therefore, the income 
without a Master’s degree for those Master’s students is the counterfactual outcome. As 
a result, researchers have to concentrate on the average treatment effect (ATE) 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008): 
= ( ) [ (1) (0)]ATE i i iE E Y Y                           (3-2) 
The average treatment effect (ATE) is defined as the difference between the expected 
outcome with and without treatment. Heckman (2008) has pointed out that the 
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estimation of the average treatment effect (ATE) includes the effect on individuals who 
will never be treated. Therefore, an alternative parameter ATT (the average treatment 
effect on the treated) can be utilized instead. It focuses directly on individuals who 
actually participate in the treatment, and is defined as the difference between the 
expected outcomes of those individuals with and without treatment (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008). 
             = ( | 1) [ (1) | 1] [ (0) | 1]ATT i i iE D E Y D E Y D                 (3-3) 
Since the mean value of the untreated outcome for those being treated, E[Yi (0)| D=1], is 
not observed, researchers have to utilize the mean outcomes for the control individuals, 
E[Yi| D=0], as a substitute to estimating ATT. However, using the mean outcome of 
control individuals in non-experimental studies is not a good idea, as participants and 
non-participants differ in terms of their characteristics, which in turn may cause 
selection bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). 
[ (1) | 1] [ (0) | 0]
{ [ (1) | 1] [ (0) | 1]} { [ (0) | 1] [ (0) | 0]}
{ [ (0) | 1] [ (0) | 0]}
i i
i i i i
ATT i i
ATT
E Y D E Y D
E Y D E Y D E Y D E Y D
E Y D E Y D
selectionBias


  
       
    
 
           (3-4) 
The matching method is used to solve selection bias in non-experimental studies. The 
basic idea of matching is to find individuals in the non-participant group who are 
similar to their participant counterparts in terms of their observable characteristics. In 
non-experimental studies, some conditions (unconfoundedness and common support) 
need to be met to solve the selection issue in equation (3-4) (Blundell et al., 2005). The 
conditions are: 
Condition 1. Unconfoundedness: (0), (1) |i iY Y D X  
where “ ”refers to independence, indicates that potential outcomes do not rely on the 
treatment assignment, given a set of observable covariates, X. In other words, there is a 
need for all variables influencing treatment participation and potential outcomes to be 
observed. 
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Condition2. Common support: 0 ( 1| ) 1P D X    
Common support indicates that all individuals have a positive probability of being 
participants and non-participants (Heckman et al., 1997). This is also called the overlap 
condition, which can be observed visually by the density distribution of the propensity 
scores in both groups. The propensity score refers to the probability of participating in 
treatment for each individual. There is a potential match in the control group for every 
individual in the treated group (Bryson et al., 2002).  
In terms of unconfoundedness, if X simply includes one observable characteristic 
(X=x), the average treatment for the treated for a particular value of X can be written as 
follows: 
           
( ) [ (1) (0) | 1, ]
[ (1) | 1, ] [ (0) | 1, ]
[ (1) | 1, ] [ (0) | 0, ]
ATT x E Y Y D X x
E Y D X x E Y D X x
E Y D X x E Y D X x
    
     
     
           (3-5) 
Here, the outcome of control group individuals, E[Y(0)| D=0, X=x], can be utilized to 
replace the unobservable outcome of treated people, E[Y(0)| D=1, X=x], with the same 
characteristics. If X contains multiple covariates, it is difficult to make a judgment 
regarding how close the control group is to the treated group. Therefore, in order to 
cope with the dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) proposed a 
balancing score, b(X), that is a function of relevant observed covariates, X. They proved 
that matching based on the balancing score will be valid when based on the relevant 
covariates. Moreover, if the outcomes are independent of treatment, conditional on 
covariates X, the outcomes are independent, conditional on the balancing score, b(X) 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). One possible balancing score is the propensity score that 
is the probability for individuals to participate in the treatment, given the observed 
covariates, X. The basic idea of propensity score matching (PSM) is to find in a large 
control group of non-participating individuals who are similar to the participants from 
the treatment group in terms of the probability of being treated. When researchers find 
participants and non-participants with similar propensity scores, the differential 
outcomes between these two groups can be estimated, in order to explain the effect of 
the treatment on the treated group. The propensity score can be written thus: 
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                      ( 1| ) ( )P D X P X                           (3-6) 
The propensity score the matching (PSM) estimator for the average treatment for the 
treated (ATT), can be written as: 
( )| 1= { [ (1) | 1, ( )] [ (0) | 0, ( )]}
PSM
ATT P X DE E Y D P X E Y D P X                (3-7) 
This gives the difference of expected outcomes, weighted by the propensity score 
distribution of participants (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). A key step to implementing 
PSM is to estimate the propensity score and find applicable nonparticipants in the 
control group with similar propensity scores to the participants. Below, I discuss the 
procedures of implementation of propensity score matching (PSM).  
Step 1. Estimating the propensity score 
In general, for a binary treatment, researchers utilize a probit or logit model to 
estimate the probability of participants receiving the treatment. The model can be 
written as  
                      
*1 0
0
i
i
if y
y
otherwise
 
 

                     (3-8) 
The latent variable y* is specified as 
                             
*
i i iy X                            (3-9)  
where X contains factors, which influence the probability of a person’ hukou status. The 
dummy variable hukou status (yi) divides all the observations into the treatment group 
(rural-urban migrants) and control group (urban hukou individuals).  
                    
0
1
i
urban hukou
y
rural urban migrants

 

               (3-10) 
Assuming that the error term, εi, follows a logistic distribution, the propensity score, 
which is the probability for an individual to participate in the treatment given his 
observed covariates, X, is given by 
                  ( 1) ( )
1
X
X
e
prob y X
e





   

                (3-11) 
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All the individuals will obtain a specific propensity score, which is constrained to lie 
between 0 and 1. Based on these participants’ propensity scores, researchers can choose 
different matching methods to find the control group individuals that are most similar to 
the treated individuals in terms of their propensity score.  
Step 2. Choosing a matching algorithm 
The matching algorithms search for potential matches in the control group based 
on the propensity score, which has been computed in the first step. The traditional and 
most popular matching estimator is nearest-neighbour matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983; Dehejia & Wahba, 1999; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). The basic idea of 
nearest-neighbour matching is to find the individual in the control group who is closest 
in terms of their propensity score for each participant in the treatment group. 
Nearest-neighbour matching can be done either “with replacement” or “without 
replacement”. In nearest-neighbour (NN) matching with replacement, individuals in the 
control group can be utilized as a potential match more than once, whilst a control 
group individual can be used only once in the case of NN without replacement. 
Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) and Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008) suggest that the quality of 
matching with replacement will be higher and the bias will decrease (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). In addition, matching without replacement 
will reduce successful matched samples, as each potential partner comparison group can 
be used only once. The second problem of matching without replacement is that it relies 
on the order in which observations are matched (Smith & Todd, 2005). Following 
previous research, this study therefore uses nearest-neighbour matching with 
replacement. 
Step 3. Checking common support or overlap  
Successful implementation of matching requires that the condition of common 
support can be satisfied, because Heckman et al. (1997) point out a bias will be caused 
by the violation of this condition. In other words, comparing the incomparable untreated 
persons with the treatment group will lead to bias in the estimates of ATT. Dehejia & 
Wahba (1999) also point out that only individuals from the comparison group who are 
matched and comparable to the people in the treatment group should be utilized in the 
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analysis, in order to calculate the average treatment of the effect on the treated (ATT). 
Therefore, checking the overlap between the treatment and control group is an 
important step before estimating the ATT.  
Different methods have been proposed to check the region of common support 
between the treatment and the control group
12
. Lechner (2008), Bryson et al. (2002) and 
Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008) suggest that the most straightforward way is a visual 
inspection of the density distribution of the propensity score for the treatment and 
comparison group. Therefore, in this study, it is essential to check the overlap between 
urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants before estimating ATT. In other words, 
there is a need to check that a subset of the urban hukou individuals in the control group 
is comparable to the rural-urban migrants in the treatment group.  
Step 4. Estimating average treatment for the treated (ATT) 
Once the treated individuals have been matched to control group individuals based 
on propensity score, the difference between the actual and the counterfactual income 
aspirations13 for the rural-urban migrants can be estimated by 
( )| 1= { [( (1) | 1, ( )] [ ( (0) | 0, ( )]}
PSM
ATT P X ruralE E Y rural P X E Y rural P X            (3-12) 
Step 5. Sensitivity analysis  
Finally, it is necessary to check the robustness of the estimated results after 
obtaining an estimate of the average treatment for the treated (ATT). Dehejia & Wahba 
(1999), Lechner (2008), Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008) point out that failure of the 
common support condition can be a significant source of estimation bias. This is 
because the individuals outside the region of common support are disregarded from the 
                                                   
12 See Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983), Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008), Bryson et al. (2002) for more details of 
theoretical discussion. 
13 For those rural-urban migrants working and living in urban cities, fewer of them have opportunities to obtain 
urban hukou status unless they participate in further professional or technical training or receive further educational 
attainment. In this case, such rural-urban migrants have a higher probability to obtain the opportunities for promotion 
and better jobs so that they are likely to get urban hukou status. Thus, for rural migrants who still hold rural hukou 
status at the present stage, the counterfactual income aspirations refer to their income aspiration if they had urban 
hukou status. The counterfactual income aspirations for these rural migrants is unobserved, thus I utilize urban hukou 
individuals with similar endowments to replace these counterfactual values.  
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sample and the estimation only focuses on the sub-sample within common support. 
Nevertheless, disregarding those individuals outside the common support also 
disregards useful information, especially if treatment effects are heterogeneous 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). The most straightforward and simple approach to check 
the robustness of the estimated average treatment effect is to change the range of 
common support in order to test whether the results are sensitive to the variation of 
common support (Lechner, 2008). In addition, some researchers use different matching 
algorithms to test the robustness of ATT because different matching algorithms look for 
potential partners based on different principles (Zhao, 2004; Heckman, 2008 and Johar, 
2009). To be specific, similar to one-to-one nearest-neighbour matching in this chapter, 
one-to-five matching means that five individuals from the control group are picked as 
matching partners for one treated individual with the closest propensity score. Radius 
matching means choosing all the individuals from the control group as matching 
partners for one treated individual whose propensity scores lie within a pre-specified 
range. Kernel matching and local linear matching are non-parametric matching 
estimators which utilize weighted averages of approximately all control individuals, 
depending on different kernel functions and bandwidth parameters (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008). All samples in both treated and control group are matched, depending 
on the estimated outcome. In this chapter, I will compare the results from these different 
matching approaches. For the multiple nearest-neighbour matching, one-to-five 
nearest-neighbour matching is utilized. The radius of radius matching is 0.01. The 
bandwidth of kernel and local linear matching is set to the default value (0.06)
14
. 
3.5 Data and Choice of Variables  
The data utilized in this chapter comes from the China General Social Survey 
(CGSS) 2010, implemented by the Department of Sociology of Renmin University of 
China and the Survey Research Centre of Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology. The CGSS, which started in 2003, is the first continuous national social 
survey project in China. Respondents in households and communities are randomly 
selected. By the end of 2008, the CGSS team had carried out five data collection rounds 
and finished the first section of the entire project. The second stage started in 2010 and 
                                                   
14
See Aakvik (2001), Rosenbaum (2002), Imbens (2004), Caliendo et al. (2008) for a discussion of sensitivity 
analysis in detail.  
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the plan is to establish an investigation on a two-year basis, with 5 rounds of data 
collection to be carried out until 2019. The CGSS 2010, which is utilized in this chapter, 
is the latest available version, carried out in 2010 and published in 2014.  
The advantage of CGSS is that I can obtain information of individuals’ income 
aspirations directly. Regarding the measurement of income aspirations, Stutzer (2004) 
utilized income evaluation measures from two aspects that were individuals’ adaption 
provided by their consumption habits and comparison with relevant and similar others. 
Through the comparison with respect to consumption and income status, respondents 
were required to evaluate their income based on their job and family. Following Stutzer 
(2004), the information I can obtain from CGSS 2010 is related to social comparison. 
Income aspirations can be captured from two questions that are asked one after the other. 
Firstly, all respondents are asked “Are you satisfied with your current yearly income, 
based on your educational attainment, job, working experience, and other social 
demographic factors?”. Secondly, they are asked “If not satisfied, what do you think you 
would have earned based on your educational attainment, job, working experience, and 
other social demographic factors?”. I delete those respondents who do not reply to the 
both questions (4%). Among these respondents, about 2% have never worked before. 
The other 2% respondents refuse to answer questions. For other respondents, I obtain a 
measure of income aspirations mainly from the second question. About 74% 
respondents give specific answers to the second question which is used to measure their 
income aspirations. The remaining 22% respondents who do not answer the second 
question, are decomposed to that approximately 8% respondents reply that they are 
satisfied or relatively satisfied with their current income and 14% respondents report 
that they feel unhappy with their current income and do not provide an answer to the 
second question. In terms of the 8% respondents, I replace the missing value of income 
aspirations with their actual income. However, the rest 14% respondents are dropped 
from the sample and that how their basic social demographic factors differ from the 
remaining sample is shown in Appendix Table 3-11. As shown in Table 3-11, there is no 
huge difference in these social demographic factors between the remaining and dropped 
samples, so that the reduction of sample does not have enormous impact on the analysis. 
In addition, they are also required to give their hukou status. Information regarding the 
survey location is also available in CGSS 2010, which can distinguish rural-urban 
migrants from the rural hukou individuals. 
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When carrying out propensity score matching, it is important to carefully choose 
the covariates in the analysis. Since propensity score matching (PSM) is based on the 
unconfoundedness condition, all variables influencing treatment participation should be 
controlled for to avoid estimation bias. The choice of variables can rely on economic 
theory, previous research and institutional settings (Heckman et al., 1997; Dehejia & 
Wahba, 1999 and Smith & Todd, 2005). Regarding the choice of variables, Heckman et 
al. (1997) suggest that only those influencing participation and outcome simultaneously 
should be included in the analysis. Augurzky & Schmidt (2001) divide the potential 
variables into three groups. The first contains those that affect the treatment 
participation but are unrelated to outcomes; the second includes variables that influence 
outcomes but are not related to treatment participation; the third group contains 
variables influencing both. They point out that the model with the third group, which 
includes all variables influencing treatment participation and potential outcomes 
simultaneously, has better estimated results of average treatment effect for the treated 
group (ATT).  
However, Bryson et al. (2002) indicate that more information in the dataset can 
advance the quality of matching. Including non-significant variables in the matching 
specification will not lead to bias in the estimation of ATT, but it will increase the 
variance. Therefore, they suggest choosing all available variables in the analysis which 
are relevant to the outcome. Rubin & Thomas (1996) argue that a variable can be 
excluded from the analysis in two cases. Firstly, based on previous research and 
economic theory, this variable is not relevant to the outcome. Secondly, the variable you 
chose is not a relevant covariate for the treatment participation and potential outcome 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). In this chapter, I intend to choose all the available 
covariates potentially affecting income aspirations from CGSS (2010) firstly, and then 
test which of the variables influence treatment participation.  
Based on previous research on the determinants of income aspirations, the effect of 
current income, socio-demographic factors (e.g. age, gender, education attainment and 
marital status), occupation status, size of household, family background, health status 
and self-evaluated SES on income aspirations have been discussed. First of all, for the 
effect of current income on income aspirations (Fuchs & Landsberger, 1973; Centers & 
Cantril, 1946; Portes et al., 1978; Stutzer, 2004; McBride, 2010; Dalton et al., 2016),  
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Table 3- 1 Description of Variables 
Variables  Description  
Dependent variable  
Income aspirations  Individuals’ aspirations regarding total income 
Treatment dummy  
Rural  1-Respondents with rural hukou status 
0-respondents with urban hukou status 
Independent variables  
Current income  Actual total income per year 
Social demographic factors  
Male   1- Male 
0- Female  
Age  Age of respondent in years. Male (16 to 60); female (16 to 55) 
Married   1- Married 
0- Unmarried  
Children Number of children in the family 
Respondents’ highest education level 
Non-education  1- No education 
0- Otherwise 
Compulsory level  1- Highest education level is compulsory school  
0- Otherwise 
Senior high school 1- Highest education level is senior level (professional high school, 
senior high school and technical school) 
0- Otherwise 
University  1- Highest education level is university  
0- Otherwise 
Type of Occupation  
Private company  1- Engaging in private organizations 
0- Otherwise (engaging in public organizations) 
Father’s highest education level  
Non-education for father’s highest 
education  
1- No education  
0- Otherwise 
Compulsory level for father’s highest 
education 
1- Highest education level is compulsory school  
0- Otherwise 
Senior high school for father’s highest 
education 
1- Highest education level is senior level (professional high school, 
senior high school and technical school) 
0- Otherwise 
University 1- Highest education level is university  
0- Otherwise 
Self-evaluated SES Individuals’ self-evaluated socio-economic status on a 10-point scale 
1- Significantly below average level 
10- Significantly above average level 
Health status 
Good health  1- Good health  
0-Otherwise 
Standard  1-Standard health status 
0-Otherwise 
Poor health 1-Poor health 
0-Otherwise  
Note: China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized.  
total income and occupational incomes per year are provided in the dataset. Since the 
income aspirations variable refers to individuals’ total income aspirations, I decided to 
use the total income variable as the measure of current income. In addition, fewer 
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people reported extremely high and extremely low value in terms of their income 
aspirations and total income. However, there is no available information to explain these 
extreme issues. Therefore, I delete the top and bottom 1% of total income aspirations 
and total income from the sample to guarantee even income distribution.  
Regarding the socio-demographic variables, information about age, gender, 
educational attainment and marital status can be found in the CGSS 2010. For the 
educational attainment, I use the highest education level, which is a categorical variable. 
Following the “Nine-year Compulsory Education Law”, decreed in 1986, all school-age 
children and teenagers must receive nine years’ compulsory education, which includes 6 
years of primary school and 3 years of lower middle school. The government exempts 
all tuition fees for compulsory education. It is the obligation of the compulsory schools, 
parents and the community to let school-age children receive the appropriate education. 
After the nine years of compulsory education, some students choose to study further in 
higher middle school or technical school, while some students may give up studying 
and devote their time to working. After graduating from higher middle school, some 
individuals choose to study further at university. Therefore, this categorical variable 
“highest education level” is divided into 4 dummy variables: no educational attainment, 
compulsory education, senior higher school and university.  
Marital status is a categorical variable as well, with 6 categories, including 
unmarried; married; living together but not married; divorced; widowed; and separated. 
In order to transfer this categorical variable into a dummy variable, people living 
together are regarded as married, whilst divorced, those separated but not divorced and 
widowed individuals are treated as unmarried. The variable health status is an ordinal 
variable with 5-point scale: 1-completely unhealthy, 2-unhealthy, 3-standard, 4-healthy, 
5-completely healthy. I restructured this ordinal variable into three dummy variables, 
which are good health (healthy and completely healthy), standard health and poor health 
status (unhealthy and completely unhealthy). 
For occupation status, specific information on detailed occupation types is not 
available but I can get information related to the broad type of occupation, including 
farmers, self-employed, employed in national organizations, such as government or 
public organizations, and employed in private enterprises. As the purpose of this study 
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is to discuss how hukou discrimination influences rural-urban migrants’ income 
aspirations, I only focus on employed individuals in the urban labour market. As a 
consequence, people who work in farming and the self-employed are deleted from the 
analysis. The occupation can be transferred into a dummy variable: 0 refers to being 
employed in public organizations and 1 refers to being employed in a private company. 
In terms of family background, I follow Portes et al. (1978) in investigating whether a 
father’s educational background has a positive association with respondents’ income 
aspirations. As for the respondents’ educational attainment variable, the father’s 
education attainment is also divided into four dummy variables: no education, 
compulsory education, senior higher school and university. Regarding household size, I 
follow Stutzer (2004), choosing the number of children as a measure of the size and 
composition of the family. 
When estimating the effect of social comparisons on income aspirations, Stutzer 
(2004), McBride (2010), Knight & Gunatilaka (2012a) and Knight & Gunatilaka (2012b) 
suggest that comparisons with neighbours, close friends, colleagues, other members in 
the community and the average standard of the whole society play an important role in 
individual aspirations. Specific information about respondents’ neighbours, friends and 
colleagues and the average standard of the whole society is unfortunately not available 
in the CGSS 2010. However, I can obtain information about individuals’ self-evaluated 
social status instead from the question “Can you make a self-evaluation of your social 
status into a given 10-point scale from bottom (1-significantly below average level) to 
the top (10-significantly above average level), based on your own income, education 
level, and other endowment factors (e.g., the extent of being respected)?”. Following 
these objective criteria such as income and education level, all respondents evaluate 
their own socio-economic status differently depending on their relative positions. They 
are more likely to assess their own status by comparing with proximal persons around 
them, such as their neighbours, relatives, fellows, close friends or the people in the same 
community. Even if a person with lower income and is not highly educated, his 
self-evaluated social status may be similar to a person who has higher education level 
and higher income. That is because these two persons are in different relative position 
and environment. Table 3-1 shows a description of the outcome variable, participation 
variable and a set of covariates which potentially have an impact on income aspirations. 
After choosing the covariates influencing potential outcomes, I tested which factors 
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among these covariates also influence treatment participation. Following the 
introduction in the Chapter 1, I can obtain detailed information of the implementation, 
reform, development and how hukou status has changed. In terms of variations in hukou 
status, most variables among the covariates influencing income aspirations have an 
impact on hukou status as well. To be specific, the educational attainment of the head of 
household, age, educational attainment, marital status, present income and occupation 
can determine an individuals’ hukou status. 
For other factors, such as the number of children and SES, no existing literature 
discusses whether hukou status can be influenced by these two factors. However, both 
Rubin & Thomas (1996) and Bryson et al. (2002) indicate that all covariates potentially 
influencing potential outcomes should be included in the propensity score matching. 
Following previous research, it is likely that family size and social comparisons play a 
significant role in determining income aspirations. Therefore, I keep these two variables 
(number of children and self-evaluated SES) when conducting the propensity score 
matching. 
Table 3-2 summarizes the characteristics of all the covariates for both urban hukou 
and rural-urban migrants. The ratio of the sample sizes for urban hukou and rural-urban 
migrants is in line with Bryson et al. (2002) and Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008), who 
suggest that the sample size of the treated group should be smaller than the sample size 
of the control group. The treated group (rural-urban migrants) has 633 observations, in 
comparison to the control group (urban hukou) with 2242 observations. It can be seen 
from Table 3-2 that urban hukou individuals report higher aspirations for income than 
rural-urban migrants on average, and also have higher incomes. In addition, urban 
hukou individuals are more likely to be educated and their father’s highest education 
level is higher than that for rural-urban migrants. To be specific, about 75% of urban 
hukou individuals had graduated from senior higher school or university compared to 
only 33% rural-urban migrants. Regarding occupation, the percentage of urban hukou 
individuals (34%) working for public organizations was about twice as high as for 
rural-urban migrants. In terms of self-evaluated SES, it can be seen that rural-urban 
migrants in different positions have different attitudes to their socio-economic status 
with urban people, by the objective criteria such as their own income and education 
attainment. Although rural-urban migrants have lower income and less education 
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attainment, their reference comparison populations are mainly individuals with the 
similar income level and education attainment as themselves. Therefore, they report 
relatively similar socio-economic status to urban hukou workers. Regarding 
Table 3- 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev Mean  Std. Dev 
 Urban hukou 
(2242 observations) 
Rural-urban migrants (633 
observations) 
Dependent variable 
Income aspirations 45420.44 35157.91 31941.07 25937.76 
Independent variable 
Current income 26496.20 23377.69 15073.20 14143.49 
Social demographic 
Age  42.01 10.96 35.17 10.80 
Male  0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Married  0.82 0.39 0.79 0.40 
Children 1.01 0.65 1.18 0.89 
Respondents’ highest education level 
Non-education  0.01 0.11 0.02 0.15 
Compulsory school 0.24 0.43 0.65 0.48 
Senior high school 0.33 0.47 0.24 0.42 
University  0.42 0.49 0.09 0.29 
Type of Occupation 
Public organization  0.34 0.47 0.13 0.33 
Private company 0.66 0.47 0.87 0.34 
Father’s highest education level 
Non-education  0.25 0.44 0.30 0.46 
Compulsory school  0.48 0.50 0.56 0.50 
Senior high school 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.33 
University  0.09 0.29 0.01 0.11 
Self-evaluated SES 4.33 1.66 4.06 1.58 
Health status  
Good health 0.67 0.47 0.76 0.41 
Standard health 0.24 0.42 0.18 0.36 
Poor health  0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24 
Note: (1) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
     (2) Self-evaluated SES utilized in this chapter is continuous variable. Due to the propensity score matching 
being utilized, the exact propensity score is required to match the urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants. 
If I combine several different levels together into three dummy variables, the PS score obtained from this approach 
may not be precise enough for matching. Therefore, I think it is much better to regard the SES as a continuous 
variable to obtain the propensity score in this Chapter. However, I have also tried to re-run analysis using the dummy 
variables of self-evaluated SES and show the results in Table 3-14 of Appendix. When comparing the estimation 
results by using continuous SES (Table 3-3 and Table 3-4) with the estimation by using dummy variable of SES 
(Table 3-14 in Appendix), I find that both the results from OLS and propensity score matching have no differences in 
the significance and direction of all the variables.  
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socio-demographic factors, urban hukou and rural-urban migrants had similar 
characteristics, in terms of gender, marital status and the number of children. However, 
the average age of urban hukou respondents was higher than that of rural-urban 
migrants. 
In line with the previous research on the determinants of income aspirations, it is 
clear from Table 3-2 that rural-urban migrants with lower income, less educational 
attainment and lower self-evaluated SES are expected to report lower absolute income 
aspirations. However, it is not clear whether their hukou status plays a role in decreasing 
their income aspirations. The propensity score matching (PSM) can disentangle this 
issue. By controlling for all the determinants of income aspirations, PSM finds urban 
hukou individuals with similar characteristics to match with the rural-urban migrants. 
The difference between the actual and counterfactual outcome for the rural-urban 
migrants can be used to explain whether hukou status has an impact on income 
aspirations. 
3.6 Results and Discussion 
3.6.1 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation Results 
Before describing the results of the propensity score matching, the results of a 
basic ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of income aspirations are shown in Table 
3-3. The covariates are those described in Table 3-2. I also include the dummy variable 
for hukou status in order to test whether this dummy treatment has an effect on income 
aspirations. 
As shown in Table 3-3, most covariates have a significant relationship with income 
aspirations, which is consistent with the previous literature. As expected, current income 
is positively and significantly associated with individuals’ income aspirations, in line 
with Centers & Cantril (1946), Fuchs & Landsberger (1973), Stutzer (2004), and 
McBride (2010). Income aspirations increase by 0.083% given a 1% increase in current 
income, holding other factors constant. 
In terms of socio-demographic factors, age, gender, marital status, and the number 
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of children is significantly related to individuals’ income aspirations. As shown in Table 
3-3, the positive coefficient on age and the negative coefficient of age squared on 
income aspirations show that income aspirations will increase by 2.9%, at a decreasing 
rate, which is in line with Stutzer (2004) who suggests an inversely U-shaped 
relationship. As in Centers & Cantril (1946), men have higher aspirations and ambition 
for income, probably because they usually undertake the major economic burden in 
most families in China. Table 3-3 shows that the income aspiration for men is 24.0% 
higher than that for women. Moreover, respondents who are married aspire to a 14.4% 
higher income than those who have never been married or divorced. The number of 
children is positive related to income aspirations, which is consistent with Stutzer 
(2004). Specifically, respondents’ income aspirations will increase by 6.5% for every 
additional child in the household.  
For respondents’ education, it is clear that individuals’ income aspirations have 
positive association with their educational attainment, in accordance with Centers & 
Cantril (1946) and Stutzer (2004). In addition, the more education they receive, the 
higher their income aspirations. In comparison with the reference group (no education), 
those respondents who have finished compulsory education have 28.4% higher income 
aspirations, while the aspirations for those people graduating from senior higher school 
is 44.2% higher than those who have not completed compulsory education. Those who 
graduated from university have the highest income aspirations compared with people 
who have never received an education. The father’s educational attainment has a similar 
relationship with income aspirations: the more education the respondents’ father has, 
the higher the income aspirations of the respondents. Compared to individuals whose 
father has not completed compulsory education, income aspirations for respondents 
whose fathers graduate from university increases by 27.8%, while the income 
aspirations for those whose fathers have only finished compulsory school increases by 
16.2%. From 1966 to 1976, China experienced the Cultural Revolution. The college 
entrance examination was abolished during this period and was not resumed until 
October 1977. Therefore, individuals who graduated from senior high school had no 
choice but to work in factories and government in this stage. When the college entrance 
examination resumed, some individuals abandoned their jobs to take the college 
entrance examination. Such individuals who have courage to quit job and take part in 
the examination were more likely to be those who have excellent academic  
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Table 3- 3 Ordinary Least Square Estimation 
Dependent variable  Coefficient  S.E.  
Log of income aspiration 
Log of current income 0.080*** (0.007) 
Rural -0.042 (0.036) 
Socio-demographic factors 
Age 0.029*** (0.010) 
Age2 -0.0003*** (0.0001) 
Male 0.240*** (0.025) 
Married 0.144*** (0.038) 
Number of children 0.065*** (0.022) 
Respondents’ highest educational level 
(reference category is no education) 
Compulsory school 0.284*** (0.102) 
Senior high school 0.442*** (0.104) 
University  0.871*** (0.107) 
Type of occupation 
Private company 0.083*** (0.030) 
Father’s highest educational level 
Compulsory school 0.162*** (0.033) 
Senior high school 0.192*** (0.044) 
University 0.278*** (0.055) 
Self-evaluated SES 0.024*** (0.008) 
Health status  
Good health 0.074 (0.048) 
Standard health  0.110** (0.052) 
Observations  2875  
R-squared 0.303  
Note: (1) Sig: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 for two-tailed t-tests; Standard errors in parentheses. 
(2) The OLS estimation results are not sensitive to the assumption that set few people’s missing income 
aspirations equal to their actual income when they are satisfied or relative satisfied with income but give no answers 
to their income aspirations. There is no significant difference in the results when taking these people out of my 
sample. The estimated results when taking these people out of the sample is shown in the Table 3-12 in Appendix.  
(3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
performance, larger ambitions, and higher aspirations for their future career 
development (Liu & Liu, 2017). When these highly educated individuals educate their 
children, such characteristics could influence the children’s personality positively and 
unconsciously. In addition, highly educated people can provide their children with better 
educational resources and more opportunities to broaden their horizons. Consequently, 
individuals with a highly educated father are more likely to have greater ambitions and 
higher aspirations.   
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When looking at the effect of occupation on income aspirations, the income 
aspirations for respondents engaged by private companies are 8.3% higher than for the 
reference group (respondents in public organizations). This may be attributed to the fact 
that income is more flexible in private companies, according to Cooke (2004). He has 
stated that public sector funding in setting the basic income structure is under the tight 
control of the state. However, employees can get a rise in salary or obtain an extra 
reward in a private company in light of their outstanding performance. As income in 
private companies is more flexible, individuals in these companies might hope to 
receive more money or reward because they believe they can obtain what they expect 
through outstanding achievement. 
The estimated coefficient for self-evaluated SES shows that aspiration income 
increases by 2.4% for every unit increase in SES (10 classes totally), when holding 
other determinants constant. This is in line with Stutzer (2004), Ray (2006) and Knight 
& Gunatilaka (2010b, 2012a, 2012b), who indicate that a higher social status or 
financial situation, based on comparisons with neighbours, colleagues, friends or the 
average standard of the whole society, has a positive associations with income 
aspirations.  
In terms of the key hypothesis regarding the effect of hukou status on income 
aspirations, the OLS estimation results in Table 3-3 show that the dummy of rural-urban 
migrants’ variable has no significant relation with income aspirations, which indicates 
that the lower income aspirations for rural-urban migrants is not attributed to their rural 
hukou status. In order to test the robustness of this result, propensity score matching 
(PSM) was utilized to match urban hukou individuals to rural-urban migrants, based on 
the same determinants. The propensity score matching (PSM) results are presented in 
the next section.  
3.6.2 Propensity Score Matching-Balancing Test 
Before matching the urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants, a logit 
model of the treatment is utilized to calculate the propensity score, as explained in the 
methodology section. The estimation results of the logit model are shown in Appendix 
Table 3-8, as the determinants of the rural hukou dummy are not the primary concern in 
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this chapter. As shown in Table 3-8, most determinants of income aspirations also have 
relationship with the treatment dummy. The estimated propensity score is used to match 
the urban hukou individuals in the control group with the rural-urban migrants in the 
treated group using nearest neighbour one-to-one matching. The next stage after 
preparing the matching is to carry out a balancing test in order to check the overlap and 
the quality of matching. Appendix Table 3-9 reports the mean value of the covariates for 
the matched and unmatched samples. Following Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983), the 
successful matching should guarantee that the differences between treated and untreated 
individuals for every factor in the matched sample should be smaller than that in the 
unmatched sample.  
Figure 3-1 Propensity Score Density Distribution of One-to-One Nearest-Neighbor 
Matching 
 
As shown in Table 3-9, the difference in the mean value of covariates between the 
treated and control groups after matching is smaller than that before matching in general. 
For example, the log of current income difference in the matched sample is 0.15 
(|T-C|=|8.58-8.73|), in comparison to 0.96 (|T-C|=|8.58-9.54|) in the unmatched sample. 
For respondent’s education attainment, the difference of finishing compulsory education 
between rural-urban migrants and urban individuals in the matched sample, 0.01 
(|T-C|=|0.65-0.64|), is lower than that in the unmatched sample, at 0.41 
(|T-C|=|0.65-0.24|). The estimated results of the joint test indicate no significant 
difference between rural-urban migrants and urban hukou individuals in the matched 
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sample (p=0.872). Thus, the results shown in Table 3-9 confirm that the matching 
procedure is successful and substantially reduces the bias in terms of most covariates. 
Figure 3-1 depicts the overlapping of PS densities distribution between rural-urban 
migrants and urban hukou individuals in the matched sample, in comparison to 
unmatched sample. It is clear that the overlapping distribution between the treated and 
untreated groups is much better in the matched sample. These results suggest that the 
personal characteristics of the rural-urban migrants and urban hukou individuals are 
similar after matching. 
3.6.3 Propensity Score Matching Results 
This section presents the results from the last two steps of the propensity score 
matching: estimation of ATT and sensitivity analysis. Table 3-4 shows the average 
estimated treatment effect for the treated group. 2784 observations have been matched 
successfully, where 633 observations come from the treated group and 2151 from the 
control group. All members in the treated group (rural-urban migrants) have been 
matched to individuals in the control group (urban hukou individuals). The estimated 
ATT shows that the mean difference in log income aspirations between rural-urban 
migrants and urban hukou people is -0.06, when holding another factors constant. This 
estimated ATT is not significant at the usual levels. This verifies the estimated results in 
the ordinary least square (OLS) analysis in Table 3-3, that no difference in income 
aspirations exist between rural-urban migrants and urban hukou individuals after 
controlling for a wide range of personal characteristics. In other words, the PS matching 
confirms that neither hukou status nor hukou discrimination has any impact on 
individuals’ income aspirations.  
Following Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) and Heckman (2008), it is necessary to 
conduct a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the estimation results. I follow 
Liu & Ma (2009) and test the sensitivity by using different methods, including multiple 
nearest-neighbour matching (one-to-five NN matching), radius matching, kernel 
matching and local linear matching
15
. Following the procedure of one-to-one 
nearest-neighbour matching, it is necessary to conduct a balancing test for the other 
algorithms before estimating the ATT. Figure 3-3, Figure 3-4, Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6 
                                                   
15 See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008) for more details.  
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in the Appendix show the propensity score distributions of the treated and untreated 
groups in the matched samples compared to the unmatched samples for each of the 
additional matching algorithms. In general, the results in these four figures suggest an 
overlap and the balancing test is successful in supporting a further estimation of the 
average treatment effect. In addition, these results suggest that the PS distribution of 
one-to-five nearest-neighbour and local linear matching are better than for radius and 
kernel matching, which is consistent with Liu & Ma (2009). 
Table 3- 4 Average Treatment Effect for Rural Group on Income Aspirations 
Variable  Sample  Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E. T-statistic  
Ln(Income 
aspirations) 
Unmatched 10.09 10.45 -0.36 0.03 -10.46 
 ATT 10.09 10.15 -0.06 0.06 -0.87 
 
Treatment 
assignment 
Common support Total  
 Off support  On support   
Untreated  91 2151 2242 
Treated  0 633 633 
Total  91 2784 2875 
Notes: (1) T-statistics are based on a two-tail test. 
      (2) Similar to OLS estimation, the PSM results are not sensitive to the assumption that set few people’s 
missing income aspirations equal to their actual income when they are satisfied or relative satisfied with income but 
give no answers to their income aspirations. There is also no significant difference in the ATT between rural-urban 
migrants and urban hukou individuals, when taking these people out of my sample. This estimation result is shown in 
Table 3-12 in Appendix.  
      (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
Table 3-5 demonstrates that the estimated results are not very sensitive to the 
choice of matching algorithm. While the estimated ATT decreases for a one-to-five 
nearest-neighbour, radius, kernel and local linear matching, the estimates are not 
significant, in line with the estimation results of one-to-one nearest-neighbour matching. 
The relatively smaller standard error of the other algorithms compared to one-to-one 
nearest-neighbour matching may be attributed to the fact that, in the later method, only 
one member in the control group is chosen as a matching partner, whilst in the former 
multiple matching partners are picked out from the untreated sample. More information 
may help to reduce the standard error (Liu & Ma, 2009). To sum up, the estimated result 
from one-to-one nearest-neighbour matching appears to be robust and not sensitive to 
different matching algorithms, which confirms that hukou status does not contribute to 
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individuals’ income aspirations, conditional on other factors. 
Table 3- 5 Sensitivity Analysis on using Different Algorithms 
Propensity Arithmetic  Difference of ATT S.E. T-value  
One-to-one nearest-neighbour matching  -0.06 0.06 -0.87 
One-to-five nearest-neighbour matching -0.02 0.05 -0.45 
Radius matching  -0.04 0.05 -0.67 
Kernel matching -0.03 0.05 -0.54 
Local linear matching  -0.03 0.05 -0.52 
Note: (1) T-statistic is based on two-tail test; Radius is 0.01. 
    (2) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
3.6.4 Further Analysis of Occupational Impacts 
The insignificant effect of hukou status on income aspirations may be attributed to 
two reasons. Although rural-urban migrants are discriminated against in the urban 
labour market, their aspiration income is not restricted to the hukou discrimination. The 
insignificant effect of hukou discrimination on income aspirations may be attributed to 
the fact that most rural-urban migrants face discrimination when they are applying for a 
job. Therefore, the occupation aspirations of rural-urban migrants may be restricted by 
hukou discrimination. As discussed in the literature review, many studies suggest that 
racial discrimination influences African Americans’ career assessment and can restrict 
career aspirations. Similarly, in China, rural-urban migrants not only suffer from income 
discrimination but also from occupational segregation. As discussed in the second 
chapter, most rural hukou individuals are blue collar and service workers. Even when 
rural-urban migrants and urban hukou individuals have similar educational attainment, 
the probability of being engaged in senior professional, junior professional, blue collar 
and service jobs is different between the two groups. Also, a large proportion of the 
effect of hukou discrimination on rural-urban migrants is attributed to discrimination 
when applying for jobs (occupation segregation). As a consequence, hukou 
discrimination may influence aspiration for occupations instead of income. 
In order to analyse whether the occupational segregation contributes to the effect of 
hukou status on income aspirations, the matching analysis was run again, after removing 
the occupation variable from the propensity score model. In addition, as current income 
and SES are positively influenced by occupation types, occupational segregation can 
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also lead to inequitable wages and SES. Thus, current income and SES were taken out 
of the analysis as well. Other covariates, including social demographic factors and 
father’s highest education level, were retained. If a large proportion of the 
discrimination in the urban labour market derives from occupation segregation, the 
estimated difference in income aspirations should be higher after removing occupation, 
current income and SES from the model. Table 3-6 shows the results from an OLS 
regression without occupation, current income and SES as explanatory variables. 
Compared to Table 3-3, the effect of dummy variable for rural-urban migrants on 
income aspirations has changed in terms of the magnitude, to a small extent. The 
estimate indicates that having rural hukou status decreases income aspirations by 5.5%, 
which is not significant.  
Table 3- 6 Estimation without Occupation, Income and Social Status 
Dependent variable  
Log of income aspirations  
Coefficient  S.E. 
Rural -0.054 (0.037) 
Socio-demographic factors  
Age 0.039*** (0.010) 
Age2 -0.0001*** (0.00002) 
Male 0.302*** (0.025) 
Married 0.137*** (0.039) 
Number of children  -0.089*** (0.023) 
Respondents’ highest educational level 
Compulsory school 0.369*** (0.105) 
Senior high school 0.539*** (0.106) 
University  1.035*** (0.108) 
Father’s highest educational level  
Compulsory school 0.165*** (0.033) 
Senior high school 0.204*** (0.045) 
University  0.301*** (0.057) 
Health status  
Good health 0.152*** (0.049) 
Standard health  0.186*** (0.053) 
Observations 2875  
R-squared 0.26  
Note: (1) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 for two-tailed t-tests;  
(2) Standard errors in parentheses. 
    (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
Similar to the previous process of propensity score matching, it is necessary to 
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conduct the balancing test before calculating the average treatment for the treated (ATT). 
As shown in Appendix Table 3-10, the difference in the mean value of most covariates 
between the treated and control groups after matching is smaller than that before 
matching, in line with the balancing test for the sample with all covariates. 
Consequently, the balancing test confirms the success of the matching strategy. 
Figure 3-2 depicts the distribution of the propensity score for rural-urban migrants 
and urban hukou individuals for the unmatched and matched samples. It can be seen that 
the overlap between urban hukou individuals and rural-urban migrants is much better in 
the matched sample compared to the unmatched sample. Therefore, all the results 
suggest that matching is successful and substantially diminishes the bias in terms of 
personal characteristics and family background. 
Table 3-7 shows the estimates of ATT, based on all the algorithms. The results of 
one-to-one nearest-neighbour matching indicates that the mean difference in income 
aspirations between rural-urban migrants and urban hukou people has decreased, after 
removing occupation, income and SES from the PS model. Specifically, the average 
effect of hukou status on income aspirations is -0.03, in comparison to -0.06 when 
matching with all covariates. However, the estimate ATT is still not significant, which is 
consistent with the OLS results. When conducting sensitivity analysis, the estimated 
ATT among one-to-five nearest-neighbour, radius, kernel and local linear matching are 
also not significant on income aspirations, in line with the results of one-to-one 
nearest-neighbour matching. Consequently, the estimation from one-to-one 
nearest-neighbour matching is robust and not sensitive to different matching algorithms. 
Following the estimation results in the Chapter 2 and previous studies, I expect the 
significance and magnitude of the effect of hukou status on income aspirations to vary 
when I remove occupations and the related covariates. However, these variations are not 
obvious in either OLS estimation or propensity score matching. Thus, the estimations do 
not accord with my expectation, which may be attributed to two possible explanations. 
The first possible explanation is that hukou discrimination has no impact on restricting 
rural-urban migrants’ income aspirations, even though rural-urban migrants are faced 
with income discrimination and occupation segregation in the urban labour market. The 
second possible explanation is that hukou discrimination influences other factors, which 
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in turn determine income aspirations. Specifically, since rural-urban migrants are 
discriminated against in the long term, they may consider that it is difficult for them to 
obtain high quality jobs in the urban labour market, even if they achieve higher 
educational attainment. 
Figure 3- 2 Propensity Score Density Distribution of One-to-One Nearest-Neighbor 
Matching for the New Sample 
 
Therefore, rural hukou individuals may not devote much time to human capital 
investment, which in turn reduces their income aspirations. In addition, the hukou 
system leads to area isolation. In general, the economic status of urban households is 
better than for rural households in China. Some rural households cannot support the 
economic burden involved with sending their children to university. Therefore, their 
children give up studying further and devote themselves to work after graduating from 
high middle school. Furthermore, hukou discrimination leads to an uneven distribution 
of information. To be specific, high quality education resources are concentrated in 
urban cities so that urban students have a higher probability of passing the university 
entrance examination. Hence, rural hukou students who are not admitted to a university 
seek work in the labour market. To sum up, rural-urban migrants’ educational 
attainment is limited by hukou discrimination, to some extent. In effect, due to the 
positive relationship between educational level and respondents’ income aspirations, 
rural-urban migrants’ lower educational levels may be indirectly influenced by 
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discrimination. 
Table 3- 7 ATT using Different Algorithms 
Propensity Arithmetic  Difference of ATT S.E. T-value  
One-to-one nearest-neighbour matching  -0.03 0.07 -0.42 
One-to-five nearest-neighbour matching -0.02 0.05 -0.40 
Radius matching  -0.03 0.05 -0.64 
Kernel matching -0.03 0.05 -0.66 
Local linear matching  -0.03 0.07 -0.51 
Note: China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
3.7 Conclusion  
Following Chapter 2, which suggests that rural-urban migrants suffer from wage 
inequality and occupation segregation in the urban labour market, this chapter has 
investigated whether hukou discrimination has other negative influences on rural-urban 
migrants. According to Alagaraja et al. (2016), a devalued group’s aspiration and 
ambition are restricted by discrimination. Individuals in the disadvantaged group are 
more likely to lose the motivation to work, which exacerbates the gap between the 
preference group and disadvantaged groups, and weakens social stability. Motivated by 
Alagaraja et al. (2016), Chapter 3 compares income aspirations between rural-urban 
migrants and urban residents, and also explores whether hukou discrimination 
constrains rural-urban migrants’ income aspirations, as an increasing number of 
rural-urban migrants flow into the urban labour market as a result of the recent reform 
of the hukou system.  
Using data from the China General Social Survey 2010, this chapter contributes to 
previous Chinese literature and analyses empirically the effect of hukou discrimination 
on income aspirations between rural-urban migrants and urban residents. It is found that 
rural-urban migrants have lower income aspirations than urban residents. The OLS 
estimate shows that respondents’ education attainment and their family background 
(father’s education attainment) have a positive association with income aspirations. In 
addition, being married, male and having a lower number of children in one’s family 
also leads to higher income aspirations. However, the dummy variable of rural hukou 
status has no significant effect on income aspirations. The OLS results suggest that, 
although rural-urban migrants are faced with discrimination, such as income inequality 
and occupation segregation, their income aspirations are not directly influenced by 
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hukou discrimination.  
Propensity score matching is also utilized to estimate the effect of hukou 
discrimination on income aspirations, by matching urban workers and rural-urban 
migrants with similar characteristics and comparing their reported income aspirations. 
The propensity score matching results show that there is no difference between actual 
income aspirations and counterfactual income aspirations. In other words, after 
matching rural-urban migrants and urban hukou workers with similar characteristics, 
there is no significant difference in the income aspirations between these two groups, 
which is consistent with the OLS estimates. The explanation of the insignificant results 
may be due to the following possible explanations: firstly, hukou discrimination may 
have no impact on restricting rural-urban migrants’ income aspirations, even though 
they suffer from different treatment in the urban labour market; secondly, hukou 
discrimination may influence income aspirations indirectly. Hukou discrimination may 
lead to rural-urban migrants considering that they cannot get high quality jobs anyway, 
in spite of having more educational attainment. In addition, discrimination leads to 
uneven information distribution between rural and urban areas, so that rural hukou 
individuals are less likely to receive a good quality education. Moreover, university 
tuition fees are a huge economic burden for most rural families, compared to urban 
households. Therefore, due to these potential influences, rural hukou individuals are 
more likely to start working rather than undertake further study, and their lower 
education attainment leads to their lower income aspirations. Therefore, the lower 
income aspirations of rural-urban migrants may be ascribed to that their highest 
educational levels being negatively influenced by hukou discrimination, which in turn 
restricts their aspirations. 
However, there is still one limitation in this chapter, and that is the unsolved 
endogeneity issue. When I conduct propensity score matching, the logit model 
analysing the correlates for rural hukou status is applied to estimate the PS score. While 
discussing the determinants of hukou status changing in the introduction chapter, I 
explained that age, marital status, occupation, income, and so forth are all factors that 
may influence the hukou status. Consequently, I take these factors into account while 
conducting the logit model estimation in Table 3-8. However, hukou status has an 
impact on respondents’ income as well. As shown in Chapter 2, rural-urban migrants’ 
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lower income is negatively influenced by their hukou status and restricted by hukou 
discrimination, to some extent. Therefore, the reverse causality can cause endogenous 
issues in this model, which in turn leads to biased estimation results. Following most 
previous studies that consider the endogeneity for income (Chau et al., 2007; Knight & 
Gunatilaka, 2010; Li et al., 2011; Knight & Gunatilaka, 2012), father’s education level 
is the most common variable that has been utilized as an instrumental variable to solve 
the endogeneity issue for income. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the father’s 
hukou status and education level can directly determine the new-born’s hukou status. 
Father’s education level is utilized as a determinant for rural hukou status in the logit 
model, and the results in Table 3-8 present that it has negative correlation with the rural 
hukou status; therefore, father’s education level is not suitable for use as an effective 
instrumental variable to deal with the endogeneity issue. Due to the limitation of dataset, 
it is difficult to obtain another suitable instrumental variable. In addition, as the CGSS 
2010 is a cross-sectional dataset, I cannot apply the PSM in combination with DID to 
deal with the endogeneity, so the unsolved endogeneity issue is the limitation of this 
study. If there is a new and better dataset in the future, I will try to deal with the 
endogeneity issue and improve this study further.  
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3.8 Appendix 
Table 3- 8 Logit Estimation Results of Rural Migrants 
Dependent variable: Rural 
Dummy 
Coefficient       S.E. 
Ln(Current income) -0.040 (0.026) 
Social demographic factors 
Age -0.134*** (0.007) 
Male 0.220* (0.117) 
Married  0.076 (0.160) 
Number of children  0.801*** (0.093) 
Respondents’ highest educational level 
Compulsory school  -0.150 (0.361) 
Senior high school -1.608*** (0.373) 
University  -2.990*** (0.398) 
Property of occupation   
Private company 0.449*** (0.153) 
Father’s highest educational level 
Compulsory school (father’s) -0.605*** (0.146) 
Senior high school (father’s) -0.895*** (0.204) 
University (father’s) -1.713*** (0.413) 
Self-evaluated SES 0.021 (0.035) 
Observations  2875  
Pseudo R-squared 0.322  
Note: (1) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 for two-tailed t-tests;  
(2) Standard errors in parentheses. 
    (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 3- 9 Balancing Test for Matching Process 
Variable Sample  Mean % Bias % Bias 
reduction  Treated  Control  
Ln(Current income)  Unmatched 
Matched  
8.58 
8.58 
9.54*** 
8.73 
-43.6 
-6.5 
 
85.1 
Social demographic factors  
Age  Unmatched  
Matched  
35.17 
35.17 
42.01*** 
35.65 
-62.9 
-4.4 
 
93.0 
Male  Unmatched 
Matched  
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.9 
0.0 
 
100 
Married  Unmatched  
Matched  
0.79 
0.79 
0.82 
0.80 
-6.0 
0.0 
 
100.0 
Number of children  Unmatched  
Marched  
1.18 
1.18 
1.01*** 
1.19* 
21.0 
-1.8 
 
91.3 
Respondents’ highest educational level 
Compulsory school Unmatched 
Matched  
0.65 
0.65 
0.24*** 
0.64 
90.4 
2.8 
 
96.9 
Senior high school Unmatched  
Matched 
0.23 
0.23 
0.33*** 
0.23 
-21.5 
0.4 
 
98.4 
University  Unmatched  
Matched  
0.09 
0.09 
0.41*** 
0.09 
-80.5 
0.0 
 
100.0 
Property of occupation  
Private company Unmatched  
Matched  
0.87 
0.87 
0.66*** 
0.87 
52.0 
0.0 
100.0 
Father’s highest educational level 
Compulsory school 
(father’s) 
Unmatched  
Matched  
0.56 
0.56 
0.48** 
0.55 
15.5 
1.9 
 
87.7 
Senior high school 
(father’s) 
Unmatched  
Matched  
0.13 
0.13 
0.17** 
0.10 
-13.3 
6.6 
 
50.2 
University (father’s) Unmatched  
Matched  
0.01 
0.01 
0.09*** 
0.01* 
-35.4 
2.9 
 
91.7 
Self-evaluated SES Unmatched  
Matched  
4.06 
4.06 
4.33*** 
4.02 
-16.6 
3.6 
 
78.2 
Good health Unmatched  0.78 0.68 22.6  
 Matched  0.78 0.79 -1.1 95.2 
Standard health  Unmatched  0.16 0.23 -19.6  
 Matched  0.16 0.14 3.6 81.6 
Propensity score Unmatched 
Matched  
0.49 
0.49 
0.14*** 
0.49 
155.3 
0.1 
 
99.9 
Joint Hypothesis Test 
Sample  Ps R2 LR Chi2 p>chi2 Mean 
bias  
Med bias  B R % Var 
Unmatched  0.323 978.36 0.000 41.1 22.1 161.7* 1.03 69 
Matched  0.006 9.90 0.872 2.7 2.3 17.7 1.03 13 
Notes: (1) propensity score are estimated at the baseline using 1-to-1 nearest matching (two-tail t-test);  
(2) Significance: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
      (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Figure 3- 3 Propensity Score Density Distribution of One-to-Five Nearest-Neighbor 
Matching 
 
 
Figure 3- 4 Propensity Score Density Distribution of Radius Matching 
(Radius is 0.01) 
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Figure 3- 5 Propensity Score Density Distribution of Kernel Matching 
 
 
Figure 3- 6 Propensity Score Density Distribution of Local Linear Matching 
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Table 3- 10 Balancing Test for Sample without Occupation, Income and Social 
Status 
Variable Sample  Mean % Bias % Bias 
reduction  Treated  Control  
Social demographic factors  
Age  Unmatched  
Matched  
35.17 
35.17 
42.01*** 
35.79 
-62.9 
-5.7 
 
90.9 
Male  Unmatched 
Matched  
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.51 
0.9 
-1.6 
 
-81.2 
Married  Unmatched  
Matched  
0.79 
0.79 
0.82 
0.77 
-6.0 
7.2 
 
-19.3 
Number of children  Unmatched  
Marched  
1.18 
1.18 
1.01*** 
1.19 
21.0 
-1.8 
 
91.3 
Respondents’ highest educational level 
Compulsory school Unmatched 
Matched  
0.65 
0.65 
0.24*** 
0.67 
90.4 
-3.8 
 
95.8 
Senior high school Unmatched  
Matched 
0.23 
0.23 
0.33*** 
0.22 
-21.5 
-2.5 
 
88.5 
University  Unmatched  
Matched  
0.09 
0.09 
0.41*** 
0.08 
-80.5 
-2.0 
 
97.6 
Father’s highest educational level 
Compulsory school 
(father’s) 
Unmatched  
Matched  
0.56 
0.56 
0.48** 
0.51 
15.5 
10.5 
 
32.4 
Senior high school 
(father’s) 
Unmatched  
Matched  
0.13 
0.13 
0.17** 
0.15 
-13.3 
-5.8 
 
56.8 
University (father’s) Unmatched  
Matched  
0.01 
0.01 
0.09*** 
0.01 
-35.4 
1.5 
 
95.9 
Good health Unmatched  0.78 0.68 22.6  
 Matched  0.78 0.82 -9.0 60.4 
Standard health Unmatched  0.16 0.23 -19.6  
 Matched  0.16 0.16 12.8 34.6 
Propensity score 
 
Unmatched 
Matched  
0.49 
0.49 
0.14*** 
0.49 
154.8 
0.0 
 
99.9 
Joint Hypothesis Test 
Sample  Ps R2 LR Chi2 p>chi2 Mean 
bias  
Med 
bias  
B R % Var 
Unmatched  0.318 965.50 0.000 41.8 21.5 160.2* 1.05 69 
Matched  0.009 16.50 0.124 5.7 3.8 29.9 1.13 23 
Notes: (1) propensity score are estimated at the baseline using 1-to-1 nearest matching (two-tail t-test);  
(2) Significance: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.  
(3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 3- 11 Social Demographic Variables Statistics of Individuals Who are 
Dropped 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev Mean  Std. Dev 
 Urban (610 observations) Rural (556 observations) 
Age 42.02 12.04 39.73 8.80 
Age2 1910.16 983.16 1657.23 708.32 
Number of children  1.10*** 0.89 1.77*** 1.16 
Male  0.47** 0.50 0.49** 0.50 
Married  0.84*** 0.44 0.88*** 0.37 
Educational attainment  
Non-education  0.05*** 0.23 0.07*** 0.38 
Compulsory education 0.29*** 0.48 0.70*** 0.47 
Senior school 0.30*** 0.45 0.20*** 0.35 
University level 0.36*** 0.46 0.03*** 0.17 
Health status 
Good health  0.62** 0.49 0.69** 0.49 
Standard health  0.26** 0.44 0.22** 0.43 
Poor health  0.12* 0.32 0.09* 0.37 
Note: (1) * refers to whether there is significantly difference between variables  
     (2) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels. 
     (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 3- 12 The Sensitive Analysis for Sample  
Dependent variable  Coefficient  S.E.  
Log of income aspiration 
Log of current income 0.076*** (0.007) 
Rural -0.049 (0.036) 
Socio-demographic factors 
Age 0.028** (0.010) 
Age2 -0.0003*** (0.0001) 
Male 0.239*** (0.026) 
Married 0.141*** (0.038) 
Number of children 0.072*** (0.023) 
Respondents’ highest educational level 
(reference category is no education) 
Compulsory school 0.298*** (0.103) 
Senior high school 0.454*** (0.105) 
University  0.879*** (0.108) 
Type of occupation 
Private company 0.091*** (0.030) 
Father’s highest educational level 
Compulsory school 0.162*** (0.033) 
Senior high school 0.183*** (0.044) 
University 0.305*** (0.057) 
Self-evaluated SES 0.025*** (0.008) 
Health status  
Good health 0.094* (0.048) 
Standard health  0.125** (0.052) 
Average Treatment Effect for Rural Group on Income Aspirations (ATT) 
Variable  Sample  Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E. T-statistic  
Ln (Income 
aspirations) 
Unmatched 10.10 10.47 -0.37 0.04 -10.42 
 ATT 10.10 10.15 -0.05 0.07 -0.68 
Note: (1) * refers to whether there is significantly difference between variables  
     (2) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels. 
     (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 3- 13 Estimation by Dummy Variables for Economic Status 
Ordinary Least Square  
Dependent variable  Coefficient  S.E.  
Log of income aspiration 
Log of current income 0.081*** (0.007) 
Rural -0.041 (0.255) 
Socio-demographic factors 
Age 0.029*** (0.010) 
Age2 -0.0003*** (0.0001) 
Male 0.238*** (0.025) 
Married 0.146*** (0.038) 
Number of children 0.064*** (0.022) 
Respondents’ highest educational level 
(reference category is no education) 
Compulsory school 0.284*** (0.102) 
Senior high school 0.444*** (0.104) 
University  0.876*** (0.107) 
Type of occupation 
Private company 0.083*** (0.030) 
Father’s highest educational level 
Compulsory school 0.164*** (0.033) 
Senior high school 0.195*** (0.044) 
University 0.282*** (0.055) 
Self-evaluated SES (reference category: low economic status) 
Average status 0.038 (0.021) 
High economic status   0.108** (0.049) 
Health status  
Good health 0.083 (0.048) 
Standard health  0.114** (0.052) 
Average Treatment Effect for Rural Group on Income Aspirations (ATT) 
Variable  Sample  Treated  Controls  Difference  S.E. T-statistic  
Ln(Income aspirations) Unmatched 10.09 10.45 -0.36 0.03 -10.46 
 ATT 10.09 10.09 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 
Note: (1) * refers to whether there is significantly difference between variables  
     (2) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels. 
     (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Chapter Four 
How Income Aspirations Influence Subjective Well-Being between 
Urban Residents and Rural-Urban Migrants 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, I find that rural-urban migrants suffer from a disparity in 
average income and occupation choice, even though the hukou system has been reformed. 
Moreover, due to the unequal information distribution, rural hukou individuals also suffer 
from different access to social service and welfare. With the transition of Chinese 
economic characteristics, China is faced with a labour supply shortage, which stimulates 
an increasing number of rural-urban migrants to enter the urban labour market. A large 
number of rural-urban migrants are, therefore, an indispensable factor to urban city 
construction, economic growth, and Chinese development. Jiang et al. (2012) indicated 
that the inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged groups could increase the gap 
of their subjective well-being
16
 (SWB), which in turn leads to lower economic growth 
and a higher crime rate. Although the urban residents are the advantaged group by their 
hukou status, they also feel unhappy because of the social unrest that is caused by 
identity-related inequality
17
. In this dualistic society, the difference in the SWB between 
the preferred group and devalued group plays an important role in determining social 
stability (Knight et al., 2009). In Chapter 3, I found that rural-urban migrants report lower 
income aspirations than urban hukou individuals, but this difference in aspirations is not 
due to discrimination. It seems to be driven by different characteristics of rural-urban 
migrants including fewer educational opportunities and attainment. Motivated by the 
                                                   
16  The subjective well-being (SWB) contains two distinct spheres: happiness and satisfaction. Although the 
definitions between happiness and satisfaction seem similar and are usually utilized interchangeably in previous 
studies, there is slight difference between these two variables. As discussed in Pavot & Diener (2008), subjective 
well-being is conceptualized as multifaceted with both affective and cognitive components. Life satisfaction as a 
measure of satisfaction with life scale represents a cognitive evaluation of the quality of one’s life. Happiness is more 
likely to be a measurement of affect. An assessment of SWB includes separate measure of both life satisfaction and 
the affective components of SWB (happiness). In this chapter, SWB refers to the respondents’ happiness, and the 
detailed information of happiness will be presented in the data section.  
17 It is a between-group inequality that is caused by the hukou system.  
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findings of the previous two chapters, Chapter 4 intends to assess whether rural-urban 
migrants also report lower SWB, and how income aspirations shape their SWB, in 
comparison to urban hukou individuals. 
Most previous studies on SWB have been concentrated in developed countries, 
while few investigations on SWB are found in developing countries. Among these few 
Chinese studies on SWB, Knight et al. (2009) and Knight & Gunatilaka (2010b) have 
only examined the SWB of rural households and rural hukou individuals. Although 
Knight & Gunatilaka (2010a) and Knight & Gunatilaka (2012b) consider the 
determinants of expectation or aspiration income, their studies mainly focus on the 
influence of the rural-urban migrants’ aspirations on their SWB, in comparison to other 
rural hukou individuals living in the rural area. The authors also discuss how rural-urban 
migrants’ aspirations change when they settle in cities and how these changes influence 
their SWB. Unlike these previous Chinese studies, I contribute to the existing literature 
by examining the role of income aspirations on SWB across rural-urban migrants and 
urban hukou individuals. 
As shown in Chapter 3, rural-urban migrants have lower income aspirations in 
comparison to urban hukou individuals, while Chapter 2 shows that rural-urban migrants 
also suffer from inequality in terms of income and occupational opportunities. Economic 
theory suggests that income positively influences SWB and would increase the gap of 
SWB between rural-urban migrants and urban hukou individuals. However, there are 
studies analysing the impact of income aspirations on SWB, which suggest that the 
absolute income aspirations reduce SWB and offset the positive impact of absolute 
income on SWB (Stutzer, 2004). Although rural-urban migrants have lower income, they 
also report lower absolute income aspirations. The suggestion is that the differential 
income aspirations between rural-urban migrants and urban hukou individuals would 
reduce the gap in SWB. There is no previous Chinese research investigating how the 
difference in income aspirations shapes the SWB between rural-urban migrants and urban 
hukou individuals. I, therefore, am able to fill the gap of previous literature and examine 
the influence of income aspirations on SWB for these two groups. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature on the development of SWB, and the literature mainly focuses on the 
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relationship between actual income, aspirations and relative income after respondent 
comparison, which includes income and social and economic circumstances. Section 3 
outlines a discussion of the data, which is followed by methodology in Section 4, 
Section 5 displays and discusses the results from the analysis, and the paper concludes 
with a discussion of the implications of the findings. 
4.2 Literature Review 
SWB has been a topic of interest in psychology and sociology for a long time
18
. 
During recent decades, an increasing number of economists have begun to focus on SWB. 
Among all the economic determinants of SWB, income is a dominating factor, where 
many studies have examined (Clark et al., 2008). This section mainly reviews those 
studies which explore the impact of income on SWB. Regarding the research on the 
impact of income, most previous economists analyse the impact of income from two 
aspects: absolute income and relative income. In this section, I review those studies 
related to absolute income and relative income separately. Afterwards, studies examining 
the effect of socio-demographic factors are also discussed to identify suitable control 
variables.  
4.2.1 Absolute Income 
Absolute income refers to actual income during the period of investigation. Some 
researchers, such as Veenhoven (1991) and Diener et al. (1993), found that richer 
persons are more likely to be happier than poorer ones. In addition, persons in affluent 
countries are much happier than those in poorer countries. Veenhoven (1991) analyses 
determinants of SWB for poor countries and suggests that life satisfaction is directly 
determined by how innate bio-psychological needs are gratified. To be specific, whether 
individuals have adequate and ample food and clothing or suffer from war largely 
determines the level of their happiness. Individuals cannot feel happy in an awful 
environment, where there is hunger, poverty, danger, war, contagion and isolation, even 
if their neighbours are worse off.  
    Diener et al. (1993) utilizes the data based on two studies to test the relationship 
                                                   
18 See more details in Diener (1984).  
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between SWB and income within and across countries. Regarding the two studies, one 
is based on 18032 college students in 39 countries, and the other relies on 4942 
American adults. They are longitudinal datasets with two waves over a 9-year interval. 
The results show that income correlates with SWB, both within-country and 
cross-country. The correlation is larger in the cross-country sample than in the 
within-country sample. In addition, they also explore whether relative status determines 
happiness. However, the results are unexpected, show that relative standard of income, 
including social comparison and adaption, has no influence on SWB, which is 
consistent with Veenhoven (1991). They ascribe the reason to the fact that people are 
more likely to compare themselves with to proximal people, which comes from the 
theory of social comparison (Festinger, 1954).  
Following the German reunification, Frijters et al. (2004) examine in how the life 
satisfaction of East Germans changed. Using the data from German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP), they mainly examine how real household income improves the life 
satisfaction as a result of German reunification. They find that real household income 
plays a significant role in life satisfaction variation, which is consistent with Veenhoven 
(1991) and Diener et al. (1993). They find the increase in real household income 
contributes to 40 percent to the increase in life satisfaction.  
In addition, Stevenson & Wolfers (2013) test the relationship between SWB and 
income, and analyse whether the happiness has a satiation point. In particular, they 
examine whether income only matter for the SWB among those whose basic needs have 
not been gratified, but has no influence on happiness beyond specific income threshold. 
They propose two hypotheses that are: firstly, there is no relationship between income 
and SWB when basic needs are satisfied; secondly, the relationship between income and 
happiness among the poor is different with the correlation among the rich. Their analyses 
confirm the significance role of income in SWB for both the poor and the rich. They find 
that proportional increases in income have same increase in SWB among the wealthy 
people, in comparison to the poor, which is not consistent with their hypotheses. 
4.2.2. Relative Income 
Several researchers put forward different viewpoints and suggest that absolute 
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income is not a decisive factor for SWB (Easterlin, 1974; Brickman & Campbell, 1971; 
Campbell et al., 1976; Brickman et al., 1978; Diener, 2000). Some previous researchers 
such as Brickman & Campbell (1971) and Brickman et al. (1978) indicate that the 
adaptation level theory suggests that a sudden increase of income can affect individuals’ 
happiness growth during a short period. Winning a lottery can bring a huge pleasure and 
improve current living standards, but people will adapt to the pleasure and new status; 
therefore, the peak pleasures will reduce eventually, and the income growth cannot make 
people happy for a long time. In addition, some researchers demonstrate that individual’s 
happiness is not only attributed to his absolute income, but also his income relative to 
other people in society, such as his neighbours and friends. An individual’s happiness is 
determined by whether his income is higher or lower than the income of the comparison 
reference group (Duesenberry, 1952). Specifically, the happiness will increase when his 
income is higher than the income of other members in the reference group, but will 
decrease while his income is below other members’ income. 
In terms of the impact of income on subjective well-being, Easterlin (1974) observes 
a paradox in that within a given country, individuals with higher income are happier than 
those people with lower income, but happiness levels are relatively flat across time 
despite rapid rises in incomes, and moreover between countries there appears to be very 
little association between GDP and happiness. Easterlin (1974) gives the two 
interpretations. The first possible interpretation is based on relative income. Individuals’ 
utility is positively influenced by their own income and negatively influenced by the 
average income of the whole society. If income of everyone increased, an increase in the 
income of any individuals would remain unchanged as the whole average income 
increases and income of the comparison reference group increases as well. Other possible 
interpretations may be due to those external non-economic factors such as health, social 
capital, pollution, and so forth. If these external non-economic factors have a negative 
association with individual’s happiness, the positive relation between the economic 
factors with happiness can be offset by these non-economic determinants, to some extent. 
Therefore, with GDP and income increasing, individual’s happiness remains unchanged. 
In general, the most common measurement of relative income relies on social 
comparison with different reference groups, as seen in Easterlin (1995), Graham & 
Felton (2005), Vendrik & Woltjer (2007), Luttmer (2005) and McBride (2001). 
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Individuals may choose reference groups according to their socio-demographic factors, 
such as age, gender, and region. For example, a 45-year old female may like to compare 
herself to other women whose age is between 40-50. Individuals in Shanghai like to 
compare themselves to other persons in the same city. In addition, they define relative 
income as a socio-economic standard (SES), based on individuals’ own judgments of 
their income, wealth, savings, occupation and education attainment, in comparison to 
their colleagues, neighbours, friends or the general standard of the whole society. 
Thirdly, the reference group is the respondents themselves. Specifically, individuals can 
compare their current situation to their previous one, such as between current and 
previous income. 
Easterlin (1995) acknowledges that individuals with higher income are happier. 
However, he also proposes that the impact of actual income cannot be maintained for a 
long time and emphasizes the importance of individuals’ comparisons to other people. 
Income increases do not increase happiness because individuals’ judgment of SWB is 
based on a comparison of their own status to others in society as a whole. If one 
person’s income increases substantially while others’ income stays at the same, he 
would be happier than before. On the contrary, if his income remains identical while 
others increase substantially, he would feel less happy. Therefore, SWB is positively 
influenced by respondents’ own income, while being negatively influenced by the 
comparison group. If the income of all individuals increases, individual’s SWB does not 
increase, since the positive effect of his own income on SWB is offset by the negative 
effect of the general growth in income. 
    Luttmer (2005) utilizes a comparison of income between respondents and their 
neighbours to analyse social comparisons and SWB. He suggests that individuals feel 
worse off when their neighbours earn more. He utilizes the U.S. National Survey of 
Families and Households data, which contains life satisfaction measures, and explores 
how the economic status of neighbours influences respondents’ SWB. He finds that it is 
negatively influenced by neighbours’ higher earnings, when controlling for respondents’ 
own income. Furthermore, he also investigates the reason why neighbours’ higher income 
lowers respondents’ SWB. He finds that the negative impact of neighbours’ income is 
most likely to be ascribed to relative consumption patterns. If one individual were 
surrounded by neighbours’ with higher incomes, he would have more disagreements 
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about goods, since his consumption behaviour is influenced by neighbours’ consumption 
patterns and he may generate a larger consumption desire that exceeds his actual income. 
Graham & Felton (2005) rely on a dataset from Latin America to study the effects 
of inequality, which is related to race, income, and the interviewer’s judgment of 
socio-economic status (SES) on SWB. The authors regard income as a proxy for wealth 
and decompose income into average income and relative income. Average income is 
calculated for each city within each country. They define the relative income as the 
discrepancy between an individual’s own income and the average income. The 
difference in relative income matters for SWB. When holding individual incomes 
constant, the average wealth (average income) of one country has no significant 
correlation with SWB, whilst the discrepancy of the individuals’ own income and 
average income shows great contribution to SWB. To be specific, the relative income 
(discrepancy between own income and average income) negatively influences SWB for 
those individuals with below average income levels. However, for the wealthy, the 
relative income has a positive impact on their SWB. They are happier with the higher 
difference between their own income and average income. 
Similar to Graham & Felton (2005), Vendrik & Woltjer (2007) also analyse SWB, 
relying on the comparison between individual income and average income in the whole 
society. They propose a hypothesis that individuals’ life satisfaction is negatively related 
to household income in the reference group, holding household size, composition and 
other relevant variables constant. They hypothesise that life satisfaction operates 
primarily through consumption and is determined by household income rather than 
individual income. Household income is, therefore, a more adequate determinant of 
satisfaction. Another relevant hypothesis indicates that life satisfaction relies positively 
on the difference between respondents’ household income and the average income of a 
reference group (relative income), controlling for household income (absolute income). 
The findings reveal that SWB is influenced by both household income and relative 
income but largely influenced by household income. 
Unlike the previously reviewed research, McBride (2001) utilizes a different 
method to define relative income. He asks respondents to compare their current status 
with their parents’ situation at the same age and defines the difference between the 
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parents’ standard and individuals’ own status as relative income. Using 1994 General 
Social Survey (GSS) data, which is an annual US household survey conducted by the 
National Opinion Research Centre, McBride (2001) investigates the presence of 
relative-income effects on life satisfaction and draws a similar conclusion, namely that 
relative income contributes greatly to SWB. The finding shows that an increase in an 
individuals’ own income influences SWB positively for a short period, while the 
difference between the parents’ standard and individuals’ current status reduces the 
levels of SWB. The size of the difference can lower individuals’ well-being. In addition, 
he also finds that the strength of the effects on SWB change with an increase in 
respondents’ income over time. The effects of relative income are stronger at higher 
income levels, while the effect of relative income on SWB is smaller at lower income 
levels. 
By reviewing previous literature, I find that most researchers define relative income 
by social comparison with others, including neighbours, friends, colleagues, their parents, 
and the average income in society. A few researchers utilize a different method to define 
relative income as aspiration income: Easterlin (2001) and Stutzer (2004). Easterlin 
(2001) finds that material aspirations are fairly similar across individuals at the start of the 
lifecycle; therefore, a higher income can bring greater happiness in the beginning. 
However, with increasing income, individuals’ material aspirations grow correspondingly, 
which offset the favourable effect of income growth on SWB. SWB increases with 
income growth, while it decreases with increasing aspirations. Although the income 
growth guarantees individuals’ ability to enjoy more products, the favourable effect of 
these goods on SWB can be offset by the desire to consume more over the lifecycle. 
Similar to Easterlin (2001), Stutzer (2004) also considered the impacts of income 
aspirations on SWB. Firstly, he investigates the respective effect of actual income and 
aspiration income on SWB. The findings show that respondents’ SWB is negatively 
influenced by their income aspirations, and the positive effect of income growth on 
SWB will be offset by the negative effect of aspiration income, which is similar to 
Easterlin (2001). In addition, Stutzer (2004) finds the positive and negative effect of 
income and aspirations on SWB are similar in absolute size and asks whether the equal 
increase of income and aspiration can counterbalance the respective impacts on life 
satisfaction. He establishes the discrepancy between aspiration income and actual income 
131 
 
to estimate the effect of people’s aspirations relative to their actual income on life 
satisfaction further. The findings show that SWB is unrelated to income per se but 
depends on the discrepancy between aspiration income and actual income. Specifically, 
the larger this gap, the lower SWB. Furthermore, he also analyses the factors that would 
determine the absolute aspiration income, and states that absolute aspiration income is 
systematically influenced by the average income within the community. Richer 
residents around respondents can stimulate higher aspirations, and the effect of 
aspiration income has a greater influence for those individuals who often interact within 
the community.  
4.2.3 Socio-demographic Factors 
Apart from income, SWB is also influenced by other socio-demographic factors. In 
this section, I also review studies on the impact of socio-demographic factors, in order to 
help choose suitable control variables in this chapter. Oswald (1997), Blanchflower & 
Oswald (2004) find a U-shaped relationship between age and happiness. To be specific, 
happiness is lowest around the age range of 45 to 50 and higher for younger and older 
individuals. The reason for this may be that individuals whose age is around 40 have to 
give up their leisure time to earn more money in order to support their family. On the 
other hand, the reason why the elderly is happier is ascribed to the fact that they have 
lower job and wage aspirations and more experience to cope with negative life events. For 
young people, most have good health. In addition, the young, after graduating from 
university, are less likely to have a child, therefore they have fewer financial burdens. 
Furthermore, young people have larger career ambitions, so that they are enthusiastic 
about work and life. Therefore, the young and the elderly feel happier than the 
middle-aged. Dolan et al. (2008) and Frey & Stutzer (2010) also suggest the U-shaped 
curve between age and SWB.  
    The relationship between marital status and SWB (Helliwell, 2003; Dolan et al., 
2008; Frey & Stutzer, 2010) indicates that married individuals are happier than those 
who have never married, are divorced or have been widowed. Marital status has a 
positive effect on SWB because couples can be affected positively by each other. 
Moreover, marriage can provide benefits, including sharing financial burdens and 
psychological pressures. Stutzer & Frey (2006) found a similar positive correlation 
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between marriage and SWB . Their results reveal that married individuals are happier or 
feel more satisfied with their lives. The single individuals were divided into two groups, 
where the first group involved individuals who stayed single throughout the research 
period and the other group comprised persons who were married during the research 
period. Stutzer & Frey (2006) also found that singles married during the survey period 
reported higher levels of satisfaction than persons who stayed single for a long time. In 
addition, marriage can provide psychological support and enable couples to share stress 
with each other, in line with Frey & Stutzer (2010).  
    Regarding the effect of children, Dolan et al. (2008) point out that the impact on 
SWB is different across countries and studies. Some studies suggest the positive 
relationship between children and SWB in general (Lelkes, 2006). However, Alesina et al. 
(2004) indicate that children may be an additional financial burden for the poor family. 
Thus, having children seem to affect SWB negatively for these poor family. Some studies 
find that educational attainment positively influence individuals’ SWB (e.g. Inglehart, 
1990; Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004). They suggest that highly educated individuals 
report higher SWB, since they can get highly skilled jobs with better conditions. 
Nevertheless, some studies have a contrary finding that well educated people have 
higher aspiration levels; therefore the highly educated individuals may suffer more 
pressure on work and feel more frustrated than their less educated counterparts when 
they do not obtain their expected achievement.  
    Regarding the impact on health, Dolan et al. (2008) and Frey & Stutzer (2010) find 
a high correlation between health status and SWB, which is probably due to the fact that 
people with poor health spend more money treating their illness and improving their 
health status. Some people with poor health can only work in lower work load jobs with 
lower wages, as their health status cannot support them in bearing a large work load. 
Shields & Price (2005) also state that several health problems such as heart attacks and 
some chronic disease lower individuals’ SWB, in particular the elderly person.  
4.2.4 Subjective Well-being (SWB) in China 
There is limited research on the determinants of SWB in China. In this section, I 
will review existing Chinese studies and discuss their limitations before delineating my 
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own contribution to the literature. Using China Household Income Project, Jiang et al. 
(2012) investigate how the between-group inequality (BI) that refers to the social 
inequality and is measured by the income gap between rural-urban migrants and urban 
residents, influence SWB. In addition, they divide sample into three groups: urban 
residents with urban hukou, rural-urban migrants without urban hukou, and people who 
were born as rural residents and acquired urban hukou at certain point of time after 
migrating to urban city. They examine the attitude to between-group inequality of all 
individuals among these three groups. Firstly, they find that urban residents report 
higher levels of happiness than rural-urban migrants without urban hukou status, to a 
small extent. Secondly, the inequality related to hukou status lowers SWB, regardless of 
the residents having local urban hukou (urban residents) or not (rural migrants) (Jiang et 
al., 2012). Lastly, all the people in their sample feel unhappy with the between-group 
hukou identity-related inequality
19
. Rural-urban migrants feel more dissatisfied 
regarding hukou identity-related inequality, since they belong to the disadvantaged 
group. Those urban residents with local urban hukou who are primarily born in rural 
areas and acquire urban hukou subsequently have similar attitudes towards the hukou 
identity-related inequality with rural migrants without local urban hukou, since they 
may be discriminated against in the labour market before they obtain urban hukou 
identity.  
    Knight et al. (2009) analyse the economic determinants of happiness in rural China, 
based on a household survey organized by the Institute of Economics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences on income distribution in China. The results suggest that 
relative income between villages and relative income over time are significant for 
current satisfaction, while current income has a smaller impact. In addition, current 
mood, attitudes, and social comparisons
20
 reveal significant and positive associations 
with SWB. Regarding the social comparison, all respondents evaluate their household 
income and living standard by comparing themselves with the average standard for their 
village. The answers are classified to much below average, below average, average, 
above average and much above average level. Although rural residents have lower 
                                                   
19 Inequality is attributed to hukou system.  
20 Social comparison in Knight et al. (2009) refers to that individuals evaluate their socio-economic status by the 
relative positions, depending on the objective criteria such as individual income, household income, wealth, 
occupation and education attainment. In general, respondents are more likely to compare their income, education 
level, wealth and positions with their close friends, neighbours, fellows, relatives and others in the same community 
to make self-assessment.   
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wages in comparison to their urban counterparts, it is uncertain that these disadvantaged 
rural people feel less happy. Even if most rural residents have lower income, lower 
socio-economic status and experience worse living conditions, they are found to confine 
their reference group to others in the village, since they have limited information 
regarding other situations (Knight et al., 2009).  
Akay et al. (2012) examine the impact of relative income on rural-urban migrants’ 
SWB. Using the Rural-to-Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMICI) dataset, 
they focus on the role of different reference groups’ relative income on rural-urban 
migrants’ SWB. They find that rural-urban migrants’ happiness is negatively influenced 
by the income of other rural-urban migrants, and also by the income of rural workers in 
rural areas. The latter result is likely to be attributed that rural hukou individuals migrate 
to cities to improve their financial status. Secondly, the higher relative income of other 
migrants may evoke the feelings of envy and competition. On the contrary, Akay et al. 
(2012) find positive relative income effect when they regard urban workers as reference 
group. The first reason for the positive relation is attributed to that most rural-urban 
migrants regard the relative income of urban workers as indicator of the benefits and 
higher standard public services of living in wealthy areas and with rich neighbours. In 
other words, the relative income of urban workers is taken as an indicator of better 
conditions. In addition, rural-urban migrants regard the relative income of urban hukou 
individuals as an informative signal of their future income, which in turn increases their 
SWB. 
In addition, there is existing but limited research investigating the influence of 
respondents’ aspiration levels on SWB in China (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010a; Knight 
and Guantilaka, 2012b). Both Knight & Gunatilaka (2010a) and Knight & Gunatilaka 
(2012b) investigated the reason why rural-urban migrants reported lower average levels 
of happiness despite their higher mean income, in comparison with rural residents. They 
argue that rural-urban migrants are likely to overestimate the quality of urban life, which 
causes their expectations of living conditions and working environment to be biased 
upwards. In addition, migrants fail to foresee how their aspirations will change as their 
living or working environment changes. One of the reasons why unhappy rural-urban 
migrants do not return to their rural origins is that a majority of migrants expect their 
income will rise over the subsequent five years. Therefore, rural-urban migrants 
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experience lower levels of happiness, although they have better living and working 
conditions, in comparison with rural residents.  
These existing Chinese studies, like Knight et al. (2009) and Knight & Gunatilaka 
(2010b), focus on the determinants of rural hukou individuals’ SWB from factors such as 
individual income, household income and SES based on comparison. In this chapter, I 
compare the SWB between rural-urban migrants and urban hukou residents, and also 
consider how income aspirations shape the SWB between these two groups. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, rural-urban migrants have lower income on average report lower absolute 
income aspirations. Although urban workers have high quality jobs with higher wages, 
they are more likely to have higher income aspirations as well. Therefore, is not clear that 
urban residents are happier than rural-urban migrants because of their higher income 
aspirations. In Chapter 4, I intend to follow Stutzer (2004) to explore how aspiration 
income influences SWB and test whether there is a difference in the impact of income 
aspirations on happiness between urban residents and rural-urban migrants.  
4.3 Data and Hypotheses 
4.3.1 Data Description and Summary Statistics 
The data used in this chapter is the China General Social Survey (CGSS) 2010, 
which have been utilized in Chapter 3 as well. Similar to Chapter 3, the dummy variable 
of hukou status and information of survey location can be used to categorize the 
respondents into urban people and rural-urban migrants. In terms of dependent variable 
SWB, all the respondents are asked “In general, do you think you are happy?”. The 
ordinal variable of happiness is measured on a 5-point scale: 1-not at all happy; 2-not 
happy; 3-neutral; 4-happy; 5-very happy. About three-quarters of respondents expressed 
being happy and very happy. The estimation sample has 3019 observations, consisting 
of 2076 urban hukou people and 943 rural-urban migrants.  
Similar to Chapter 3, aspiration income also comes from those two questions “Are 
you satisfied with your current yearly income, based on your educational background 
and other factors?” and “If not satisfied, what do you think you should have earned 
based on your educational attainment, working experience and other factors?”. The 
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detailed measurement and definition of income aspirations have been explained in 
Chapter 3. Income is a leading factor in most economic research. Regarding the 
definition of income, there are two relevant variables: total income and occupational 
income per year. Since aspiration income in this survey refers to individuals’ total 
income, I chose the total income as the measure of income, in order to keep aspiration 
income and absolute income consistent. Similar to Chapter 3, I also dropped the top 1% 
and bottom 1% of total income and income aspirations from the sample to guarantee 
even income and aspirations distribution. The mean value of total income and aspiration 
income after removing the top 1% and bottom 1% from the sample was 22,749 yuan 
and 42,946 yuan. The distributions of total income and aspiration income are shown in 
Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2.  
Figure 4- 1 Distribution of Total Income 
 
Figure 4- 2 Distribution of Aspiration Income 
 
Since this chapter investigates the well-being of people in the urban labour market, I 
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also took individuals’ working situations into account and dropped 735 individuals who 
had never worked before. After making this adjustment, the sample only includes 
individuals who were currently employed or those currently unemployed but who had 
had an occupation previously. The reason for including this latter group is that these 
individuals also provided information in terms of their income from their previous job 
and aspiration income for their new jobs. 
Regarding the socio-demographic factors, age, number of children, marital status, 
gender, educational attainment and health are taken into account (Frey & Stutzer, 2010). 
Given the focus on income aspirations, the sample only chooses respondents aged (16 to 
60 for male and 16 to 55 for female). The variable of number of children comes from 
the question, “How many sons and daughters do you have, respectively?”. The number 
of sons and daughters separately are added as the total number of children. Two thirds 
of individuals had just one child, which is likely a result of the Chinese one child policy. 
The marital status is a categorical variable with 6 categories (unmarried, married, living 
together but not married, divorced, widowed, and separated) and I combined some 
categories in order to transfer this into a dummy variable. Similar to Chapter 3, people 
living together are regarded as married, whilst divorced, those separated but not 
divorced and widowed individuals are treated as unmarried. The variable “highest 
education level” is a categorical variable which is divided into multiple dummy 
variables. As with Chapter 3, this categorical variable of “highest education level” is 
divided into four dummy variables: no educational attainment, compulsory education, 
senior high school and university. The same to previous chapter, health status is an 
ordinal variable with 5-point scale: 1-completely unhealthy, 2-unhealthy, 3-standard, 
4-healthy, 5-completely healthy. I restructured this ordinal variable into three dummy 
variables, which are good health (healthy and completely healthy), standard health and 
bad health status (unhealthy and completely unhealthy). In the sample, more than 50% 
of individuals reported that they had good health in general (healthy and completely 
healthy). Approximately 8.6% of individuals reported that they had bad health 
(unhealthy and completely unhealthy), and 23% considered their health situation to be 
‘standard’. Individual health status is included in the analysis as it can influence 
individual happiness directly. Individuals with poor health are less likely to feel happy, 
especially the elderly (Frey & Stutzer, 2010).  
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As shown in Table 4-2, the mean value of happiness of rural-urban migrants is 
similar to urban workers. Approximately 77.02% of urban individuals reported being 
very happy and happy, while 77.09% of rural-urban migrants reported the same. In 
terms of respondents’ actual income, urban individuals have higher actual income 
(24721.63 yuan) than rural-urban migrants (18405.12 yuan).  
Table 4- 1 Description of Variables 
Happiness 1- Not at all happy; 
2- Not happy; 
3- Neutral (between happy and unhappy); 
4- Happy; 
5- Very happy  
Rural  1- Rural-urban migrants 
0- Urban hukou workers  
Actual income Real total income per year 
Aspiration income Individuals’ aspirations on income 
Partner income  Income per year of respondents’ partner 
Age  Individuals within the range of working age (16-60 for male and 16-55 
for female respondents) 
Children Number of children for each individual 
Male  1- Male 
0- Female 
Married  1- Married 
0- Unmarried 
Non-educational attainment 0- No education 
0- otherwise 
Compulsory school 1- Highest education level is compulsory school (primary or junior 
middle) 
0- Otherwise 
Senior high school 1- Highest education level is senior level (professional high school, 
senior high school and technical school) 
0- Otherwise 
University  1- Highest education level is university  
0- Otherwise 
Good Health  1- Good health 
0- Otherwise 
Standard Health  1- Standard health status 
0- Otherwise 
Poor Health 1- Poor healthy  
0- Otherwise  
Note: China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
However, urban hukou respondents have correspondingly higher absolute aspirations 
(46215.31 yuan) than their rural-urban counterparts (35749.73 yuan) as well. 
Considering the impact of socio-demographic factors, the average value of age, marital 
status, gender distribution, was similar between urban hukou workers and rural-urban 
migrants. However, rural-urban migrants are healthier than their urban counterparts, in 
general. Regarding educational attainment, only 3% of rural-urban migrants graduated 
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from university, in comparison to 34% of urban people. Moreover, 33% of urban hukou 
workers only received compulsory education attainment while more than 70% of 
rural-urban migrants gave up further study when they finished the compulsory 
education.  
Table 4- 2 Summary Statistics for Urban People and Rural Migrants 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
 Urban (2076 observations) Rural (943 observations) 
Happiness 
Not at all happy 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 
Not happy 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23 
Neutral  0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 
Happy 0.60 0.49 0.59 0.49 
Very happy 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 
Independent variables 
Income categories  
Actual income  24721.63 24021.63 18405.12*** 17663.21 
Aspiration income  46215.31 36433.38 35749.73*** 29073.31 
Partner income 23259.42 33146.65 12347.33*** 17078.31 
Social demographic factors 
Age  43.45 9.65 39.75*** 8.79 
Age2 1980.65 834.37 1657.34*** 708.34 
Number of children 1.20 0.61 1.61*** 0.82 
Male 0.50 0.50 0.62*** 0.49 
Married  0.97 0.05 0.96 0.07 
Health status  
Good health  0.65 0.47 0.74*** 0.44 
Standard health 0.25 0.48 0.19*** 0.40 
Poor health 0.10 0.29 0.07** 0.38 
Educational attainment  
Non-education 0.01 0.14 0.04*** 0.21 
Compulsory education 0.33 0.47 0.66*** 0.44 
Senior school 0.32 0.46 0.27*** 0.44 
University level 0.34 0.47 0.03*** 0.18 
Note: (1) * in the column of rural-urban migrants refers to whether the mean value of each variable is significantly 
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different with mean value of urban hukou individuals. *, **. *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels. 
     (2) The sample of this chapter is slightly different with the sample of Chapter 3 shown in Table 3-2. Although 
these two chapters involve the same variable (income aspiration), as mutually independent chapters they have 
different research topics. Chapter 4 analyses subjective well-being, which is not considered in Chapter 3. Thus, the 
dependent variable is different in each case. Moreover, some Chinese individuals are reluctant to answer questions 
related to personal income, personal or family property, family background and personal attitudes. The subjective 
well-being and income aspirations depend on respondents’ self-evaluation and their personal attitude. Therefore, 
some interviewees are not willing to answer questions related to happiness in CGSS 2010. Many reasons may be 
adduced for respondents being reluctant to respond to questions on subjective well-being, such as economic reasons, 
special experiences, physical health, and so on. In addition, as these two chapters have different research topics, the 
corresponding independent variables are slightly different, as explained above. In the preceding chapter, which 
investigates the determinants on income aspirations, some respondents were unwilling to report any information 
related to family background, e.g., father’s education, family property, and so on. This may be attributed to parental 
divorce, paternal death, and/or disharmonious family relationships from childhood. Thus, due to the different 
purposes of and variables at work in the two chapters, there is a slight difference between the two samples.  
    (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized.  
4.3.2 Hypotheses and Corresponding Specifications 
Considering the similar SWB between urban individuals and rural migrants shown 
in Table 4-2, this chapter aims at explaining this issue from the impact of income 
aspirations on SWB. As is well-known, SWB not only depends on individuals’ own 
income, but also replies on income aspirations or income of the reference group that 
may be the average income of all individuals in the same group or the income of 
respondents’ friends, neighbour, and colleagues. Moreover, income aspirations and the 
income of the reference group are more likely to have a negative impact on SWB. Some 
studies suspect whether the positive and negative coefficient for absolute income and 
aspiration income (or income of reference group) have a similar magnitude, and if the 
increase of actual income and aspiration income may counterbalance the respective 
impact on SWB. Therefore, in addition to analysing the respective effect of actual 
income and income aspirations (or income of the reference group) itself on happiness, 
these studies also put forward the discrepancy between income aspirations (or income of 
reference group) and actual income as relative income to estimate its impact on SWB 
further.  
In general, when these studies investigate the impact of aspirations or other 
people’s income on respondents’ SWB, the usual estimation process includes studying 
the effect of absolute aspirations or income of a reference group (e.g., the average 
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income of all individuals in the same group or income of respondents’ friends, 
neighbour, relatives and colleagues) on SWB in the first step. Secondly, when 
controlling the respondents’ actual income, the discrepancy between income aspirations 
(or income of the reference group) and actual income is established to further estimate 
the impact of relative income on SWB (Stutzer, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Graham 
& Felton, 2005; and Vendrik & Woltjer, 2007). For example, when Stutzer (2004) 
investigates the role of income aspiration on individuals’ happiness, the author also 
estimates the actual income and absolute income aspirations on SWB first. Following 
aspiration level theory, an individual’s subjective well-being is determined by the 
difference between aspiration and achievement, as well (Michalos, 1991; Inglehart, 
1990); thus Stutzer (2004) studies the income aspirations relative to the actual income 
(discrepancy between aspiration income to actual income) on respondents’ happiness 
further. Consequently, following these previous studies, the empirical analysis in this 
chapter will be based on two different specifications to test for various hypotheses 
regarding the effect of income and aspirations on SWB.  
The first simple specification is one that includes absolute actual income and 
aspiration income as a determinant of SWB. A common assumption in economics is that 
individuals’ actual income has a positive association with SWB (Veenhoven, 1991; 
Diener et al., 1993). However, as shown in Table 4-2, the similar SWB is found between 
urban people and rural migrant although urban workers report higher actual income 
(24721.63 yuan) in comparison to rural-urban migrants (18405.12 yuan). That is 
inconsistent with the correlation between SWB and income suggested by previous 
studies. 
Firstly, a possible reason may be ascribed to differences in the effect of actual 
income on SWB between urban workers and rural-urban migrants, holding other 
variables constant. If actual income matters more for rural-urban migrants’ SWB, an 
additional actual income would contribute more to rural-urban migrants’ happiness. In 
contrast, a 1% increase of actual income contributes less to urban individuals’ SWB. 
Consequently, higher actual income may present a positive effect on urban respondents’ 
happiness, to the same extent as lower income affects rural-urban migrants’ SWB. The 
direction of the coefficients for an interaction term between the dummy variable of rural 
status and actual income can be checked in order to explore whether the impacts of 
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additional actual income for rural-urban migrants are greater than that for urban ones. I 
propose the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a differential effect of actual income on SWB for rural-urban 
migrants with a given increase in income generating larger gains in SWB for rural 
migrants, in comparison with urban hukou individuals. Thus, an interaction term 
between actual income and a dummy variable for rural-urban migrants should be 
positive.  
In terms of partner income, Kahneman & Deaton (2010) and Brown & Gray (2014) 
find a positive relationship between household income and SWB. When holding 
individuals’ actual income constant, partner income can positively influence SWB. As 
shown in Table 4.2, the partner’s income for urban individuals (23259.42 yuan) is 
twofold in comparison to rural-urban migrants (12347.33 yuan); therefore, urban 
workers should report higher levels of SWB. However, the happiness of urban workers 
is similar to rural-urban migrants. Following Hypothesis 1, the reason for the similar 
happiness levels may be attributed to the fact that partner income matters more for 
rural-urban migrants’ happiness levels. An additional partner income can contribute 
more to rural-urban migrants’ SWB; hence, an interaction term between the dummy 
variable of rural hukou status and partner income is also generated to explore the 
difference in the impact of partner income between urban workers and rural-urban 
migrants. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a difference in the impact of partner income on SWB for 
rural-urban migrants with a given rise in partner income generating larger gains in SWB 
for rural migrants compared with urban residents. Thus, an interaction term between 
partner income and a dummy variable for rural migrants should be positive. 
Another reason why urban respondents with higher incomes have similar 
happiness to rural-urban migrants may be due to some factors offsetting the positive 
effect of actual income or partner income on SWB. Stutzer (2004) suggests that 
individuals with higher incomes are more likely to have higher aspirations regarding 
their current status, and he also reveals that aspiration income has a negative effect on 
SWB. The negative correlation between aspiration and SWB can offset the increasing 
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happiness that is brought by higher actual income or partner income. As can be seen 
from Table 4-2, even though urban workers have a higher income and higher partner 
income, they also report higher absolute aspiration income (46215.31 yuan) than 
rural-urban migrants (35749.73 yuan). I, therefore, propose a third hypothesis to explore 
whether similar happiness can be attributed to aspiration income offsetting the positive 
effect of actual income or partner income on SWB. 
Hypothesis 3: Aspiration income has a negative impact on SWB. 
Following hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3, I generate an interaction term between 
income aspirations and a dummy variable of rural-urban migrants, and expect that 
rural-urban migrants are less affected by income aspirations. Knight & Gunatilaka 
(2010b) have suggested that urban hukou individuals are more materialistic and have 
more requirements, in comparison to rural-urban migrants. Thus, urban hukou 
individuals are more likely to have higher aspirations and care more about whether their 
aspirations can be satisfied. If the aspiration income has a negative effect on SWB and 
matters less for rural-urban migrants, the difference in SWB between urban hukou 
individuals and rural-urban migrants can be reduced, and the similar SWB in this 
chapter can be explained. I propose the fourth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a differential effect of aspiration income on SWB for rural-urban 
migrants with a given increase in aspiration income leading to a smaller loss in SWB for 
rural-urban migrants, in comparison with urban residents. Thus, an interaction term 
between aspiration income and a dummy variable for rural migrants should be positive.   
The description above shows the first specification to test the impact of actual 
income and aspiration income itself on SWB, respectively. In addition, as discussed by 
Michalos (1991) and Ingelhart (1990), subjective well-being is also determined by the 
gap between aspiration and achievement. Therefore, I follow Stutzer (2004) in 
considering the effect of aspiration income relative to individuals’ actual income. The 
second specification estimates how aspiration income influences SWB in the form of 
relative status, i.e., how the discrepancy between individual aspiration income and 
actual income determines SWB. This can be conducted by taking the difference between 
the logarithm of each respondent’s income aspirations and the logarithm of their actual 
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income, i.e. ln (aspiration income)-ln (actual income). I found that, although urban 
individuals report higher absolute income aspirations, the gap between their aspirations 
and actual income is slightly lower than that for rural-urban migrants. The reason for 
this may be attributed to that actual income of rural-urban migrants is too low to reach 
the normal standard they deserve. The actual income of rural-urban migrants is 
negatively restricted by hukou discrimination, whilst the findings of Chapter 3 show that 
their income aspirations are not negatively influenced by hukou discrimination. 
Therefore, the discrepancy between rural-urban migrants’ income aspirations and actual 
income (ln (aspiration income)-ln (actual income)) is larger. As suggested by Stutzer 
(2004), the greater discrepancy between aspirations and income, the lower subjective 
well-being. Thus, following Stutzer (2004), I assume that the discrepancy between 
aspiration income and actual income is negatively associated to people’s SWB.  
However, as rural-urban migrants who experience larger discrepancy between 
aspirations and actual income report the similar happiness with their urban counterparts, 
I expect that the negative impact of this gap on rural migrants is far less than that for 
urban individuals. As only a 1% increase in the discrepancy has a greater negative 
impact on urban people, the similarity in happiness levels between rural migrants and 
urban people can be explained. Therefore, following hypothesis 4, I generated an 
interaction term between the dummy variable of rural-urban migrants and the gap 
between income aspirations and actual income, expecting that rural-urban migrants care 
less about this distance between their aspirations and what they actually earned. Based 
on description above, hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6 are established as follows.  
Hypothesis 5: The gap between aspiration income and actual income is negatively 
associated to people’s SWB. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a differential effect of this gap on SWB for rural-urban 
migrants with a given increase in the discrepancy between individuals’ aspiration 
income and actual income, generating a quite smaller loss in SWB for rural-urban 
migrants, in comparison to urban hukou individuals. Thus, an interaction term between 
the dummy variable for rural-urban migrants and the discrepancy between income 
aspirations and actual income should be positive.  
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4.4. Methodology 
The ordered probit model will be used to estimate the effect of actual income and 
aspiration income on happiness. Following Long & Freese (2006), the ordered probit 
model can be derived from a model in which a latent variable y* ranging from -∞ to ∞ is 
mapped to an observed variable y. The dependent variable (SWB) is thought of as 
providing incomplete information about an underlying y* according to the following 
equation: 
*
1 for m=1 to 5i m i my happiness m if y                       (4-1) 
The τ’s are thresholds and the extreme categories 1 and 5 are defined with τ0=-∞ and 
τ5=∞. The dependent variable ‘happiness’ is measured on a 5-point scale: 1-not at all 
happy; 2-not happy; 3-netural; 4-happy; 5-very happy. Then the observed y (happiness) 
is related to y* according to the following equation:  
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The latent variable y* is specified as: 
                           
*
i iy  iX                           (4-3)    
where the matrix X contains actual income, partner income, aspiration income and a set 
of control variables including age, number of children, male, married, rural hukou status, 
medical and pension insurance, debt and highest educational level. In addition, I also 
take the interaction terms between rural hukou dummy variable and actual income, and 
between partner income and aspiration income into account when estimating the 
different effect on SWB between urban people and rural-urban migrants. The reason 
why I pool urban and rural migrants together and generate an interaction term between 
rural dummy variable with income aspiration, actual income, partner income is 
attributed to that I cannot only see the difference effect of actual income or aspiration 
income on happiness between urban people and rural migrants, but also can clearly 
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observe if the differential impact is significant to SWB. This advantage of generating 
interaction terms is that regression for urban people and rural-urban migrants separately 
cannot be achieved21. β is a column vector of coefficients and εi is the error term which 
is a standard normally distributed constant (Long & Freese, 2006). For the first 
specification, the latent variable can be expressed specifically as: 
* *
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
ln ln ln ln
ln ln
inc part aspir inc
i i i i i i i i
part aspir
i i i i
y happiness W W W R R W
R W R W Z
     
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(4-4) 
where R is the dummy variable referring to rural hukou status. Winc, Wpart and Waspir are 
actual income, partner income and aspiration income, respectively. In order to express 
the equation (4-4) briefly, I used Z to represent all the remaining control variables.  
The probability that a random variable is between two values is the difference 
between the cumulative distribution function at these values. The probability of any 
observed outcome y=m, given X, is:   
 
(4-5) 
 
I use F to represent the cumulative distribution function and f to represent the 
probability density function of εi (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Interpretation of the modelling results is carried out by computing the partial 
change (marginal effect) or discrete change (incremental effect) for the probabilities 
resulting from marginal/discrete changes in one of the independent variables. The 
partial derivative of any observed outcome, y=m, with respect to Xk is given by:
                                                   
21 I have tried the regression for urban people and rural-urban migrants separately in the Table 4-13 of Appendix.   
*
1
1
1
1
( | ) ( | )
( | )
( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
i i m i m i
m i i m i i
i m i i i m i i
m i m i
pr y m pr y
pr
pr pr
F F
 
  
   
 




   
    
     
   
 
 
 
X X
X X X
X X X X
X X
147 
 
 
1
1
1
( | ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i m i m i
k k k
k m i k m i
k m i m i
pr y m F F
x x x
f f
f f
 
   
  



     
 
  
   
   
 
 
 
X X X
X X
X X
                     (4-6) 
The marginal effect is the slope of the curve relating Xk to Pr(y=m|k), holding all other 
variables constant. However, the interpretation of a dummy variable is very different. In 
this case, a measure of discrete change or incremental effect is much more informative. 
The discrete change for a dummy variable, xk, is the change in the probability resulting 
from a change in xk from 0 to 1.  
( | ) ( | , 1) ( | , 0)i i i i k i i kpr y m pr y m x pr y m x       X X X          (4-7) 
The predicted probability of outcome, m, changes by ( | )i ipr y m  X , holding all other 
variables constant, while the independent variable, xk, changes from 0 to 1. 
As explained earlier, I also include interaction terms between rural hukou status 
and actual income, and between partner income and aspiration income in the model. 
According to Abdel-Aty (2003), Ai & Norton (2003), Norton et al. (2004), Drichoutis & 
Nayga Jr (2011), and Karaca & Mandic et al. (2012), the marginal effect of variables 
that are interacted is different. The marginal effect of the interaction term on the 
probability of outcome, m, can be calculated in two steps. Firstly, the correct marginal 
effect for the log of actual income on the probability of outcome m, is: 
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The correct marginal effect for the log of partner income on the probability of outcome, 
m, is: 
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In addition, the correct marginal effect of log of aspiration income on the probability of 
outcome m, is:
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The correctly estimated discrete change for the dummy variable, R, (rural hukou) is: 
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(4-11) 
The correct marginal effect of the interaction term involves a mixture of equation (4-8) 
and (4-11), a mixture of equations (4-9) and (4-11), and the mixture of equations (4-10) 
and (4-11). That is, I first calculate the derivative with respect to actual income, partner 
income and aspiration income, and then calculated the difference in probability for a 
change in rural hukou from 0 to 1. The marginal effect of outcome y=m with respect to 
the interaction between the log of actual income and rural hukou is given by: 
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The marginal effect of outcome y=m with respect to the interaction between log of 
partner income and rural hukou is: 
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(4-13) 
The marginal effect of outcome y=m with respect of to the interaction between log of 
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aspiration income and rural hukou is: 
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(4-14) 
As discussed in section 4.3.2., in addition to estimating the respective effect of 
actual income and absolute aspiration income itself on SWB, I also follow Stutzer (2004) 
to consider the impact of individual aspirations relative to actual income on SWB in the 
following analysis. Following the approach by Stutze (2004), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), 
Graham & Felton (2005) and Vendrik & Woltjer (2007), this can be implemented by 
replacing aspirations with the discrepancy between aspiration income and actual income, 
i.e. ln (aspiration income)- ln (actual income). 
              Relative aspiration= ln lnaspir incW W              (4-15) 
According to the Eq. (4-4), the latent variable based on the aspiration income in the 
form of relative status can be transformed as: 
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(4-16) 
Eq. (4-16) separates the effect that is attributed to the difference between log aspiration 
income and log actual income and the pure effect of log of actual income. In 
comparison to the first specification shown in Eq. (4-4), the coefficient of discrepancy 
between aspiration income and actual income is equal to the coefficient of pure 
aspiration income. Moreover, the coefficient of actual income in Eq. (4-16) is equal to 
the sum of the respective coefficient of actual income and aspiration income in Eq. 
(4-4).  
For all the marginal effects, I present the average of marginal effects. 
4.5 Results and Discussion 
150 
 
4.5.1 Main Results 
Regarding the impact of the respective effect of actual income and aspiration 
income on SWB in first specification, Table 4-3 presents the results of the ordered 
probit model and the marginal effects of reporting being ‘very happy’. Columns A and B 
present the results of the basic model, which includes absolute actual income, income 
aspirations, and other basic control variables. 
Table 4-3 shows that actual income has a significant and positive effect on SWB. 
The marginal effect of actual income in column B shows that a 1% increase in actual 
income leads to a 0.93 percent increase in the probability of “reporting being very 
happy”, which is consistent with Veenhoven (1991) and Diener et al. (1993). In addition, 
the coefficient on partner income also shows a positive correlation with SWB. Based on 
the marginal effect of partner income in column B, a 1% higher partner income leads to 
a 1.23 percent greater probability of reporting the top category, in line with Kahneman 
& Deaton (2010) and Brown & Gray (2014). Consequently, the higher the income, the 
better basic needs can be satisfied, which in turn leads to higher SWB. 
Regarding the differential effect of actual income between rural-urban migrants 
and urban workers, the marginal effect of the interaction term22 shows positive and 
significant impacts on SWB. The positive relationship between the interaction term and 
happiness reveals that actual income matters more in terms of rural-urban migrants’ 
happiness. As can be seen from Column B of Table 4-3, the marginal effect of 
interaction term between actual income and dummy variable of rural-urban migrants 
presents a positive effect on SWB. To be specific, with 1 % actual income increasing, 
rural-urban migrants experience a 0.38
23
 higher percentage points increase in the 
probability of reporting “very happy”, in comparison with their urban counterparts. As a 
consequence, an additional actual income increase contributes more to happiness of 
rural-urban migrants, in comparison with their urban counterparts, which supports the 
first hypothesis that an interaction term between the dummy variable of rural migrants 
and actual income has a positive effect on SWB. This result may be attributed to the 
                                                   
22 In general, the marginal effect of the interaction term is calculated by the difference between rural=1 and rural=0 
across the different continuous variables (e.g., actual income and income aspirations).   
23 In general, it is calculated by taking the difference in the marginal effect between rural=1 and rural=0 across actual 
income. The marginal effect of actual income for rural=1 is 0.01189 and 0.00809 for rural=0.  
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different marginal benefit for rural-urban migrants and urban residents. To be specific, 
rural-urban migrants have lower income and therefore are less able to meet their basic 
needs than urban hukou residents. Therefore, with 1% increase in actual income, 
rural-urban migrants’ basic needs can be better achieved, in comparison to their 
previous status. In addition, for those rural migrants who left the elderly, children and 
even their wives at home, they feel happier as they can send money back home to 
improve the living standards for the left-behind family members which has been 
discussed in Chapter 1 while describing the nature of migration.  
    Meanwhile, the marginal effect of the interaction between the dummy of rural 
migrants and partner income shows a negative effect on SWB, which suggests that an 
increase in partner income contributes less to the well-being of rural-urban migrants. In 
Column B of Table 4-3, the negative marginal effect of the interaction term between 
partner income and the dummy variable of rural migrants shows that rural-urban 
migrants have a 0.29
24
 lower percent increase in terms of the probability of reporting 
“very happy” than urban workers, with a 1% partner income increase. Additional 
partner income contributes less to rural-urban migrants’ SWB, relative to urban 
individuals. This estimation result is not consistent with the second hypothesis that 
partner income contributes more to rural migrants’ happiness; therefore, the similar 
SWB between rural-urban migrants and urban workers cannot be explained by the 
differential effect of partner income. 
In terms of the previous two hypotheses, I can conclude that the interaction term of 
partner income presents an opposite effect to the interaction term of actual income on 
SWB. Actual income contributes more to rural-urban migrants’ happiness while partner 
income has more contribution to urban workers’ SWB. Whether the similar SWB 
between urban people and rural-urban migrants can be explained by the first hypothesis 
should be discussed further. It is not certain whether the effect of interaction terms 
between the dummy of rural migrants and partner income can offset the positive 
impacts of interaction variables between the dummy of rural-urban migrants and actual 
income. By considering the marginal effect of these two interaction terms, the 
magnitude of the marginal effects can be compared to investigate the differential effect  
                                                   
24 The marginal effect of partner income for rural=1 is 0.01015 and 0.013091 for rural=0. Thus, the marginal effect 
of interaction term between rural and partner income is negative.  
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Table 4- 3 Ordered Probit Results for Different Specifications 
 Basic model Extended model 
 Coefficient (A) Marginal effect of 
very happy (B) 
Coefficient (C) Marginal effect of 
very happy (D) 
Income categories  
Actual income 0.0335** 
(0.0134) 
0.0093** 
(0.0032) 
0.0287** 
(0.0134) 
0.0079** 
(0.0032) 
Aspiration income  0.0375 
(0.0378) 
0.0041 
(0.0077) 
0.0297 
(0.0378) 
0.0030 
(0.0077) 
Partner income 0.0542*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0508*** 
(0.0106) 
0.0112*** 
(0.0021) 
Hukou status  
Rural  0.7475 
(0.6234) 
0.0138 
(0.0140) 
0.6263 
(0.6249) 
0.0134 
(0.0144) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories  
Rural× actual income  0.0131 
(0.0317) 
0.0038** 
(0.0016) 
0.0107 
(0.0318) 
0.0031** 
(0.0014) 
Rural×aspiration income -0.0658 
(0.0638) 
-0.0162 
(0.0159) 
-0.0551 
(0.0639) 
-0.0136 
(0.0159) 
Rural×partner income -0.0144 
(0.0162) 
-0.0029** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0110 
(0.0163) 
-0.0021** 
(0.0009) 
Social demographic factors  
Age  -0.0527** 
(0.0183) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.0548** 
(0.0184) 
-0.0006 
(0.0007) 
Age2 0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
 0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
 
Number of children 0.0698** 
(0.0221) 
0.0173** 
(0.0079) 
0.0821** 
(0.0326) 
0.0202** 
(0.0080) 
Male  -0.0088 
(0.0450) 
-0.0022 
(0.0111) 
-0.0016 
(0.0451) 
-0.0004 
(0.0111) 
Married  0.8757** 
(0.3226) 
0.1380*** 
(0.0264) 
0.8322** 
(0.3228) 
0.1341*** 
(0.0284) 
Educational level 
Compulsory education 0.4675*** 
(0.1255) 
0.1165*** 
(0.0313) 
0.4565** 
(0.1257) 
0.1133*** 
(0.0313) 
Senior school 0.4965*** 
(0.1303) 
0.1336** 
(0.0374) 
0.4795** 
(0.1308) 
0.1280** 
(0.0372) 
University level 0.6082*** 
(0.1387) 
0.1694*** 
(0.0421) 
0.5786*** 
(0.1394) 
0.1596*** 
(0.0418) 
Health status  
Good health  0.6842*** 
(0.0705) 
0.1490*** 
(0.0146) 
0.6606*** 
(0.0754) 
0.1439*** 
(0.0147) 
Standard Health  0.2323** 
(0.0806) 
0.0605** 
(0.0220) 
0.2175** 
(0.0808) 
0.0562** 
(0.0219) 
Financial status 
 
Debt    -0.1749** 
(0.0508) 
-0.0411*** 
(0.0114) 
Social security      
Medical insurance    0.2588*** 
(0.0624) 
0.0583*** 
(0.0128) 
Pension insurance    -0.0006 
(0.9901) 
-0.0002 
(0.0120) 
Note: (1) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels, respectively. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
     (2) ME presented in this table is average marginal effect. 
     (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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on SWB between the two terms. From Column B of Table 4-3, we can see that the 
magnitude of the marginal effect of the interaction term between actual income and the 
dummy of rural-urban migrants is larger than that of the interaction term between 
partner income and the dummy of rural migrants. With an increase in actual income, 
both the probability of replying “very happy” for rural-urban migrants and urban people 
is increased, but the magnitude of the probability increasing for rural-urban migrants is 
0.38 percentage points larger than that of urban individuals. However, with an increase 
in partner income, the magnitude of increase in the probability of choosing “very happy” 
for a rural-urban migrant is 0.29 percentage points smaller than that of urban workers. 
In other words, the magnitude of difference in the effect of actual income between 
rural-urban migrants and urban people is higher than the difference of partner income 
between rural-urban migrants and urban residents. The positive differential effect of 
actual income between rural-urban migrants and urban workers is not completely offset 
by the negative difference in the effect of partner income between rural-urban migrants 
and urban individuals. Consequently, the similar SWB between urban people and 
rural-urban migrants can be partly explained by the first hypothesis that actual income 
has more contribution to rural-urban migrants’ SWB. 
Following Stutzer (2004), the relationship between income aspirations and SWB 
are also investigated. Hypothesis 3 is proposed to investigate whether the impact of 
income aspirations has a negative association with SWB and offsets the positive effect 
of income on SWB. Table 4-3 shows that aspiration income itself has no statistically 
significant effect on latent SWB, which is not consistent with Easterlin (2001) and 
Stutzer (2004), who both find aspiration income has a negative relationship with SWB. 
In addition, the marginal effect of aspiration income is not significant either, which does 
not support Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of actual income and partner income on 
SWB cannot be offset by the effect of higher aspiration income. Although urban hukou 
workers report higher income aspirations, their similar SWB with rural-urban migrants 
is not ascribed to their higher aspirations. Moreover, the ordered probit results for the 
marginal effect of “very happy” illustrates that the interaction term between the dummy 
of rural-urban migrants and aspiration income has no statistically significant effect on 
SWB, which is not consistent with Hypothesis 4. To sum up, the results from testing 
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 reveal that the similar SWB between urban workers with 
higher income and rural-urban migrants cannot be explained by the fact that urban 
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workers report higher income aspirations. 
For the effect of those basic socio-demographic factors other than income on SWB, 
the dummy variable for gender does not have a significant effect on SWB. As shown in 
Table 4-3, the coefficients of age and age squared in Column B show that SWB has a 
“U-shaped” age pattern, in line with Inglehart (1990), Oswald (1997), Blanchflower & 
Oswald (2004), Frey & Stutzer (2010), Hansen et al. (2008) and Plagnol (2011). 
SWB is positively influenced by education. The marginal effect in Column B 
shows that, in comparison with people who have never received an education, 
respondents attaining compulsory education experience 11.65 percentage points 
increase in the probability of replying “very happy”. In addition, respondents with more 
educational attainment have a greater chance of being in this top category. Respondents 
having attained a senior education had a 13.36 percentage point increase in the 
probability of being in the top category whilst people graduating from university 
reported a 16.94 percentage points increase in the probability of the same category, 
relative to the reference group: non-educated people. The estimation results in this 
chapter are consistent with Witter et al. (1984) and Inglehart (1990), who found that 
education is positively related to adults’ SWB. There have been mixed findings on the 
impacts of educational attainment on SWB in previous research. The results of 
education impact contradict the findings of Frey & Stutzer (2010). Since highly 
educated individuals have higher ambitions, the pressure may lead to an inverse impact 
on SWB (Frey & Stutzer, 2010). My finding may be attributed to the fact that highly 
educated individuals are more likely to be engaged in better jobs. Holding income 
constant, highly educated people can enjoy many fringe benefits from better jobs, such 
as better welfare, higher standard working conditions, and a better environment. 
Therefore, the positive relationship between education attainment and SWB found in 
this chapter may be due to better educated people being employed in higher skilled jobs 
with better welfare and conditions. 
Being married is positively related to SWB. According to the marginal effect in 
Column B of Table 4-3, married people report a 13.80 percent higher probability of 
choosing “very happy”, compared to individuals who have never married, been 
divorced, or are widowed. This is in line with Frey & Stutzer (2010) who suggest that 
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married individuals report higher SWB since marriage can provide additional sources 
through sharing financial burdens and provide psychological support to each other. With 
an increasing of number of children, the probability of being happiness will increase as 
well. 
For the effect of health status on SWB in Column B of Table 4-3, it can be seen 
that both dummy variables, ‘good health status’ and ‘standard health status’, have 
positive impacts on SWB. In comparison with unhealthy respondents, people who reply 
“good health” or “standard health status” report higher levels of happiness than people 
who self-describe as “unhealthy”, in line with Okun et al. (1984), Gerdtham & 
Johannesson (2001) and Frey & Stutzer (2010). In addition, the better the health status 
is, the higher the SWB. Individuals in good health have a 14.90 percent higher 
probability of replying “very happy”, whilst people who report having “standard health 
status” have only a 6.05 percent higher probability of reporting the top category, 
compared to those who describe themselves as “unhealthy”. 
On the other hand, few researchers have proposed that there may be some other 
factors influencing the impact of these traditional economic variables on SWB, such as 
the effect of income on SWB (Roberts et al., 1998; Brown et al., 2005; Esser & Palme, 
2010; Liao et al., 2012 and Keng & Wu, 2014). Other studies focus on aspects of 
security, specifically financial security and social security. Roberts et al. (1998) and 
Brown et al. (2005) explore the effect of debt on respondents’ happiness. They find that 
respondents with debt are more likely to suffer from psychological distress, since they 
are faced with financial restrictions. The negative effect of debt can be offset by the 
positive effect generated by a rise in monthly income or annual savings, otherwise 
normal expenditure has to be sacrificed to repay debt. Sometimes, individuals may need 
to borrow money to repay their debt, which induces a vicious circle of financial debt 
(Brown et al., 2005). Therefore, even if a person has higher income, his happiness will 
be restricted if he suffers from the pressure of debt.  
In terms of social security
25
, I intend to follow latest studies (Esser & Palme, 2010; 
                                                   
25 Not only the public sector but also private companies will provide social security including pension insurance and 
medical insurance to the permanent staff with a regular labour contract. As long as employees sign the legal labour 
contract with a normal private company, they are provided with social security, which is similar to those in the public 
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Liao et al., 2012 and Keng & Wu, 2014) to examine its impact on SWB from two 
aspects, medical insurance and pension insurance, due to the incomplete medical care 
system and pension system in China. The catastrophic health expenditure can compel a 
middle class family to be poor due to health shocks (Zhang et al., 2010; Keng & Wu, 
2014). Although one person without medical insurance has higher wages, he may be 
worried about the huge expenditure for an unexpected health shock in the future. He is 
thus more likely to sacrifice several expenses to build a deposit against future medical 
expenditures. The same applies to the pension system. One individual without pension 
insurance should consider saving more money to finance daily expenses after retirement. 
Medical insurance and pension insurance can alleviate the financial loss for those 
unexpected health shocks and retirement. A deficiency of medical and pension insurance 
may lower individuals’ happiness even if they earn higher wages. Keng & Wu (2014) 
also find that the implementation of National Health Insurance (NHI) has increased the 
levels of happiness of elderly persons, especially elderly women, to a large extent. In 
CGSS 2010, information on debt related to financial security, and medical insurance and 
pension insurance related to social security, was available. Consequently, I follow these 
studies and estimate the impact of financial security and social security on SWB by 
controlling for other economic factors. The basic model is extended by taking a dummy 
variable of debt, and two dummy variables of pension and medical insurance into 
account in order to check the robustness of the main results. Results of the extended 
model are shown in Columns C and D of Table 4-3.  
The results of all independent variables in the extended model are consistent with 
the basic model. Results in Table 4-3 show that having debt leads to lower levels of 
SWB. An individual with debt has a 4.11 percent lower probability of reporting being 
“very happy” compared to people with no debt, in line with Roberts et al. (1998) and 
Brown et al. (2005). In addition, the positive relationship shown in Column C of Table 
4-3 between medical insurance and SWB reveals that people having medical insurance 
are found to report higher SWB than those without medical insurance, as seen in Liao et 
al. (2012) and Keng & Wu (2014). People with medical insurance are 5.83 percent more 
likely to report being “very happy”, as individuals with medical insurance do not have 
to worry about incurring large medical expenses when in need of medical treatment. 
                                                                                                                                                     
sector. However, only temporary staff or informal employees in the private organizations are not able to enjoy 
benefits from social security.  
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However, results in Table 4-3 show that pension insurance does not influence SWB, 
which is not consistent with Esser & Palme (2010) and Bender (2012). 
Overall, according to the relationship between these social demographic factors 
and SWB, urban individuals should report higher SWB. When comparing these 
characteristics between urban residents and rural-urban migrants, it can be seen from 
Table 4-2 that 66% of urban people had graduated from senior school or university, 
whilst only 30% of rural-urban migrants reported the same. Due to the positive 
relationship between educational attainment and happiness, urban respondents with 
more educational attainment should have been happier than rural-urban migrants. In 
addition, when taking financial security and social security into account, I found that 70% 
of urban individuals had medical insurance, compared to 29% of rural-urban migrants. 
Thus, urban people should have reported higher SWB as well, due to the negative effect 
of debt and positive impacts of medical insurance on happiness. However, urban 
residents and rural-urban migrants showed similar levels of SWB.  
In the first specification above, I know that individuals’ aspiration income has no 
direct impact on happiness, which is not in line with my expectations. Individuals’ 
aspiration income does not offset the positive impact of actual income on SWB. This 
may be due to the fact that SWB is more likely to be affected by the difference between 
the aspiration and actual income. When people realize that there is a huge gap between 
their aspirations and actual status or their own real status has already achieved the 
aspiration levels, the happiness may be correspondingly affected. Similarly, other 
people’s income may not have a profound effect on the happiness; however, when a 
person compares his own income with others and finds that his income is much lower, 
he is likely to be unhappy. As discussed in hypotheses section, the common approach 
for analysing the relative income on SWB is to substitute the reference income itself 
(e.g., aspiration income or other individuals’ income) with the distance between the 
reference income and actual income in the second step, on controlling the individuals’ 
actual income. Michalos (1991) and Stutzer (2004) also indicate that individuals’ 
well-being is determined by the difference between aspirations and achievement. 
Following previous studies, the second specification of this chapter is to examine the 
impact of the discrepancy between aspirations and actual income on SWB in order to 
explain the similar happiness between urban people and rural-urban migrants.  
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Table 4-4 presents the estimation results for this second specification in which the 
aspiration income is substituted by the discrepancy between aspiration income and 
actual income. As shown in Eq. (4-16), the estimation of other variables (e.g., education 
attainment, social-demographic factors, partner income, health status, financial and 
social security) remain consistent in terms of their sign, significance and magnitude. 
The coefficient of actual income in Table 4-4 is equal to the sum of the respective 
coefficient of actual income and aspiration income in Table 4-3, which is in line with Eq. 
(4-16). Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction term between rural hukou status and 
actual income in Table 4-4 is also the sum of respective coefficient of interaction for 
actual income and aspiration income in Table 4-3, which presents negative impact on 
SWB but it is not significant. Regarding the estimation of the discrepancy between 
aspiration income and actual income, it is consistent with estimation of aspiration 
income alone in Table 4-3. Specifically, the discrepancy between aspiration income and 
actual income has a sizable positive impact on the reported happiness, but the impact is 
also statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the ordered probit results for “very happy” 
in Table 4-4 also show that the interaction term between the dummy of rural hukou 
status and the discrepancy between aspiration income and actual income is statistically 
insignificant to SWB as well. Similar to the results of hypotheses 3 and 4, the estimated 
results in Table 4-4 do not support hypotheses 5 and 6. Therefore, based on all the 
estimations above, both income aspirations and the discrepancy between individuals’ 
aspirations and actual income have no effects on SWB. The similar happiness between 
rural-urban migrants and urban hukou individuals cannot be explained by respondents’ 
aspiration level, no matter which measurement of income aspiration (aspiration itself or 
aspiration in the form of relative status) is utilized in the model. Overall, self-evaluated 
aspiration has no contribution to balance the happiness between rural-urban migrants 
and urban people.  
The reason why aspirations have no significant impact on SWB may be attributed 
to the fact that Chinese people are not really concerned about their own aspiration levels. 
In Chinese cultural context, there is a proverb that people’s desire is always imagined to 
be canyon that can never be filled up. Chinese individuals may realize that even if their 
current aspirations are satisfied, they will have new aspiration further and the desire will 
never be satisfied. As a result, most Chinese people may be more concerned with their 
current situation such as the current income and the current status, in comparison with 
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others. Secondly, the insignificant effect may be because social comparisons matter 
more for SWB in the Chinese cultural context. For example, the measurement of the 
respondents’ aspiration income depends on the respondent’s personal evaluation, but the 
comparison is determined by an evaluation of the whole families’ financial status. For 
those respondents with lower actual income and lower aspiration income, their higher 
SWB may not be influenced by their own lower aspirations but may be influenced by 
their whole household’s social and economic status (SES). As previous studies suggest, 
social comparisons play a critical role in determining individuals’ SWB (Graham & 
Felton, 2005; Vendrik & Woltjer, 2007; Wu & Tam, 2015 and Lam & Liu, 2014). I, 
therefore, investigate the effect of SES on SWB to establish whether it is in fact SES, 
rather than income aspirations per se, that matter in the Chinese background. This will 
be discussed in section 4.5.2. 
To sum up, the analysis in the first specification shows that the similar SWB 
between urban residents and rural-urban migrants can be partly explained by hypothesis 
1, that actual income contributes more to rural-urban migrants’ levels of happiness. 
Although the results are inconsistent with hypothesis 2, that partner income matters 
more for rural-urban migrants, the differential effect of actual income is larger and 
outweighs the differential effect of partner income. Consequently, the reason for similar 
SWB is partly ascribed to higher contributions of actual income to rural-urban migrants’ 
happiness, based on the first specification. Hypotheses 3 and 4, that aspiration income 
has a negative effect on SWB, were proposed in order to analyse whether the negative 
impact of aspiration income can offset the positive effect of actual income, in turn 
leading to similar SWB. However, aspiration income is shown to make no contribution 
to SWB. In addition, the relative measurement of aspirations in the second specification, 
the discrepancy between aspiration income and actual income, shows no contribution to 
SWB, as well. The estimation results of this discrepancy between aspirations and actual 
income also do not support hypotheses 5 and 6. Therefore, I can conclude that income 
aspiration income has no contribution to the similar SWB between urban workers and 
rural-urban migrants in China. Following most previous studies that suggest that income 
influence happiness relatively (Graham & Felton, 2005; Vendrik & Woltjer, 2007; 
Knight et al., 2009; and Lam & Liu, 2014), the most likely economic factor for 
happiness is social comparison. Further analysis and discussion about the impact of 
social comparison on SWB are given in the next subsection.  
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Table 4- 4 Ordered Probit Results for the Discrepancy between Income Aspirations 
and Actual Income 
 Basic model Extended model 
 Coefficient 
(A) 
Marginal effect 
of very happy 
(B) 
Coefficient 
(C) 
Marginal effect of 
very happy (D) 
Income categories  
Actual income 0.0710** 
(0.0337) 
0.0134** 
(0.0054) 
0.0584** 
(0.0225) 
0.0109** 
(0.0034) 
Discrepancy between aspirations 
and income (= aspiration level (ln)- 
actual income (ln))  
0.0375 
(0.0378) 
0.0041 
(0.0077) 
0.0297 
(0.0378) 
0.0030 
(0.0077) 
Partner income 0.0542*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0508*** 
(0.0106) 
0.0112*** 
(0.0021) 
Hukou status  
Rural  0.7475 
(0.6234) 
0.0138 
(0.0140) 
0.6263 
(0.6249) 
0.0134 
(0.0144) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories  
Rural× actual income  -0.0527 
(0.0601) 
-0.0124 
(0.0131) 
-0.0444 
(0.0602) 
-0.0105 
(0.0101) 
Rural× discrepancy between 
aspirations and income 
-0.0658 
(0.0638) 
-0.0162 
(0.0159) 
-0.0551 
(0.0639) 
-0.0136 
(0.0159) 
Rural× partner income -0.0144 
(0.0162) 
-0.0029** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0110 
(0.0163) 
-0.0021** 
(0.0009) 
Social demographic factors  
Age  -0.0527** 
(0.0183) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.0548** 
(0.0184) 
-0.0006 
(0.0007) 
Age2 0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
 0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
 
Number of children 0.0698** 
(0.0221) 
0.0173** 
(0.0079) 
0.0821** 
(0.0326) 
0.0202** 
(0.0080) 
Male  -0.0088 
(0.0450) 
-0.0022 
(0.0111) 
-0.0016 
(0.0451) 
-0.0004 
(0.0111) 
Married  0.8757** 
(0.3226) 
0.1380*** 
(0.0264) 
0.8322** 
(0.3228) 
0.1341*** 
(0.0284) 
Educational level 
Compulsory education 0.4675*** 
(0.1255) 
0.1165*** 
(0.0313) 
0.4565** 
(0.1257) 
0.1133*** 
(0.0313) 
Senior school 0.4965*** 
(0.1303) 
0.1336** 
(0.0374) 
0.4795** 
(0.1308) 
0.1280** 
(0.0372) 
University level 0.6082*** 
(0.1387) 
0.1694*** 
(0.0421) 
0.5786*** 
(0.1394) 
0.1596*** 
(0.0418) 
Health status  
Good health  0.6842*** 
(0.0705) 
0.1490*** 
(0.0146) 
0.6606*** 
(0.0754) 
0.1439*** 
(0.0147) 
Standard Health  0.2323** 
(0.0806) 
0.0605** 
(0.0220) 
0.2175** 
(0.0808) 
0.0562** 
(0.0219) 
Financial status 
Debt    -0.1749** 
(0.0508) 
-0.0411*** 
(0.0114) 
Social security  
Medical insurance    0.2588*** 
(0.0624) 
0.0583*** 
(0.0128) 
Pension insurance    -0.0006 
(0.9901) 
-0.0002 
(0.0120) 
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Note: (1) *, **, *** refer to 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels, respectively. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
     (2) ME presented in this table is average marginal effect. 
     (3) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
4.5.2 Further Analysis 
Graham & Felton (2005), Vendrik & Woltjer (2007), Knight et al. (2009) and Lam 
& Liu (2014) suggest that social comparison and social-economic status (SES) plays a 
critical role in determining individuals’ SWB. Knight et al. (2009) define the relative 
income by classifying respondents’ household income and living standard to much 
below average, below average, average, above average, or much average in their rural 
village. Therefore, following the measurement of socioeconomic status in Knight et al. 
(2009), further analysis in this chapter focuses on the effect of social comparison to test 
whether the similar happiness can be explained by SES
26
. All individuals were asked to 
evaluate their own economic standard relative to others in their community, based on 
their own income, their household income, savings and other assets. The answers are 
given on a 10-point scale from the bottom 1-significantly below average level to the top 
significantly above average level. In this chapter, levels 1, 2 and 3 are combined in the 
dummy variable “low economic status”. Levels 4, 5 and 6 are combined in a dummy 
variable “average economic status”. Levels 7, 8, 9 and 10 are combined in a dummy 
variable “high economic status”.  
It can be seen from Table 4-5 that, although urban workers have higher income and 
partner income, they report similar economic status to rural-urban migrants. Specifically, 
about 61.65% of urban people consider they are located at the average or high economic 
level, compared to 62.8% of rural migrants. The reason for the similar economic status 
                                                   
26 The measurement of SES in this chapter is different with that in the preceding Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, propensity 
score matching is utilized so that I need calculate the exact propensity score to match the urban hukou individuals and 
rural-urban migrants. If I used same method in Chapter 4 and combined several different levels together into three 
dummy variables, the PS score obtained from this approach is not precise enough for matching. For example, if levels 
1, 2 and 3 were combined in the “low economic status”, respondents reporting any levels among this category (lower 
economic status) would report the same PS score. Therefore, I think it is much better to regard the SES as a 
continuous variable to obtain the propensity score in Chapter 3. However, in most studies which analyze the effect of 
social status on subjective well-being, the variable of social status is utilized to classify all the individuals into 
different groups. People with relatively close answers can be classified as one group. Therefore, following previous 
studies, I transform the 10-point scale ordinal variable into few simple and straightforward dummy variables 
including lower socio-economic status, average status and higher socio-economic status.  
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is ascribed to the variable’s definition that respondents compare their economic status to 
other people in their own communities. Following the theory of social comparison 
(Festinger, 1954), individuals compare themselves to proximal others. Therefore, 
respondents compare their own income or household income to their friends, 
neighbours, colleagues and other people around them. 
Table 4- 5 Summary Statistics of Economic Status of Urban Worker and Rural 
Migrants 
 Urban (2076 observations) Rural (943 observations) 
Variables  Mean  Mean  
Low economic status 0.3834 0.3720 
Average status 0.5178 0.5536 
High economic status 0.0987 0.0744 
Note: China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
Although rural-urban migrants report lower income and partner income, they may not 
have a lower evaluation of their economic status because they are found to confine or 
narrow their reference groups (Knight et al., 2009). Most people around them, such as 
their friends, neighbours and colleagues, experience a similar situation. In addition, as 
discussed in Chapter 1 (introduction chapter), rural adults who work in urban cities left 
their parents, children or wife in countryside, and transfer income back to support their 
families in rural area. Thus, these rural-urban migrants can improve the living standards 
of families in rural area, in comparison to those families in which there is no one 
working in an urban city. Therefore, these migrants consider that the economic status of 
the entire family is in good condition. Due to the positive relationship between SWB 
and socio-economic status (Graham & Felton, 2005; Vendrik & Woltjer, 2007; and Lam 
& Liu, 2014), Hypothesis 7 is proposed.  
Hypothesis 7: Self-reported economic status has a positive impact on SWB.  
In addition, as with hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, the differential effect of 
economic status on SWB between urban people and rural-urban migrants should be 
taken into account. If economic status contributed more to urban hukou people, their 
happiness will increase more with the same extent of increase in economic status. 
Consequently, if this assumption is accepted, the similar happiness cannot be explained 
by economic status even though urban hukou respondents reported similar economic 
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status to their rural migrants. Therefore, I generated interaction terms between the 
economic status and a dummy variable of rural status, in order to investigate whether 
SWB is positively impacted on by the interaction terms, and propose Hypothesis 8. 
Hypothesis 8: There is a differential impact of economic status on SWB for rural-urban 
migrants with an increase in their economic status generating larger gains in SWB for 
rural migrants. Therefore, an interaction term between economic status and a dummy 
for rural migrants should be positive, in comparison with urban hukou workers.  
Table 4- 6 Ordered Probit Results for Different Specifications including Economic 
Status 
 Basic model Extended model 
 Coefficient  
(A) 
Marginal effect of 
very happy 
(B) 
Coefficient  
(C) 
Marginal effect of 
very happy 
(D) 
Income categories  
Actual income 0.0255** 
(0.0128) 
0.0052* 
(0.0031) 
0.0215* 
(0.0129) 
0.0043 
(0.0025) 
Partner income 0.0425*** 
(0.0106) 
0.0088*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0402*** 
(0.0107) 
0.0085*** 
(0.0021) 
Hukou status 
Rural  0.2890 
(0.3082) 
0.0026 
(0.0136) 
0.2556 
(0.3100) 
0.0021 
(0.0141) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories 
Rural× actual income 0.0121 
(0.0302) 
0.0028** 
(0.0010) 
0.0113 
(0.0303) 
0.0027* 
(0.0012) 
Rural× partner income -0.0195 
(0.0166) 
-0.0046*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0161 
(0.0166) 
-0.0071** 
(0.0022) 
Social demographic factors  
Age  -0.0425** 
(0.0184) 
-0.0003 
(0.0006) 
-0.0448** 
(0.0185) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
Age2 0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
 0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
 
Number of children 0.0043 
(0.0323) 
0.0104 
(0.0078) 
0.0534 
(0.0328) 
0.0129 
(0.0089) 
Male  -0.0154 
(0.0446) 
-0.0037 
(0.0108) 
-0.0100 
(0.0447) 
-0.0024 
(0.0108) 
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Table 4-6 Ordered Probit Results for Different Specifications including Economic 
Status (Continued) 
 Basic model Extended model 
 Coefficient  
(A) 
Marginal effect 
of very happy 
(B) 
Coefficient 
(C) 
Marginal effect 
of very happy 
(D) 
Married  0.9315** 
(0.3233) 
0.1411*** 
(0.0245) 
0.8957** 
(0.3235) 
0.1382*** 
(0.0259) 
Education level  
Compulsory education  0.4501*** 
(0.1258) 
0.1099*** 
(0.0307) 
0.4426*** 
(0.1260) 
0.1078*** 
(0.0307) 
Senior school 0.4516** 
(0.1304) 
0.1181** 
(0.0363) 
0.4407** 
(0.1309) 
0.1147** 
(0.0362) 
University level 0.5045*** 
(0.1379) 
0.1351** 
(0.0399) 
0.4845*** 
(0.1386) 
0.1288** 
(0.0398) 
Health status 
 
Good Health  0.6034*** 
(0.0756) 
0.1309*** 
(0.0148) 
0.5888*** 
(0.0759) 
0.1278*** 
(0.0149) 
Standard Health 0.2055** 
(0.0808) 
0.0521** 
(0.0214) 
0.1952** 
(0.0810) 
0.0493** 
(0.0223) 
Economic Status 
 
Average status 0.4271*** 
(0.0546) 
0.1030*** 
(0.0107) 
0.4091*** 
(0.0548) 
0.0980*** 
(0.0107) 
High economic status 0.6345*** 
(0.0942) 
0.1825*** 
(0.0262) 
0.6090*** 
(0.0945) 
0.1720*** 
(0.0260) 
Interaction between hukou status and financial status 
 
Rural× average status 0.0261 
(0.0963) 
0.0080*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0184 
(0.0965) 
0.0058*** 
(0.0003) 
Rural× high status 0.0253 
(0.1668) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0393 
(0.1669) 
0.0110*** 
(0.0023) 
Financial security  
 
Debt  
 
  -0.1363*** 
(0.0511) 
-0.0318** 
(0.0115) 
Social security 
 
Medical insurance   0.2120** 
(0.0628) 
0.0477*** 
(0.0131) 
Pension insurance    -0.0051 
(0.0487) 
-0.0012 
(0.0118) 
Note: (1) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels, respectively. 
(2) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
     (3) ME presented in this table is average marginal effect.  
(4) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
Table 4-6 shows the results of the ordered probit model, replacing income 
aspirations with economic status. As with Table 4-3, Columns A and B report the 
ordered probit coefficients and marginal effect of the basic model. Columns C and D 
report the ordered probit coefficients and marginal effects of the extended model. In 
general, the results for all the variables which are included in Table 4-3 remain the same. 
165 
 
For example, the interaction term between actual income and dummy of rural-urban 
migrants presents a positive effect on SWB. While the interaction between the dummy 
of rural migrants and partner income is negative as found in Table 4-3, the magnitude of 
the marginal effect of the interaction term between the dummy variable of rural hukou 
and actual income is smaller than that of the interaction between dummy of rural-urban 
migrants and partner income. In terms of economic status, individuals with higher 
economic status are happier than those reporting a lower economic status, supporting 
Hypothesis 7, which suggests that economic status has a positive association with SWB. 
To be specific, it can be seen from basic model of Table 4-6 that individuals reporting 
average economic status have a 10.30 percentage points higher probability of reporting 
being “very happy”, compared to people reporting low economic status. In addition, 
people with high economic status are 18.25 percentage points more likely to report 
being in the top category. 
Considering the differential effect of economic status on SWB between urban 
people and rural-urban migrants, the marginal effect of the interaction terms between 
dummy of rural-urban migrants and economic status shows a significant and positive 
effect on SWB. This reveals that economic status matters more for rural-urban migrants’ 
happiness. As can be seen from Column B of Table 4-6, the difference in the effect of 
average economic status on SWB between rural-urban migrants and urban people is 
0.80 percentage points. In addition, rural migrants, having higher economic status has a 
0.61 percentage points greater positive effect on SWB for rural-urban migrants, 
compared to their urban counterparts. Economic status contributes more to rural-urban 
migrants’ happiness compared to their urban counterparts, which supports Hypothesis 7. 
Consequently, a similar economic status between urban residents and rural-urban 
migrants is a potential reason to explain why the reported SWB of rural-urban migrants 
and urban people are similar. Overall, the differential effect of economic status helps to 
explain the similar SWB across rural-urban migrants and urban individuals, while 
income aspirations appear to have very little impact on SWB for both groups. 
Respondents’ economic status can balance happiness between urban individuals and 
rural-urban migrants, in line with many previous economic studies which explore the 
impact of income on happiness relatively. 
4.6 Conclusion 
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According to Knight et al. (2009), the difference in SWB between the preferred 
group and disadvantaged group is important to social stability. As discussed in Chapter 
2, rural-urban migrants are discriminated against and suffer from inequality in terms of 
income and occupation. Therefore, the difference in happiness levels between urban 
residents and rural-urban migrants plays an important role in determining Chinese social 
stability. However, few studies have considered the difference in SWB between these 
two groups. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the previous Chinese literature by 
comparing SWB between urban workers and rural-urban migrants, and explores the 
determinants of their SWB. In addition, motivated by Chapter 3, this chapter also 
contributes to the previous literature by estimating the impact on SWB from the aspect 
of income aspirations.  
Using the data CGSS 2010, which is the same as with Chapter 3, it is found that, 
rural-urban migrants report similar happiness to urban hukou individuals. Although 
rural-urban migrants have lower income and lower partner income, they also report 
lower aspiration income. However, the results show that aspiration income has no 
contribution to SWB. Although urban hukou individuals have higher income aspirations, 
the positive effect of their higher income cannot be offset by the aspiration income. In 
addition, further analysis is conducted to explain the similar SWB between rural-urban 
migrants and urban hukou individuals, in terms of social comparison. It has found that 
economic status has positive impact on SWB and matters more for rural-urban migrants’ 
SWB, compared to urban people. Thus, social comparison rather than income 
aspirations explains the similar SWB between rural-urban migrants and urban hukou 
individuals.  
Since the similar happiness level between urban residents and rural-urban migrants 
cannot be adequately explained by aspiration income, I follow previous studies which 
suggest that income influences happiness relatively, in order to estimate whether the 
social comparison can explain the similar happiness level between urban people and 
rural-urban migrants. Although rural-urban migrants have lower income, they evaluate 
themselves as having similar economic status to urban people. The results of the social 
comparison on happiness show that economic status positively influences SWB. People 
with higher economic status are happier than those with lower economic status. In 
addition, economic status contributes more to rural-urban migrants’ happiness, in 
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comparison to their urban counterparts. Hence, it is social comparison rather than 
income aspirations that can help to explain why rural-urban migrants have similar levels 
of happiness. 
As with most studies, there is limitation to this chapter’s model, as an endogeneity 
issue may exist. Firstly, there might be reverse causation as discussed in Stutzer (2004), 
unhappy people are likely to report higher income aspirations because these unhappy 
people consider that the levels of their happiness can be improved by higher income. In 
addition, there may be some unobserved and omitted factors, such as traits or 
characteristics that may not only influence the dependent variable SWB, but also have a 
relationship with the explanatory variables. This can cause the explanatory variables to 
be related to the disturbance term, which in turn leads to endogeneity problems. For 
example, an extroverted and positive person is more likely to feel happy. These people 
are also active in taking part in many social activities and communicating with their 
neighbours, friends, relatives and fellows during leisure time. These individuals may 
also be more likely to be influenced by others around them, which in turn influences 
their assessment of their aspirations. In this circumstance, the estimation of the impact 
of aspiration income on SWB may be upward-biased.  
Similarly, due to reverse causation and omitted factors, there may be endogeneity 
of actual income as well. Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener (2005) state that positive affect 
can foster skills, positive behaviour, sociability and activity, and effective conflict 
resolution capability. Consequently, happier people may be better at generating income 
or benefits. To be specific, an outgoing and optimistic person may be more positive and 
communicative in daily life and work, which helps them to improve themselves by 
communication with others. Therefore, these positive individuals are more likely to 
perform better and earn higher incomes. In addition, if there are also some unobserved 
and omitted factor such as personal traits of characteristics positively influenced 
respondents’ income as their impact on aspirations, the estimated coefficient of actual 
income on SWB would be upward-biased as well.   
An appropriate empirical approach to deal with endogeneity is an instrumental 
variable, which ideally will influence the endogenous explanatory variables only with 
no impact on the SWB. Following previous studies like Chau et al. (2007), Knight & 
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Gunatilaka (2010), Li et al. (2011), Knight & Gunatilaka (2012), potential instrumental 
variables for actual income are language ability, siblings’ income, and father’s education 
attainment. In CGSS 2010, only the father’s education level is available. When I tried to 
utilized father’s education attainment to deal with the potential endogenous problem for 
income, I found that father’s education is not relevant with the actual income 
unfortunately so that it is not suitable as instrument variable (IV) for income, based on 
my dataset.27  
In considering potential instrumental variables for aspiration income, Stutzer 
(2004) indicates that it is difficult to find a suitable instrument, as both aspiration and 
SWB are attitudes. Stutzer (2004) applies the proportion of rich people in the same 
community and its interaction term with the frequency of contact with neighbours as an 
instrument to overcome the endogeneity. However, due to the limitation of the dataset 
(CGSS 2010), there is no available information for such instrumental variables for 
aspiration income, unfortunately. Lagged variables of endogenous explanatory variables 
can be also utilized as instrumental variables; however, this approach of seeking can 
only be applied for time series or panel data. Unfortunately, CGSS 2010 is a 
cross-sectional dataset and is not suitable for this approach. Overall, considering the 
potential endogenous problems in this chapter, there is limited information to obtain 
available and valid instrumental variables. Consequently, it is difficult for me address 
the endogenous problem at the moment, a limitation of this chapter’s study.  
                                                   
27 Both the estimation from the conditional mixed process (CMP) in ordered probit model and the two-stage least 
square (2SLS) in linear regression model show that father’s education attainment is not relevant with actual income 
unfortunately. The estimation results are shown in Table 4-14 in the appendix.  
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4.7 Appendix 
Table 4- 7 Marginal Effect of Basic Model 
 Not at all happy Not happy Neutral  Happy  Very happy 
Income categories 
Actual income 
 
-0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0035** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0063** 
(0.0022) 
0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
0.0093*** 
(0.0032) 
Aspiration income -0.0005 
(0.0008) 
-0.0016 
(0.0029) 
-0.0028 
(0.0052) 
-0.0007 
(0.0013) 
0.0041 
(0.0077) 
Partner income -0.0014*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0046*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0083*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0019*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0021) 
Hukou status  
Rural  -0.0021 
(0.0015) 
-0.0065 
(0.0049) 
-0.0105 
(0.0091) 
0.0053 
(0.0039) 
0.0138 
(0.0140) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories 
Rural× actual income -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0022** 
(0.0010) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0038** 
(0.0016) 
Rural× aspiration income 0.0018 
(0.0013) 
0.0061 
(0.0044) 
0.0109 
(0.0089) 
-0.0025 
(0.0022) 
-0.0162 
(0.0159) 
Rural× partner income  0.0006** 
(0.0001) 
0.0017** 
(0.0007) 
0.0024** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0017** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0029** 
(0.0005) 
Social demographic factors  
Age  -0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
Number of children -0.0019** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0064** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0117** 
(0.0054) 
0.0027** 
(0.0011) 
0.0173** 
(0.0079) 
Male  0.0002 
(0.0012) 
0.0008 
(0.0041) 
0.0015 
(0.0075) 
-0.0003 
(0.0017) 
-0.0022 
(0.0111) 
Married  -0.0592 
(0.0409) 
-0.1206* 
(0.0554) 
-0.1260*** 
(0.0271) 
0.1678** 
(0.0760) 
0.1380*** 
(0.0264) 
Educational attainment  
Compulsory education -0.0144** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0430*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0723*** 
(0.0172) 
0.0132** 
(0.0043) 
0.1165*** 
(0.0313) 
Senior school -0.0124** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0406*** 
(0.0099) 
-0.0759*** 
(0.0174) 
-0.0047 
(0.0084) 
0.1336** 
(0.0374) 
University  -0.0125*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0465*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.0950*** 
(0.0190) 
0.0155 
(0.0130) 
0.1694*** 
(0.0421) 
Health status  
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Good Health  -0.0230*** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0736*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.1184*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0661*** 
(0.0120) 
0.1490*** 
(0.0146) 
Standard health -0.0060** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0200** 
(0.0066) 
-0.0368** 
(0.0120) 
0.0023 
(0.0025) 
0.0605** 
(0.0220) 
Note: (1) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels, respectively.  
(2) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
(3) ME presented in this table is average marginal effect. 
(4) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 4- 8 Marginal Effect of Extended Model 
 Not at all happy  Not happy Neutral  Happy  Very happy 
Income categories 
Actual income 
 
-0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
-0.0029** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0054** 
(0.0022) 
0.0012** 
(0.0006) 
0.0079** 
(0.0032) 
Aspiration income -0.0004 
(0.0008) 
-0.0012 
(0.0029) 
-0.0020 
(0.0052) 
0.0005 
(0.0012) 
0.0030 
(0.0077) 
Partner income -0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0043*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0079*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0018*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0112*** 
(0.0021) 
Hukou status  
Rural  -0.0019 
(0.0015) 
-0.0060 
(0.0050) 
-0.0100 
(0.0093) 
0.0045 
(0.0039) 
0.0134 
(0.0144) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories 
Rural× actual income -0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0001) 
0.0031** 
(0.0014) 
Rural× aspiration income 0.0014 
(0.0013) 
0.0049 
(0.0046) 
0.0091 
(0.0087) 
-0.0020 
(0.0018) 
-0.0136 
(0.0159) 
Rural× partner income  0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0013** 
(0.0006) 
0.0020** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0021** 
(0.0009) 
Social demographic factors 
Age  -0.00002 
(0.00006) 
-0.00004 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006 
(0.0007) 
Number of children -0.0022** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0075** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0137** 
(0.0054) 
0.0031**  
(0.0014) 
0.0202** 
(0.0080) 
Male  0.0001 
(0.0012) 
0.0001 
(0.0041) 
0.0003 
(0.0075) 
-0.0001 
(0.0017) 
-0.0004 
(0.0111) 
Married  -0.0526 
(0.0375) 
-0.1123** 
(0.0548) 
-0.1225*** 
(0.0306) 
0.1533* 
(0.0736) 
0.1314*** 
(0.0284) 
Educational attainment  
Compulsory education -0.0137** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0416** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0706** 
(0.0173) 
0.0126** 
(0.0041) 
0.1133*** 
(0.0313) 
Senior school -0.0117** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0391*** 
(0.0099) 
-0.0736*** 
(0.0177) 
-0.0037 
(0.0079) 
0.1280** 
(0.0372) 
University  -0.0117*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0443*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0909*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0128 
(0.0121) 
0.1596*** 
(0.0418) 
Health status  
Good Health  -0.0214*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0701*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.1146*** 
(0.0129) 
0.0621*** 
(0.0118) 
0.1439*** 
(0.0147) 
Standard status  -0.0056** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0187** 
(0.0066) 
-0.0345** 
(0.0121) 
0.0025 
(0.0022) 
0.0562** 
(0.0219) 
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Financial security   
Debt  0.0051** 
(0.0018) 
0.0170*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0296** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0105** 
(0.0044) 
-0.0411*** 
(0.0114) 
Social security    
Medical insurance -0.0083** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0264*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.0439*** 
(0.0108) 
0.0203** 
(0.0077) 
0.0583*** 
(0.0128) 
Pension insurance 0.0001 
(0.0013) 
0.0001 
(0.0044) 
-0.0001 
(0.0008) 
-0.00002 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0120) 
Note: (1) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels, respectively.  
(2) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
(3) ME presented in this table is average marginal effect. 
(4) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 4- 9 Marginal Effects of the Ordered Probit Results for Discrepancy 
between Income Aspirations and Actual Income (Basic Model) 
 Not at all 
happy 
Not happy Neutral  Happy  Very happy 
Income categories 
Actual income 
 
-0.0015** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0051** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0091* 
(0.0051) 
0.0007** 
(0.0002) 
0.0134** 
(0.0054) 
Discrepancy between aspirations and 
income (aspiration income(ln)- 
actual income (ln)) 
-0.0005 
(0.0008) 
-0.0016 
(0.0029) 
-0.0028 
(0.0052) 
-0.0007 
(0.0013) 
0.0041 
(0.0077) 
Partner income -0.0014*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0046*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0083*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0019*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0021) 
Hukou status  
Rural  -0.0021 
(0.0015) 
-0.0065 
(0.0049) 
-0.0105 
(0.0091) 
0.0053 
(0.0039) 
0.0138 
(0.0140) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories 
Rural× actual income 0.0016 
(0.0012) 
0.0051 
(0.0039) 
-0.0087 
(0.0059) 
-0.0020 
(0.0015) 
-0.0124 
(0.0131) 
Rural× discrepancy between 
aspiration and actual income 
0.0018 
(0.0013) 
0.0061 
(0.0044) 
0.0109 
(0.0089) 
-0.0025 
(0.0022) 
-0.0162 
(0.0159) 
Rural× partner income  0.0006** 
(0.0001) 
0.0017** 
(0.0007) 
0.0024** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0029** 
(0.0005) 
Social demographic factors  
Age  -0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
Number of children -0.0019** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0064** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0117** 
(0.0054) 
0.0027** 
(0.0011) 
0.0173** 
(0.0079) 
Male  0.0002 
(0.0012) 
0.0008 
(0.0041) 
0.0015 
(0.0075) 
-0.0003 
(0.0017) 
-0.0022 
(0.0111) 
Married  -0.0592 
(0.0409) 
-0.1206* 
(0.0554) 
-0.1260*** 
(0.0271) 
0.1678** 
(0.0760) 
0.1380*** 
(0.0264) 
Educational attainment  
Compulsory education -0.0144** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0430*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0723*** 
(0.0172) 
0.0132** 
(0.0043) 
0.1165*** 
(0.0313) 
Senior school -0.0124** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0406*** 
(0.0099) 
-0.0759*** 
(0.0174) 
-0.0047 
(0.0084) 
0.1336** 
(0.0374) 
University  -0.0125*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0465*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.0950*** 
(0.0190) 
0.0155 
(0.0130) 
0.1694*** 
(0.0421) 
Health status  
Good Health  -0.0230*** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0736*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.1184*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0661*** 
(0.0120) 
0.1490*** 
(0.0146) 
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Standard health -0.0060** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0200** 
(0.0066) 
-0.0368** 
(0.0120) 
0.0023 
(0.0025) 
0.0605** 
(0.0220) 
Note: (1) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels, respectively.  
(2) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
(3) ME presented in this table is average marginal effect. 
(4) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 4- 10 Marginal Effects of the Ordered Probit Results for Discrepancy 
between Income Aspirations and Actual Income (Extended Model) 
 Not at all 
happy 
Not happy Neutral  Happy  Very happy 
Income categories 
Actual income 
 
-0.0012** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0041** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0074* 
(0.0039) 
0.0017 
(0.0010) 
0.0109** 
(0.0034) 
Discrepancy between aspiration 
and income(aspiration(ln)-actual 
income(ln)) 
-0.0004 
(0.0008) 
-0.0012 
(0.0029) 
-0.0020 
(0.0052) 
-0.0005 
(0.0012) 
0.0030 
(0.0077) 
Partner income -0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0043*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0079*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0018*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0112*** 
(0.0021) 
Hukou status  
Rural  -0.0019 
(0.0015) 
-0.0060 
(0.0050) 
-0.0100 
(0.0093) 
0.0045 
(0.0039) 
0.0134 
(0.0144) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories 
Rural× actual income 0.0012 
(0.0011) 
0.0042 
(0.0033) 
0.0073 
(0.0055) 
-0.0024* 
(0.0012) 
-0.0105 
(0.0101) 
Rural× discrepancy between 
aspiration and actual income 
0.0014 
(0.0013) 
0.0049 
(0.0046) 
0.0091 
(0.0087) 
-0.0020 
(0.0018) 
-0.0136 
(0.0159) 
Rural× partner income  0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0013** 
(0.0006) 
0.0020** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0021** 
(0.0009) 
Social demographic factors 
Age  -0.00002 
(0.00006) 
-0.00004 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006 
(0.0007) 
Number of children -0.0022** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0075** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0137** 
(0.0054) 
0.0031** 
(0.0014) 
0.0202** 
(0.0080) 
Male  0.0001 
(0.0012) 
0.0001 
(0.0041) 
0.0003 
(0.0075) 
-0.0001 
(0.0017) 
-0.0004 
(0.0111) 
Married  -0.0526 
(0.0375) 
-0.1123** 
(0.0548) 
-0.1225*** 
(0.0306) 
0.1533* 
(0.0736) 
0.1314*** 
(0.0284) 
Educational attainment  
Compulsory education -0.0137** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0416** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0706** 
(0.0173) 
0.0126** 
(0.0041) 
0.1133*** 
(0.0313) 
Senior school -0.0117** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0391*** 
(0.0099) 
-0.0736*** 
(0.0177) 
-0.0037 
(0.0079) 
0.1280** 
(0.0372) 
University  -0.0117*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0443*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0909*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0128 
(0.0121) 
0.1596*** 
(0.0418) 
Health status  
Good Health  -0.0214*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0701*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.1146*** 
(0.0129) 
0.0621*** 
(0.0118) 
0.1439*** 
(0.0147) 
Standard status  -0.0056** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0187** 
(0.0066) 
-0.0345** 
(0.0121) 
0.0025 
(0.0022) 
0.0562** 
(0.0219) 
Financial security 
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Debt  0.0051** 
(0.0018) 
0.0170*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0296** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0105** 
(0.0044) 
-0.0411*** 
(0.0114) 
Social security  
Medical insurance -0.0083** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0264*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.0439*** 
(0.0108) 
0.0203** 
(0.0077) 
0.0583*** 
(0.0128) 
Pension insurance 0.0001 
(0.0013) 
0.0001 
(0.0044) 
-0.0001 
(0.0008) 
-0.00002 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0120) 
Note: (1) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels, respectively.  
(2) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
(3) ME presented in this table is average marginal effect. 
(4) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 4- 11 Marginal Effect of Basic Model including Economic Status 
 Not at all happy Not happy Neutral  Happy  Very happy 
Income categories  
Actual income 
 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0019* 
(0.0010) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0021) 
0.0008* 
(0.0005) 
0.0052* 
(0.0031) 
Partner income -0.0010** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0059*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0014** 
(0.0004) 
0.0088*** 
(0.0021) 
Hukou status  
Rural  -0.0010 
(0.0016) 
-0.0025 
(0.0050) 
-0.0031 
(0.0089) 
0.0039 
(0.0061) 
0.0026 
(0.0136) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories 
Rural× actual income -0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0011** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0020* 
(0.0010) 
0.0006* 
(0.0004) 
0.0028** 
(0.0010) 
Rural× partner income  0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
0.0018* 
(0.0010) 
0.0032* 
(0.0017) 
-0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0046*** 
(0.0008) 
Social demographic factors  
Age  -0.00004 
(0.00006) 
-0.00004 
(0.0002) 
0.00008 
(0.0004) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0006) 
Number of children -0.0011 
(0.0009) 
-0.0039 
(0.0029) 
-0.0070 
(0.0053) 
0.0016 
(0.0012) 
0.0104 
(0.0078) 
Male  0.0004 
(0.0012) 
0.0014 
(0.0040) 
0.0025 
(0.0073) 
-0.0006 
(0.0016) 
-0.0037 
(0.0108) 
Married  -0.0629 
(0.0415) 
-0.1260** 
(0.0545) 
-0.1296*** 
(0.0247) 
0.1774* 
(0.0950) 
0.1411*** 
(0.0245) 
Educational attainment  
Compulsory education -0.0132** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0402** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0688*** 
(0.0172) 
0.0124** 
(0.0041) 
0.1099** 
(0.0307) 
Senior school -0.0108** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0363** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0687** 
(0.0178) 
-0.0023 
(0.0041) 
0.1181** 
(0.0363) 
University  -0.0101*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0387*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.0794** 
(0.0199) 
-0.0069 
(0.0097) 
0.1351** 
(0.0399) 
Health status  
Good Health  -0.0183*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0618*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.1038*** 
(0.0131) 
0.0531** 
(0.0110) 
0.1309*** 
(0.0148) 
Standard status -0.0052** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0174** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0322** 
(0.0120) 
0.0026* 
(0.0019) 
0.0521** 
(0.0214) 
Financial status  
Average economic status -0.0108*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0399*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0739*** 
(0.0082) 
0.0217*** 
(0.0047) 
0.1030*** 
(0.0107) 
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High economic status -0.0096*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0406*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0935*** 
(0.0104) 
-0.0388** 
(0.0132) 
0.1825*** 
(0.0262) 
Interaction between hukou status and financial status  
Rural× average status -0.0001*** 
(0.00001) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0051*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0080*** 
(0.0030) 
Rural× high status -0.0009*** 
(0.00003) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0034*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0021) 
Note: (1) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels, respectively.  
(2) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
(3) ME presented in this table is average marginal effect. 
(4) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 4- 12 Marginal Effect of Extended Model including Economic Status 
 Not at all happy Not happy Neutral  Happy  Very happy 
Income categories  
Actual income 
 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
-0.0016 
(0.0010) 
-0.0029 
(0.0022) 
0.0007 
(0.0005) 
0.0043 
(0.0025) 
Partner income -0.0009** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0031*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0013** 
(0.0004) 
0.0085*** 
(0.0021) 
Hukou status  
Rural  -0.0009 
(0.0016) 
-0.0023 
(0.0051) 
-0.0028 
(0.0092) 
0.0038 
(0.0061) 
0.0021 
(0.0141) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories 
Rural× actual income -0.0004** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0010* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0018 
(0.0025) 
0.0005** 
(0.0001) 
0.0027* 
(0.0012) 
Rural× partner income  0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0015* 
(0.0009) 
0.0026 
(0.0017) 
-0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0071** 
(0.0022) 
Social demographic factors  
Age  -0.00009 
(0.00006) 
0.00007 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
Number of children -0.0014 
(0.0009) 
-0.0048 
(0.0029) 
-0.0087 
(0.0054) 
0.0020 
(0.0013) 
0.0129 
(0.0089) 
Male  0.0003 
(0.0011) 
0.0009 
(0.0040) 
0.0016 
(0.0073) 
-0.0004 
(0.0016) 
-0.0024 
(0.0108) 
Married  -0.0574 
(0.0389) 
-0.1195** 
(0.0542) 
-0.1271*** 
(0.0275) 
0.1658* 
(0.0935) 
0.1382*** 
(0.0259) 
Educational attainment  
Compulsory education -0.0127** 
(0.0046) 
-0.0393** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0677*** 
(0.0173) 
0.0120** 
(0.0040) 
0.1078** 
(0.0307) 
Senior school -0.0104** 
(-0.0034) 
-0.0353** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0677** 
(0.0180) 
-0.0018 
(0.0068) 
0.1147** 
(0.0362) 
University  -0.0096*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0372** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0764** 
(0.0203) 
-0.0056 
(0.0091) 
0.1288** 
(0.0398) 
Health status  
Good Health  -0.0174*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0598*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.1013*** 
(0.0132) 
0.0508*** 
(0.0108) 
0.1278*** 
(0.0149) 
Standard status  -0.0048** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0165** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0306** 
(0.0121) 
0.0026 
(0.0018) 
0.0493** 
(0.0223) 
Financial status  
Average economic status -0.0101*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0377*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0704*** 
(0.0083) 
0.0202*** 
(0.0045) 
0.0980*** 
(0.0107) 
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High economic status -0.0092*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0391*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.0896*** 
(0.0106) 
-0.0342** 
(0.0125) 
0.1720*** 
(0.0260) 
Interaction between hukou status and income categories 
Rural× average status -0.0002*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.00009) 
-0.0038*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0058*** 
(0.0003) 
Rural× high status -0.0009*** 
(0.00006) 
-0.0028*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0051*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0021** 
(0.0005) 
0.0110*** 
(0.0023) 
Financial security  
Debt  0.0037** 
(0.0016) 
0.0127** 
(0.0050) 
0.0226** 
(0.0086) 
-0.0072** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0318** 
(0.0115) 
Social security  
Medical insurance  -0.0063** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0207** 
(0.0050) 
-0.0353** 
(0.0106) 
0.0145** 
(0.0065) 
0.0477*** 
(0.0131) 
Pension insurance -0.0001 
(0.0013) 
0.0005 
(0.0043) 
0.0008 
(0.0079) 
-0.0002 
(0.0018) 
-0.0012 
(0.0118) 
Note: (1) *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, 1% significant levels, respectively.  
(2) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
(3) ME presented in this table is average marginal effect. 
(4) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 4- 13 Order Probit Model for Rural Migrants and Urban People 
Separately 
 Rural-urban migrants  Urban people  
 Coefficient 
(A) 
Marginal effect 
of very happy 
(B) 
Coefficient 
(C) 
Marginal effect of 
very happy (D) 
Income categories  
Actual income 0.0339** 
(0.0138) 
0.0110** 
(0.0035) 
0.0289** 
(0.0136) 
0.0078** 
(0.0033) 
Aspirations income  -0.0248 
(0.0547) 
-0.0062 
(0.0138) 
0.0340 
(0.0383) 
0.0077 
(0.0093) 
Partner income 0.0453** 
(0.0140) 
0.0111*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0523*** 
(0.0108) 
0.0134*** 
(0.0026) 
Social demographic factors  
Age  -0.0605** 
(0.0183) 
-0.0010 
(0.0012) 
-0.0504** 
(0.0235) 
-0.0006 
(0.0008) 
Age2 0.0011** 
(0.0004) 
 0.0006** 
(0.0003) 
 
Number of children 0.0798** 
(0.0221) 
0.0201** 
(0.0084) 
0.9002*** 
(0.0306) 
0.0291** 
(0.0108) 
Male  -0.0490 
(0.0891) 
-0.0123 
(0.0222) 
-0.0013 
(0.0527) 
-0.0002 
(0.0128) 
Married  0.7875** 
(0.2915) 
0.1713*** 
(0.0191) 
0.8439** 
(0.2351) 
0.1124*** 
(0.0330) 
Educational level 
Compulsory education 0.4890*** 
(0.1771) 
0.1268*** 
(0.0333) 
0.3973** 
(0.1806) 
0.1011** 
(0.0483) 
Senior school 0.5192*** 
(0.1938) 
0.1555** 
(0.0619) 
0.4457** 
(0.1842) 
0.1113** 
(0.0494) 
University level 0.6078** 
(0.2734) 
0.1861** 
(0.0925) 
0.5097** 
(0.1914) 
0.1393*** 
(0.0522) 
Health status  
Good health  0.6039*** 
(0.1498) 
0.1148*** 
(0.0296) 
0.6942*** 
(0.0879) 
0.1504*** 
(0.0173) 
Standard health  0.1985** 
(0.0705) 
0.0528 
(0.0414) 
0.2755** 
(0.0935) 
0.0634** 
(0.0253) 
Financial status 
Debt  -0.2084** 
(0.0815) 
-0.0505** 
(0.0190) 
-0.1545** 
(0.0654) 
-0.0397** 
(0.0144) 
Social security  
Medical insurance  0.2696** 
(0.1139) 
0.0619** 
(0.0237) 
0.2907*** 
(0.0759) 
0.0578*** 
(0.0150) 
Pension insurance  -0.1082 
(0.0831) 
-0.0278 
(0.0218) 
-0.0461 
(0.0607) 
-0.0113 
(0.0150) 
Note: (1) It can be seen that there is no difference in the significance and direction for the variables except for 
income, aspiration income and partner income between urban people and rural-urban migrants. Although there is a 
slight difference in the magnitude, this chapter mainly focuses on the contribution of aspiration income and actual 
income to SWB so that I only set up interaction terms for these key variables in my analysis.  
(2) China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized. 
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Table 4- 14 Relationship between Income and Father’s Education (Potential 
Instrument Variable) 
 Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Father education level 
Compulsory education -0.0911 0.0725 -0.1292 0.0898 
Senior school -0.0085 0.1114 -0.0166 0.0919 
University level 0.0365 0.1554 0.0032 0.1408 
Other exogenous variables 
Rural   3.6286*** 0.9168 1.3242** 0.6120 
Aspiration income 0.8726*** 0.0529 0.9019*** 0.0672 
Partner income 0.0304* 0.0158 0.0218 0.0200 
Age  0.0258 0.0271 -0.0050 0.0256 
Age square -0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
Number of kid -0.0458 0.0475 -0.0639 0.0451 
Male  0.5659*** 0.0659 0.4077*** 0.0581 
Married  0.2088 0.4973 0.4109 0.5848 
Compulsory education  0.1247 0.0895 0.1622** 0.0776 
Senior school 0.2262** 0.1170 0.2791** 0.1098 
University level 0.9120*** 0.2089 0.9247*** 0.2162 
Good health 0.3822** 0.1120 0.3420** 0.1312 
Standard health 0.4149** 0.1215 0.4004** 0.1358 
Note: China General Social Survey 2010 is utilized.          
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The hukou system (household registration system) divides the Chinese labour 
market into a dual structure which is composed of urban hukou and rural hukou 
individuals. This thesis focuses on exploring whether the dual characteristics of Chinese 
society has a series of negative impacts on the labour market in three aspects, including 
discrimination, economic development and social stability. Chapter 2 describes the 
phenomenon of inequality in the Chinese urban labour market, in terms of income and 
occupation distribution, and analyses whether the inequality in the Chinese urban labour 
market is attributed to hukou discrimination. Chapter 3 investigates whether 
discrimination in the urban labour market restricts rural-urban migrants’ aspirations, 
motivation or ambitions, which in turn negatively influence the economic development 
of China. Chapter 4 compares the subjective well-being (SWB) between urban people 
and rural-urban migrants in urban China, and also estimates the impact of aspiration 
income on SWB. The main findings of each chapter are discussed below. The policy 
implications, limitations and suggestions for future work are also discussed at the end of 
this section.  
With the reform of the hukou system, an increasing number of people in rural areas 
have migrated to urban cities and looked for suitable jobs. However, most of them suffer 
from unequal treatment in urban China, in comparison to their urban counterparts. 
Motivated by the inequality in the Chinese urban labour market, Chapter 2 investigates 
whether the different treatment of rural-urban migrants and urban people are ascribed to 
hukou discrimination, using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). 
Unlike most previous Chinese studies, I take occupation segregation into account and 
utilize the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition in Chapter 2. I find that 11.64% more 
rural-urban migrants would have been employed in white collar jobs (senior 
professional, junior professional, administrative/executive/manager, office staff) if they 
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were treated the same as their urban counterparts. In addition, about 12% less 
rural-urban migrants would have been employed in blue collar jobs if they were treated 
the same as urban people. In comparison with the results from using the Oaxaca & 
Ransom (1994) decomposition without selectivity correction, the estimated results 
taking occupation segregation into account show that the total explained part from the 
decomposition results decreases to 69% and the unexplained part increases to 31%, 
which suggests that Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) decomposition underestimates the 
unexplained portion (discrimination). In addition, a large proportion of the wage 
differential is attributed to occupation segregation. The lower wages for rural-urban 
migrants is mainly due to the fact that they are restricted to obtain a higher standard job. 
Overall, the findings from the analysis suggest that occupational segregation faced by 
rural-urban migrants is more important in urban China, and this situation is mostly 
ascribed to the rural migrants’ human capital investments, i.e. their lower education 
level. 
Motivated by the wage discrimination and occupation segregation between 
rural-urban migrants and urban people investigated in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 contributes 
to previous Chinese studies by examining empirically whether hukou discrimination 
restricts rural-urban migrants’ aspirations. Using data from the China General Social 
Survey 2010 (CGSS 2010), it is found that rural-urban migrants report lower income 
aspirations in comparison to urban people. Both the estimated results from OLS 
regressions and propensity score matching show that although rural-urban migrants 
suffer from discrimination in urban labour market, their income aspirations are not 
directly influenced by hukou discrimination. The explanation may be due to the 
following reasons: firstly, hukou discrimination may have no impact on restricting 
rural-urban migrants’ income aspirations, even though they suffer from different 
treatment in the urban labour market. Rural-urban migrants may have already become 
accustomed to long-term discrimination. Secondly, hukou discrimination may determine 
rural-urban migrants’ income aspiration indirectly. To be specific, people in rural areas 
are faced with different information and resources, and have more limited access to a 
good quality education. Moreover, unlike urban families, most rural families cannot 
afford the expensive tuition fees to attend university. Consequently, most of them are 
more likely to start working rather than pursuing further study. Their lower educational 
levels, indirectly caused by hukou discrimination, can restrict their income aspirations.  
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Following the previous two chapters, rural-urban migrants are faced with hukou 
discrimination in terms of wage and occupation opportunities, but their lower income 
aspirations seem not to be driven by hukou discrimination. Motivated by the previous 
two chapters, Chapter 4 investigates whether rural-urban migrants also have lower 
subjective well-being, and how their income aspirations shape their SWB in comparison 
to urban hukou individuals. Using the same dataset (CGSS 2010) as in Chapter 3, it is 
found that rural-urban migrants report similar SWB as their urban counterparts, 
although they have lower income. However, it is also found that the income aspirations 
have no significant impacts on individuals’ SWB. The higher income aspirations of 
urban people do not offset the positive effect of their higher income on SWB. Moreover, 
there is no difference in the effect of aspirations on SWB between rural-urban migrants 
and urban people as well. Therefore, the similar SWB between urban people and 
rural-urban migrants cannot be explained by aspirations. In order to explain the similar 
SWB between rural-urban migrants and urban individuals, I follow previous studies and 
consider whether social comparisons shape their SWB. It is found that economic status 
positively influences SWB, and that it has a larger impact on rural-urban migrants’ 
happiness compared to urban individuals. Therefore, the findings suggest that it is social 
comparison rather than aspiration income that explains the similar SWB between 
rural-urban migrants and urban people.   
In summary, the conclusion of the whole thesis is that the hukou system still 
influences Chinese society and its urban labour market. Rural-urban migrants suffer 
from occupation segregation, which in turn exacerbates wage differentials. Moreover, 
rural-urban migrants have less access to social welfare. Although rural-urban migrants 
are still discriminated against in the urban labour market, their ambition or aspirations 
are not found to be directly influenced by hukou discrimination. Their lower income 
aspirations may be attributed to other factors, such as their educational background. In 
addition, although rural-urban migrants suffer from different treatment in the urban 
labour market, they still have similar levels of SWB to urban hukou residents. 
5.2 Policy Implications 
Although this thesis cannot be regarded as evidence for policy formulation, it can 
provide useful information for policy makers. Based on the empirical analysis in this 
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thesis, the distribution of resources between rural and urban areas and the reform of the 
hukou system should be highlighted. Firstly, the resource allocation should be balanced 
between the urban and rural areas. The educational resources in urban areas are superior 
to those in rural areas; thus the probability of urban students being admitted to 
university is much higher than for rural students. As a result, these highly educated 
urban people are more likely to obtain a good job with higher wages and better welfare. 
Additionally, rural people are aware of the poor educational resources in rural areas, and, 
as a result, they are reluctant to spend much money and time on educational investments. 
Individuals with such awareness will devote themselves to work instead. These 
outcomes can negatively affect long-term economic growth in China. Under the 
situation where the hukou system still exists, it is necessary to guarantee the educational 
resources as equal as possible in urban and rural areas, to ensure that rural students have 
the same probability as equally talented urban students of receiving a higher education 
or being admitted to universities.   
In addition to the equalization of the resource distribution, policy formulation 
should also concentrate on the hukou system itself. For example, policy makers should 
focus on how rural hukou individuals can obtain urban hukou status or how rural people 
can enjoy the same rights as urban people, as it is currently difficult for rural people to 
change their hukou status. First of all, the reform of the hukou system should gradually 
relax the restrictions on population movement and variations of hukou status. Secondly, 
the two-tier society in China should be transformed into an integrated one, specifically 
the integration of the social security systems between urban and rural individuals. It 
should actively play the role of the government in embodying the principle of fairness 
in the social security system. In 2016, the Interim Regulations of Residence Permit was 
decreed in order to decrease the differences in social security treatments and basic 
public services between urban people and rural-urban migrants. Following the Interim 
Regulations of Residence Permit, if one person migrates to an urban city with a year 
legal residency and job, he/she can obtain a residence permit. In addition, he/she can 
enjoy the same basic public services as other local urban residents. However, there are 
still some limitations to the resident permit (i.e., the resident permit cannot replace 
hukou registration). Although rural-urban migrants having resident permits can enjoy 
most basic public services, there are still some rights that migrants cannot enjoy. For 
example, rural migrants have no access to buying a house or a car in the urban areas that 
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they migrate to, nor can they gain legal assistance. Moreover, in the absence of local 
urban hukou, there is no access to schools for rural-urban migrants’ children in local 
urban area. These public services should be the responsibility of the local government, 
but these problems continue to result from citizens’ hukou status.   
In addition, basic public services do not include social welfare and social security, 
such as pensions insurance, unemployment benefits, allowances, resident medical 
insurance, and housing subsidies. These are implemented based on hukou status. If a 
rural migrant wishes to enjoy the same standard of social welfare and security, they 
must have a local urban hukou. The extent of public services that migrants can enjoy 
varies across cities. For some higher standard items, such as health care, there is still no 
access for rural migrants with a resident’s permit. These examples show that equality 
between citizens with rural hukou and urban hukou has not been achieved by the Interim 
Regulations of Residence Permit. Recently, several coastal cities have started to carry 
out a “credit settling” policy. Migrants can obtain corresponding credit based on their 
work achievements, length of residence, educational background, and so on. Migrants 
with higher educational attainments and better jobs have a higher probability of 
obtaining a local urban hukou. At the moment, “credit settling” is a step in the right 
direction to obtain equality between rural-urban migrants and urban residents in urban 
cities, but it still maintains the duality of the hukou system and is only available in 
certain areas. The national government should implement a form of “credit settling” for 
the whole country in order to help capable rural-urban migrants obtaining local urban 
hukou.  
5.3 Research Limitations and Further Study  
There are some limitations to the analysis in the thesis. Firstly, due to very limited 
references in terms of the theoretical and technical approach on addressing the selection 
issue in the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition, it is difficult for me to obtain 
appropriate information to address the selection issue in Chapter 2 using the Brown et al. 
(1980) decomposition. When I compare the estimation of the Oaxaca & Ransom 
decomposition (1994) with and without selectivity correction, it can be seen that the 
sample selection issue has an impact on the estimated results. The unexplained portion 
in the Oaxaca & Ransom decomposition (1994) without selectivity correction is 
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downward biased; therefore, my estimation results based on the Brown et al. (1980) 
decomposition underestimate the actual discrimination faced by rural-urban migrants in 
the Chinese urban labour market. In the future, if a more systematic and specific 
approach to address the selectivity in the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition is 
introduced, or some other more advanced approach is put forward, I will consider the 
wage differential and occupation segregation in Chinese urban labour market in more 
depth.  
In addition, the second limitation of this thesis should be ascribed to the dataset 
China General Social Survey 2010 (CGSS 2010) used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Due 
to the problems of reverse causation and omitted variables, there are potential 
endogeneity problems in both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The limitations of the China 
General Social Survey (CGSS 2010) also make it difficult for me to find appropriate 
and corresponding instrumental variables for those endogenous explanatory variables 
(e.g. actual income and income aspirations). As the endogeneity issue cannot be 
addressed effectively by the CGSS 2010 dataset, the estimated results of these chapters 
may be biased. Nevertheless, the information of income aspirations can only be 
obtained from the CGSS 2010 at the moment. If there is a new survey dataset that 
includes information of aspirations appears in the future, it is worthwhile to investigate 
the questions in Chapters 3 and Chapter 4 further and try to overcome the existing 
endogeneity problems.  
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